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Abstract 
In 2014, European heads of state selected new targets for the EU as part of 
the 2030 climate and energy framework. The targets will guide the ambition 
and nature of EU policy in this area until 2030 and are likely to have important 
implications for Europe’s transition to a low-carbon economy. The decision 
taken by the European Council was preceded by several years of vigorous 
interaction between interest groups, the European Commission and the 
member states. The outcome of this interaction set the agenda for EU 
climate and energy policy but the role of interest groups in climate and 
energy policy, especially relative to important economic ideas, is relatively 
under researched. By augmenting and applying the multiple streams 
approach developed by John Kingdon in the 1980s and using process-
tracing techniques, this thesis contributes a detailed case study of this 
important instance of European interest representation. It is found that the 
complex and dynamic political context for the interaction made planning and 
executing advocacy campaigns challenging for all actors. The debate about 
the 2030 framework is shown to hinge on the idea of technology-neutrality 
and its status on the policymaking agenda. A number of policy coalitions are 
observed with a wide range of characteristics, some novel. Several attempts 
at ‘policy entrepreneurship’ by interest groups are recorded but most were 
disrupted by the confused and fast-changing political situation. It is shown 
that a combination of spill-over between policy windows, framing and 
coalition building activity served to push the idea of technology neutrality up 
the agenda. The multiple streams approach is shown to be broadly 
applicable to the research context and aims but greater agency over policy 
windows than originally assumed must be granted to actors and the 
possibility for successful policy entrepreneurship to yield unintended policy 
outcomes allowed for. 
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Preface: Europe blinks 
Guidebooks recommend that the traveller visit Brussels in the spring or autumn, 
known as the ‘shoulder seasons’. The weather is cooler than in high summer, 
the crowds less frenetic and hotel prices more moderate. Although there is a 
downside; in common with most of North West Europe, Brussels in autumn can 
spend days or weeks at a time stewing under an insulating blanket of 
oppressive low, grey cloud.   
On one such cool, overcast Thursday morning in autumn 2014, the European 
Council met at 175 rue de la Loi. The monumental pink granite building, named 
for sixteenth-century Flemish philosopher, Justus Lipsius, is the venue for the 
quarterly summits of the heads of state and government of the EU’s member 
states known as the European Council. 
At this particular summit, on the 23rd of October, the twenty-eight politicians 
were due to take a decision with implications for Europe’s energy system, the 
environment and the global climate. The decision was set to shape the priorities 
for EU’s climate and energy policy between 2020 and 2030. The European 
Council was working from proposals made by the EU’s executive, the European 
Commission, which proposed that several ‘targets’ be set for 2030. 
Recommendations had been made for the level and nature of the targets, 
backed up by hundreds of pages of analysis. 
Like any big decision, the ‘EU 2030’ framework was riven by trade-offs and 
compromises. With climate change accepted as a real and epoch-defining 
challenge and transforming Europe’s dirty energy systems into sustainable ones 
proving extremely complex, the stakes were high. Some countries wanted to 
move faster than others. There were disagreements over the proper role for 
Europe in promoting specific clean technologies. The strongly held differences 
of opinion about the right way ahead meant that the potential for disagreement 
around the huge oval table was palpable.  
And then, in the face of what many describe as the “greatest challenge of our 
time”, Europe blinked. 
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The consensus that emerged from the European Council that day represented a 
significant change in course from the one set just seven years earlier by the 
2020 targets. The overall target for emissions reduction was the lowest that 
could be said to be commensurate with the EU’s goal of deep decarbonisation 
by 2050 – itself informed by the desire to limit global temperature increase to 
2̊C. The targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency were both low and 
will not carry any legal weight. Politics was seen to have trumped the climate. 
But many of the critical choices that determined the outcome had not been 
taken by the Council at all. They had been taken, in fact, in the months and 
years leading up to the meeting and were contained in the European 
Commission’s proposals, published earlier in 2014. By the time the prime-
ministers, presidents and chancellors took their allocated seats that morning, 
the ‘2030 framework’ and the ideas it represented had been debated, discussed 
and raked over by scores of experts and analysts in Brussels and elsewhere – 
relatively few of whom held official positions in the EU.  
In the course of developing their proposals, the European Commission had 
consulted national and European interest groups. These same interests had 
prepared and published proposals of their own. They had undertaken modelling 
exercises, formed coalitions. They had plotted, planned, persuaded and sought 
at every turn to make their mark on the options that faced Europe’s leaders that 
dreary Thursday in October. 
So, while the grand politics of the summit table played a role in defining the 
2030 climate and energy framework, so did the intense activity of a small 
community of interest groups – lobbyists and campaigners - living and working 
within a few kilometres of the Justus Lipsius building.  This thesis tells that 
story. 
 
European Council, 23rd October 2014 (source: European Council)  
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Chapter 1. Introduction, context and 
literature 
 
“Of the gladdest moments in human life, methinks, 
is the departure upon a distant journey into 
unknown lands” - Richard Francis Burton 
 
This chapter sets out the context for the research that follows and provides and 
overview of the thesis and a brief review of relevant literature. It is broken into 
seven sections. Section 1.1 describes the research context including a brief 
history of EU energy policy. Section 1.2 reviews existing studies on the topic of 
EU energy policy and policymaking, 1.3 introduces and reviews the literature on 
European interest representation, 1.4 reviews the burgeoning literature on 
socio-technical transition and transformation. Section 1.5 then develops a 
research question while section 1.6 describes the structure of the thesis and 
section 1.7 summarises and concludes the introduction. 
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1.1 Research context 
Human influence on the earth’s climate system is occurring, largely as the result 
of emission of greenhouse gases. The negative consequences of these 
changes are being felt by societies across the world and unless emissions are 
reduced radically, these impacts are very likely to become more severe (IPCC, 
2014a). The European Union (EU) is the world’s third largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases1, 80% of which is associated with energy production, 
conversion, transportation and use (European Environment Agency, 2014a).  
The EU is also a unique political entity and its nature is often captured by the 
concept of a system of multi-level governance in which decision-making 
involves the interaction of a wide range of state and non-state actors (Hooghe 
and Marks, 2001). It is built on a series of treaties which pool the sovereignty of 
its member states in certain areas and support a range of supranational 
policymaking institutions. From a purely functional perspective, the EU exists to 
provide common goods in areas where cooperation provides benefits relative to 
unilateral action, such as transnational markets or climate action (Peterson and 
Shackleton, 2012). But aggregating the national interests of what is, at the time 
of writing, a bloc of twenty-eight sovereign states and the institutions that 
administer the Union is far from a purely technical business; it is inherently and 
profoundly political. 
1.1.1 Europe’s energy policy journey 
There can be little doubting that the European Union is a major force in many 
policy domains from agriculture to international trade - and energy policy has 
been central to the story of the EU since its earliest days. In the 1950s, creating 
a common market in coal and steel, the primary basis of military power, under 
the oversight of a new authority was seen as an important means of ensuring 
interdependence between the nations of Europe (especially France and 
Germany) which would make war “not merely unthinkable, but materially 
impossible” (Schuman, 1950). But, despite the fact that energy cooperation was 
at the heart of the Treaty of Paris which established the European Coal and 
                                            
1 Behind China and the USA 
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Steel Community (ECSC)  - beginning the process of European integration in 
1951 (Lucas, 1977) - the European Commission did not have legal competence 
to act in the field of energy under the 1957 Treaty of Rome which created the 
European Economic Community, the direct antecedent of the EU. Nevertheless, 
making use of its competence in other areas, most notably trade harmonisation, 
a number of energy measures were introduced by the Commission in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, beginning with an instrument known as ‘the Protocol of 
Agreement on Energy Problems’ in 1964 (Benson and Russel, 2015; Lucas, 
1977; Weyman-Jones, 1986; Cameron, 2011, p.125). Until the late 1980s, the 
EC Commission's Directorate-General responsible for energy was limited to 
energy research and producing forecasts (Matlary, 1998).  
The institutional reform set in train by the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 
and the subsequent drive towards a general European 'internal market' formally 
brought energy onto the European agenda (Matlary, 1998). The inclusion of an 
energy section in what became the Maastricht Treaty which formally created the 
European Union in 1992 was proposed but did not make the final text (Duffield 
and Birchfield, 2011). The 1990s saw slow progress in energy integration with a 
lack of will on the part of the Member States to act on proposals by the 
European Commission preventing a collective response to the energy 
challenges of the time (Duffield and Birchfield, 2011). Without formal 
competence to act on energy issues, the institutions of the EU made use of the 
mandate they did have in other areas, such as market liberalisation and the 
environment, to impact on energy (Duffield and Birchfield, 2011). The first years 
of the twenty-first century witnessed a profusion of action on energy. Energy 
supply concerns, climate change and the drive to create an internal energy 
market all played a role in raising energy up the EU's agenda. These concerns 
saw the inclusion of an energy title in 2009’s reform to the legal basis of the EU, 
the Lisbon Treaty.  
1.1.1.1 Climate and energy policy emerges 
Prompted by an emerging understanding of the threat posed by climate change, 
from the late 1980s the EU began tentative moves towards implementing a 
Europe-wide policy to limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 1992 the 
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European Commission proposed a tax on carbon dioxide and energy2 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1992) with the current Director 
General for Climate Action, Jos Delbeke, a key figure in its promotion (Convery, 
2009). There was fierce resistance to the proposals, from some member states 
(especially the UK) on grounds of fiscal sovereignty. Industry, largely 
represented by the confederation of European business (UNICE, later to 
become BUSINESSEUROPE) opposed it on grounds of both scepticism of the 
case for climate action and the effectiveness of a tax to realise emissions 
reductions (Ikwue and Skea, 1994; Liberatore, 1995). The proposals were 
eventually dropped.  
Despite the European Commission’s (failed) resistance to carbon trading within 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, following the protocol’s signature and the ensuing 
international bargaining over ratification, the idea of a European emissions 
trading system took hold. In the autumn of 2001, a design for an emissions cap-
and-trade system covering installations in the electricity and industrial sectors 
was proposed3. The Council of the European Union and the European 
Parliament adopted a text in October 20034 and trading in the EU Emissions 
Trading System (EU-ETS) began in January 2005 (Wettestad and Jevnaker, 
2016). 
A turning point in the story of energy and the EU was an informal summit at 
Hampton Court, UK, in 2005 at which, led by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
leaders of the EU countries agreed that ways towards greater cooperation on 
energy and climate change should be found (Birchfield, 2011; Skjærseth, 2013; 
Eikeland, 2012; Mcgowan, 2011). The disruption of gas supplies to parts of the 
community due to a dispute between Russian and Ukrainian gas companies in 
2006, as well as the EU’s burgeoning role as a leader in global climate action 
also added to a new political commitment to EU energy action, one of the most 
visible manifestations of which was the 2020 climate and energy package 
                                            
2 COM(92)226 
3 COM (2001) 581 
4 Directive 2003/87/EC 
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agreed in 2007. Designed to meet part of the EU's three-fold energy goals of 
clean, secure and competitive energy, the package consisted of what became 
known as the 202020 targets. The targets included a commitment to a 20% 
reduction in emissions (30% in the event of a global deal on climate change), an 
increase of EU energy consumption from renewable sources to 20%, and a 
20% improvement in energy efficiency. In 2009 the renewable energy target 
was implemented in the form of a European Directive, legally binding the 
Member States, to produce a specified proportion of their energy consumption 
from renewables (European Commission, 2009c) while energy efficiency 
legislation has been implemented through a non-binding Directive issued in 
2012. Progress towards both targets appears to be more or less on track if 
somewhat aided by reduced energy demand resulting from poor economic 
performance (European Environment Agency, 2014b; Bergamaschi et al., 2014; 
also see appendix 2).  
While many areas of climate and energy policy remain separate, notably the 
internal market and the EU’s external energy policy, the 2020 energy package 
symbolised the partial merging of climate policy and energy policy – a change 
which some authors suggest created favourable political conditions for high 
ambition in the targets for 2020 (Wettestad et al., 2012; Skjærseth, 2014). The 
new climate and energy policy area consists primarily of renewable energy 
policy, energy efficiency policy and the EU-ETS. The merger process is on-
going with the introduction by European President Jean-Claude Juncker of a 
dedicated Commissioner for climate and energy in 2014. 
In 2009, the UN-administered process for reaching international agreement on 
climate change saw the 15th ‘Conference of the Parties’ or COP15, held in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. At the conference, which was widely hoped would 
produce a significant deal on global emissions reduction efforts, the EU had 
high hopes for building on its position as a leader on climate policy 
(demonstrated by the 202020 package) by helping to ensure a meaningful 
climate agreement (Dimitrov, 2010). 
Despite the EU’s statement of ambition and apparent willingness to act as an 
international leader on the topic of climate change (Skovgaard, 2013, p.1141), 
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the Copenhagen negotiations did not result in other nations adopting similarly 
ambitious climate goals. The outcome of the Copenhagen summit is commonly 
described as unsuccessful or even disastrous for the EU (Skovgaard, 2013; 
Dimitrov, 2010). 
Between them, the project to create a liberal internal energy market and the 
202020 package of climate and energy targets has had profound impacts on the 
energy situation in EU member states. Renewable energy penetration in the 
energy mix of the EU has increased dramatically with the policies designed to 
implement the 2020 renewable energy target deemed largely responsible 
(European Commission, 2013e; Duscha et al., 2016). 
1.1.1.2 Targets for 2030 
In the years following COP15 in Copenhagen, with the expiry of the 2020 
ambition looming, the terms of a new framework for energy and climate 
cooperation was negotiated for the period between 2020 and 2030. Given the 
significance of the impact of the 202020 package on the energy production and 
use in EU member states, the targets for 2030 are an important test of Europe’s 
ability to maintain the transformative trajectory established by the 202020 
targets. But, despite the similarity in content, negotiating the new package was 
not a replay of the historic 202020 agreement. The game had changed: this 
time the European Commission had been granted formal competence in the 
field of energy by the Lisbon Treaty, the Union has grown by three Member 
States and all of the players from national, EU, non-governmental and private 
interests have had seven years to reflect on what works and what does not 
when negotiating European Climate and Energy policy. At the same time, 
factors such as the success of Eurosceptic parties to increase their 
representation in the European Parliament at the 2014 elections (European 
Parliament, 2014b), the on-going Eurozone crisis leading to poor economic 
performance across Europe (Elliott, 2014) and perennial concerns about gas 
prices and supplies following radical changes to the gas market in the US as 
well Europe's status as a net energy importer (BBC, 2014) and questions over 
Europe’s role in global climate negotiations (Groen et al., 2012) provided the 
context for the negotiations. 
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On 23rd October 2014, the heads of state and governments of the twenty-eight 
Member States met at the European Council to decide the content of the 2030 
climate and energy policy goals, based on policy proposals from the European 
Commission. As a result, they agreed a framework within which the EU aims to: 
 emit 40% less greenhouse gas in 2030 than it did in 1990;  
 to produce 27% of the energy consumed in the Union from renewable 
sources; and  
 reduce energy consumption by 27% compared to a projection derived 
from a 2007 reference case (European Council, 2014).  
Some action on increasing electrical interconnection to integrate the EU’s 
‘energy islands’ was also agreed against opposition from countries, notably 
France, which perceive greater regionalisation of electricity infrastructure as a 
threat to important national industries (European Council, 2014; Oliver, 2014a).  
The conclusions of the European Council were the subject of significant 
bargaining between member states with concessions extracted by various 
countries. Most strikingly a group of ten of the poorer countries of Eastern and 
Central Europe including the Bulgaria, Romania and the Visegrad group of 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary5 negotiated what Poland’s 
Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz described as a ‘win’ (Euractiv, 2014k). These 
countries were able to use the threat of a veto of the package to obtain a 
continued exclusion of parts of their electricity systems from the European 
Emissions Trading System (ETS) cap and trade scheme and access to an 
energy system modernisation reserve based on ETS revenues (European 
Council, 2014). 
1.1.1.3 Policy change: the significance of the 2030 framework 
The scope and structure of the package of targets are notable in two ways. 
Firstly, the overall level of the targets is lower than many advocates of climate 
action had hoped for (e.g. E3G, 2014b; de Vos et al., 2014). The ‘at least’ 40% 
reduction in GHG emissions has been calculated by the European Commission 
                                            
5 Classified in the text as countries with GDP per capita below 60% of the EU average 
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to be the very minimum level commensurate with meeting the target of an 80-
95% reduction in emissions (compared to 1990) by 2050, set by the European 
Council in 2009. The renewable energy target, at 27%, is acknowledged by the 
European Commission to be more or less what could be expected to be 
produced by renewables in the absence of any target (European Commission, 
2014h). The rates of change implied by the three 2030 targets are also less 
ambitious than those implied by the 2020 targets – or, indeed, the rates of 
growth achieved to date6. 
Secondly, the package also rules out individual national targets for energy 
efficiency and renewable energy determined at a European level with the 
targets either ‘indicative’ with no legal weight (in the case of the energy 
efficiency target) or binding only at a European level (as for the renewable 
energy target) (European Commission, 2014b; European Council, 2014). As will 
be shown in the following chapters, the move away from a renewable energy 
target, legally binding on the member states to a framework within which 
member states are free to choose their own target, is important for a number of 
reasons. Firstly it indicates that ambitious European level agreement on the 
goals and means of energy policy has become more difficult since the 202020 
package was agreed in 2007. Secondly, it demonstrates a clear shift towards 
policy which prefers not to ‘pick winners’ among energy technologies, placing 
less emphasis on supporting specific technology groups such as renewables at 
the European level. By relaxing the requirement for member states to pursue 
technology specific policies, the EU made a choice, which this thesis argues 
can be described as inherently more ‘technology-neutral’ than the 202020 
package of policies. 
This shift towards a more ‘technology-neutral’ approach to energy policy is 
significant because it stands at odds to much of burgeoning literature on 
sustainability transitions and transformations discussed in the next chapter, 
which suggests that a successful energy system transformation - a “messy, 
conflictual, and highly disjointed process” (Meadowcroft, 2009, p.324) - is likely 
                                            
6 See the appendix for a more detail analysis of the ambition level implied by the targets 
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to require policy intervention focussed on specific technologies, rather than 
simply ‘allowing the market’ to choose between a range of low-carbon energy 
alternatives (Solomon and Krishna, 2011). It also shows that the distributional 
implications of transitions mean that shifting from an ‘old’ energy system to a 
‘new’ one will always be inherently and unavoidably political (Meadowcroft, 
2011).  
1.1.1.3.1 Outside interests and the 2030 agenda 
While the European Council agreed the 2030 climate and energy targets, the 
choices facing the heads of state in October 2014 were set out in a number of 
proposals made by the European Commission during that same year with the 
final package very close in content to that proposed by the Commission. The 
Commission’s proposals, in turn, were shaped by an intensive period of 
discussion among a community of policy experts from industry, business and 
other ‘civil society’ interests – as well as the staff of the European Commission, 
which consulted formally on its proposals in 2013.  
It is the nature and impact of this early discussion among policy experts that are 
the primary focus of this thesis; especially the role played by business and civil 
society groups in shaping this policy in the months and years ahead of the 
European Council in October 2014. As later chapters discuss (see page 49), 
this early discussion of policies and ideas is often described as ‘agenda 
building’ or ‘agenda setting’ (Cobb and Elder, 1972; Jones and Baumgartner, 
2005), 
1.2 Studies of European Union energy policy 
Having provided the policy context in the previous section, this section reviews 
the literature on EU energy policy and policymaking. 
The complexity and fundamental importance of the policy area has inspired a 
recent surge in scholarly work explicitly examining the politics of European 
climate and energy policy (Duffield and Birchfield, 2011). The account given in 
Janne Haaland Matlary's (1998) 'Energy Policy in the European Union', while 
comprehensive, ends a decade before the Hampton Court Summit at which EU 
climate and energy policy was politically re-booted in 2005. Some more recent 
work on EU energy and climate policy provides useful and more up-to-date 
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accounts (e.g. Buchan, 2009; Buchan and Keay, 2014; Buchan, 2013; 
Kanellakis et al., 2013; Rowlands, 2005), but are often purely descriptive and 
without explicit reference to the theoretical assumptions about political life that 
underpin them. Several recent publications, which do focus on energy and 
climate policy through the theoretical lenses afforded by European studies and 
political science, conclude that EU energy policy is undergoing a 'supranational 
turn'. It is argued that it is becoming more distinctly European, increasingly 
driven by supranational institutional and industrial factors rather purely 
intergovernmental negotiations (e.g. Eikeland, 2008; 2011; Eising, 2002; 
Maltby, 2013; Boasson and Wettestad, 2013). A fairly recent, wide-ranging 
collection of work is found in an edited volume brought together by Duffield and 
Birchfield (2011). The contributions, bound by the theme of Europe's progress 
towards a 'common energy policy', covers important areas of energy policy, 
provide case studies of several EU Member States' relationships with the EU as 
well as discussing the implications for energy policy of the institutional 
peculiarities of the Union.  
The breadth of energy policy at the EU level and, to some extent, the division of 
responsibility between the Directorates-general in the Commission has led to a 
disaggregation of the topic by some authors into the parallel topics of the 
internal energy market and energy and climate change e.g. (Helm, 2014b) and 
many studies focus on one or other side of this divide, focussing on one or other 
aspect such as the internal market (e.g. Eikeland, 2004; 2011) or renewable 
energy policy (e.g. Solorio et al., 2014). Work on the politics of the 2030 targets, 
in particular, is thin on the ground. The results of one study into the case that 
has emerged are focussed on explaining the fact that the renewable energy 
target included in the package was less binding than the target included in the 
202020 package. The paper, by Alexander Bürgin, places the internal dynamics 
of the European executive body, the European Commission, at the centre of its 
explanation with a particular focus on the policy preferences and political skills 
of the Energy Commissioner, Günther Oettinger (Bürgin, 2015). 
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1.3 European interest representation 
This thesis is primarily interested in the role played by business and civil society 
interests in shaping the 2030 targets. This section reviews the scholarly field of 
this kind of ‘interest representation’, especially in a European context. 
The EU has been the subject of academic study since the earliest days of 
European integration following the Second World War. For many years, 
scholars focused on understanding the integration phenomenon, with some 
authors arguing that the European Communities (and later the EU) were an 
example of the creation of a new kind of supranational polity while others drew 
attention to the continued domination of the European nation state. See Haas 
(2003) for an exposition of the former point of view, known as neofunctionalism 
and Hoffmann (1966)7 for the basis of the latter, intergovernmentalism. While 
these intellectual approaches attempted to grapple with the phenomenon of the 
European integration in order to answer the questions ‘what is European 
integration? and ‘how is it possible? In response to an intellectual impasse in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s between the two schools, later research tended 
to take a more comparative approach with a plurality of methodological 
approaches taken to illuminating particular facets of the EU, such as the policy 
making processes by which the EU takes decisions (Rosamond, 2000). 
The influence of interest groups and the power of business and civil society in 
the policy process has been of interest to scholars for at least a century (Woll, 
2007) and, arguably, a great deal longer than that (e.g. Machiavelli, 2010). The 
‘participatory’ rather than exclusively ‘representative’ role played by non-official  
actors in a democracy has been discussed for several decades (Pateman, 
1970; Saurugger, 2008). The activity of these interest and their relationship to 
politics and policymaking can be seen as fundamental to questions of 
democracy and governance (Schmitter, 1974; 1977). 
While environmental groups became increasingly potent political forces through 
the 1980s and 1990s (Rawcliffe, 1995; 1998), it has also been shown that the 
activity of interest groups can have a significant impact on the route and rate of 
                                            
7 See also Moravcsik (1998) 
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energy transitions and transformations (Cherp et al., 2016). This section 
surveys some of the key concepts and literature that define this area of study. 
Classical models of 'interest representation' or ‘interest intermediation’ can be 
grouped into two basic theoretical categories, corporatism and pluralism 
(Schmitter, 1974), both alternatives to statism (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 2003). 
Corporatism assumes the granting of monopolies of representation to a limited 
number of private interests by the state, while pluralism assumes that interests 
are negotiated among an unspecified number of organisations, with no 
monopoly granted or licensed by the state (see Dryzek and Dunleavy, 2009 for 
a good overview of the concept; as well as Dahl, 1978). Later ‘neo-pluralist’ 
thinking about the nature of pluralism holds that, rather than treating all interests 
symmetrically, the existence of a market system leads to a situation in which 
capital – represented by the interests of corporations – holds more power over 
policy than other interests (Lindblom, 1982).  
While this thesis starts from an agnostic position about the relative power of 
different classes of actor, it is clear that the threshold to involvement in the EU 
policymaking is rather high and policy process is more accessible to some 
people than others. The relationship between the institutions of the EU and 
external interests is sometimes described as a form of ‘élite pluralism’ in which 
access is not restricted or managed by the institutions but is “a system where 
access is generally restricted to a few policy players [or élites], for whom 
membership is competitive and strategically advisable, but not compulsory or 
enforceable as [it is in] the corporate model” (Coen, 1997, p.98).  
The perceived success of businesses to obtain favourable outcomes in political 
contexts leads many researchers and others to try and understand the power of 
interest groups and how it is wielded (for example, Gray and Lowery, 1996; 
Lowery and Gray, 1998; 2004; 2005; Balanyá et al., 2003; Dür and De Bièvre, 
2007; Mazey and Richardson, 2001).  
Nevertheless, power has been shown to be expressed in more nuanced ways 
than a simple expression of ‘winners and losers’ and is difficult or impossible to 
observe directly. Instead, a fruitful research agenda might focus on 
systematically observing some of the elements that are known to contribute to 
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power such as access to policymakers and actors’ resources (Woll, 2007; 
Klüver, 2011). 
It is observed in the literature that, due to the fact that access to policy 
engagement and influence tends to be restricted to formal and legislative bodies 
during the later stages of policy formulation, legislation and implementation, 
outside interests tend to have the greatest impact during the earliest phase of a 
policy’s life (Birkland, 2010; Princen, 2007). This period is often described as 
the ‘agenda setting’ phase, a concept that will be explored in Chapter 2. 
The EU, compared to the population which it serves, is relatively underfunded 
and its institutions require outside input in many policy areas, leading to intense 
relationships between policymakers and interest groups (Majone, 1994; 
Richardson and Coen, 2009). A surge in EU lobbying activity in the last two 
decades or so has been accompanied by similar growth in studies of interest 
group activity, both sectoral, empirical overviews and theoretical contributions 
with debates about the nature and implications of this type of engagement still 
contentious (Richardson and Coen, 2009; Greenwood, 2011; Bouwen, 2002; 
Coen, 2007a; Adelle and Anderson, 2013; Curtin, 2003; Mahoney, 2007). There 
is also a thriving business in producing ‘how-to’ guides for EU lobbyists (e.g. de 
Cock, 2010; Geiger, 2012; van Schendelen, 2013). Wide variations are 
observed between policy areas, institutional venues, organisation type, stage of 
the policy process, type of actor and other factors, making systematic 
understanding of the phenomenon of interest representation challenging 
(Greenwood, 2011; Richardson and Coen, 2009; Long and Loerinczi, 2009; 
Warleigh, 2006). In common with other areas of EU studies, there is a wide 
variance in researchers ‘parent’ disciplines which may include international 
relations, comparative politics, policy analysis or democratic theory which can 
cause some confusion (Eising, 2008). 
As the number of studies into interest representation in the EU grows, it is 
inevitable that a growing section is focussed on climate and energy policy. 
Some of these studies tend to frame lobbying and interest group activity as an 
explanatory factor in a particular policy outcome rather than the prime object of 
the analysis (Gullberg, 2008; Wettestad, 2009). Some studies look in detail at 
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specific policy debates such as that of early ETS reform (Wettestad, 2009) while 
others look at the climate policy area more generally (Gullberg, 2008). While 
comprehensive studies have been produced into the EU climate and energy 
policy making, the role of interest groups is generally overlooked (Tosun et al., 
2015; Skovgaard, 2013). No scholarly studies have yet been published which 
explicitly focus on the role of interest groups in the EU 2030 climate and energy 
targets.  
1.3.1 The importance of framing in interest representation 
An important strategy used by interest groups is that of ‘framing’. Framing is a 
strategy by which an actor exploits ambiguity (see section 2.3.2.1 on page 57) 
which gives policy issues multiple possible dimensions to ‘spin’ the issue or 
attempt to emphasize particular aspects of the problem or its solution (Eising et 
al., 2015; Boräng et al., 2014; Klüver et al., 2015; Voltolini and Eising, 2016). 
Framing is, in effect, a communications technique that selects and highlights 
some features of reality while omitting others (Entman, 1991). 
In policy debates, framing is of particular importance during the early stages of 
the debate in which there is the most scope for introducing new ideas and when 
an activity known as ‘agenda setting’ (see section 2.2.2 on page 49) is in 
progress (Klüver et al., 2015; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). As policy 
debates involve increasing numbers of actors, so ‘frame competition’ intensifies 
in which actors frame and counter-frame to attempt to establish the primacy of 
their frame. It is also apparent that in these competitive situations it is difficult for 
any particular actor’s frame to ‘win the day’ (Eising et al., 2015, p.531). Since 
the early days of their rise to political prominence, environmental groups have 
been shown to be especially adept at framing the ‘issues’ which ‘form the 
debate’ (Rawcliffe, 1998, p.9). 
Despite the importance of framing in influencing public policy outcomes, the 
understanding of how it functions within and across policy domains remains 
relatively underdeveloped (Klüver et al., 2015; Eising et al., 2015). 
1.4 Technology, transitions and transformations  
In order to analyse climate and energy policy, it is necessary to consider the 
fundamental objectives of the policy. In the case of the 2030 targets, the 
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ultimate aim is to contribute to Europe’s ‘transition’ to a sustainable, low-carbon 
economy (European Commission, 2014b). This section provides an overview of 
the key concepts contained in the literature about sustainability transitions and 
transformations. It also introduces and describes the idea of technology-
neutrality, which later chapters will show to be an important factor in the policy 
debate about the 2030 targets. 
Achieving the EU’s stated goal of near complete decarbonisation by 2050 
(European Council, 2009) will require a radical change in the way that energy is 
produced and consumed. While some steps can be made through incremental 
means such as the improved operation of existing technology, the scale of 
change required to reduce emissions as far and as fast as has been indicated 
to be necessary demands ‘system innovation’ (Elzen et al., 2004). In other 
words, the ‘relatively stable configurations of institutions, techniques and 
artefacts’ or ‘socio-technical system’ (STS) that encompasses the various 
elements of the energy system will need to ‘transition’ from its current state to 
some sustainable future state (Geels, 2002; Kern and Howlett, 2009). The 2030 
targets’ stated goal is to contribute to the transition of the EU’s energy system 
(European Commission, 2014b).  
To some, the concept of a ‘singular’ or ‘scalar’ transition from one state to 
another through time is reductive and unable to fully reflect the implications of 
uncertainty, power and diversity inherent in the move to environmental 
sustainability. Instead the concept of a plural, vector or open transformation is 
invoked in which progress is “best represented, not as a single-track ‘race’, but 
as palimpsests of branching counterfactual paths” (Stirling, 2010; 2011, p.83; 
2014). For the purposes of this this thesis, however, the distinction between 
transition and transformation is somewhat less relevant with the critical point 
being that major change is required and that the specific policy action – 
including at the EU level  - can and is playing a part in enabling or restraining 
that change. 
It is also important to observe that in order to successfully traverse a transition 
or transformation, new technology must be accompanied by ‘new markets, user 
practices, regulations, infrastructures and cultural meanings’ (Geels et al., 
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2004). A growing literature on the topic of socio-technical transitions and 
transformations underpins several assertions about their nature relevant to this 
study:  
 First, analysis of historical transitions demonstrates they do not happen 
by accident and rarely, if ever, happen quickly (Solomon and Krishna, 
2011); 
 Second, an important ‘steering’ role for public authorities is ascribed. 
This role is especially important in overcoming ‘lock-in’ or returns to scale 
of dominant unsustainable technologies or practices (Verbong and 
Geels, 2007; Kern and Howlett, 2009); and 
 Third, distributional impacts and implications for transitions mean that 
successful navigating a path to a sustainable energy system will be 
inherently political – there may be losers as well as winners. Factors 
such as interests, institutions and ideas matter in the same way as policy 
does in determining transitional or transformational outcomes 
(Meadowcroft, 2009; 2011; Stirling, 2014).  
These insights tell us firstly that the swing in EU climate and energy policy 
towards a less managed, market-driven transition pathway may have significant 
implications for the effectiveness of the transition European politicians claim to 
be pursuing with a technology neutral approach to policy less likely to bring 
about the scale or rate of change required (Azar and Sandén, 2011). The 
impact of the 202020 targets from 2007 on renewable energy growth8 shows 
how potent the EU-level steering role can be (European Environment Agency, 
2014b). Transitions and transformations research also illustrates that the 
political nature of transformation opens up the politics of  this kind of change as 
a fruitful area for research (Meadowcroft, 2009).  
1.4.1 The idea of technology-neutrality 
The idea of ‘technology-neutrality’ is a perennial point of discussion in debates 
about the environment, climate change and sustainable energy (Azar and 
Sandén, 2011) and can be traced back to the work of British economist Arthur 
                                            
8 See Figure 22 on page 128 for more detail 
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Pigou in the 1920s. Pigou built on Alfred Marshall’s observation in 1890 that 
certain activities had distinctly different implications for private firms than for 
wider society. Marshall described the concept in terms of internal and external 
economies, a principal now most often described as ‘externalities’. The principle 
suggests that a private firm, acting to maximise profits will not fully reflect in its 
decision-making costs borne by the whole of society. Environmental pollution 
might be one such ‘negative externality’, with profit-seeking firms producing 
more pollution than is socially optimal. Pigou made the case that, in such 
circumstances, government action was justified in the form of a tax which 
effectively puts a price on the externality to ‘internalise’ the cost within firms, 
with the intention of influencing their decision-making to reduce or eliminate it 
(Pigou, 2013; Marshall, 2009). While not a tax, the EU-ETS is Pigouvian in that 
it seeks to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions to internalise their negative 
impact on the climate and encourage emissions reduction such as investment in 
lower-emission technology (Heindl and Löschel, 2012; Haar and Haar, 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Arthur Cecil Pigou 
Since emissions pricing systems such as the EU-ETS do not specify the 
technology choices9 that can be made to reduce emissions, they are often 
                                            
9 In general, the main ‘low-carbon’ energy supply technologies are renewable energy sources which, by 
definition, rely on limitless natural resources and do not emit GHGs; nuclear energy, which is being 
pursued by some member states (especially the UK and Czech Republic; and carbon capture and storage 
technology which allows the use of fossil fuels for electricity generation with climate damaging carbon 
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described as ‘technology-neutral’. But there are many reasons why a 
technology-neutral approach may not achieve policymakers’ climate goals, at 
least on its own (Azar and Sandén, 2011). The most pronounced of these are 
firstly the general failure of economy-wide policies such as carbon prices to 
encourage adequate investment in the often risky business of research and 
development (R&D) into the technologies needed to mitigate emissions, often 
for reasons of path dependence of the energy socio-technical system (IPCC, 
2014b). A second problem with technology neutrality emerges from the 
literature on socio-technical transitions and transformations. It is argued that 
enabling transition requires the “shielding, nurturing and empowerment” of 
transformational innovations, such as renewable energy (Smith and Raven, 
2012, p.1034), which is inconsistent with an approach reliant entirely on carbon 
pricing to drive transition. A similar argument is made in the economics 
literature where it is empirically shown that ‘price-only’ approaches tend to offer 
socially sub-optimal outcome (Jaffe et al., 2005). It is also observed that a price 
high enough to enable technological transformation – on its own - is likely to be 
politically challenging, especially when it increases the price of an important and 
highly visible factor such as energy (Lundgren et al., 2015).  
For these reasons, more targeted technology policies are often used in place of 
- or in conjunction with - carbon pricing (Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; Gross et 
al., 2012) with policy formulations tending to occupy a continuum between 
extremes marked out by pure ‘technology-neutrality’ and technology policy only 
approaches. 
Despite some confusion about the term’s precise definition (Romero Monivas, 
2011), roughly speaking, the ‘idea’ of technology-neutrality is often promoted as 
a preferable alternative to the ‘picking of winners’ by policymakers across a 
wide range of public policy areas from communications to computer software, 
as well as energy. In place of technology choices, markets or other mechanisms 
are assumed to assess and choose between technologies on the basis of 
‘objective’ criteria (such as the unitary cost of emissions reduction or energy 
                                            
removed from its exhaust gases. Technology-neutrality also implies no inherent disadvantage to energy 
demand reduction to reduce emissions (Foxon, 2013) 
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production). The principle is most often invoked in situations where information 
about technology costs and benefits is sparse and asymmetric and, due to lack 
of accurate or complete information, choices made by governments may be 
poor. It is sometimes argued that a technology neutral approach can deliver 
outcomes in the most economically ‘efficient’ (read cheapest) manner (Helm, 
2012; 2014b). It may also be invoked in situations where a government’s choice 
risks becoming a ‘hostage to fortune’ if legislation or regulations referring to a 
specific technology become redundant due to rapid technological change 
(Romero Monivas, 2011).  
In energy policy, the idea or principle of technology-neutrality is challenged by 
contemporary understandings of the socio-technical transition in the energy 
system. In general, objections are based on the non-existence of adequate 
metrics on which a technology-neutral selection can be made. For example, 
nuclear electricity generation stations, even having accounted for environmental 
factors may (or may not) appear to have low cost of energy but may have other, 
less tangible impacts such as altering the future characteristics and 
development path along which the electricity system evolves, influencing the 
ability of the system to integrate other low-carbon generation options (Mitchell, 
2010). Similarly, using biomass in electricity generation may have impacts on 
food prices or deforestation. It is argued that to expect to accurately internalise 
the full range of externalities in a single metric (price) is absurd. Choices about 
energy supply and use are, it is put, inherently political and to wish otherwise is 
naïve (Azar and Sandén, 2011).  
Research which compares the two broad approaches of technology-neutrality 
and multiple-instrument approach including targeted technology support tends 
to find that a single instrument is an inadequate response to the range of 
market-failures presented by the climate problem (Somanthan et al., 2014, 
p.1173; Jaffe, 2012) At the same time, most scholars that support the principle 
of technology-neutrality also acknowledge that enabling an energy 
transformation is likely to require additional technology-specific policies (Fischer 
et al., 2012; Helm, 2014b).  
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The idea of technology-neutrality and its role in sustainable energy policy has 
divided opinion for many years (Azar and Sandén, 2011; Jacobsson et al., 
2009). Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, for example, there was a great deal of 
debate about whether renewable energy remuneration support policies were 
most effective when they were technology-neutral and ‘let the market’ select 
which technologies should be brought forward or when a more targeted strategy 
was taken in which chosen technologies were supported in order to fulfil specific 
policy goals (Mitchell, Bauknecht and P. M. Connor, 2006). Member states of 
the EU drew different conclusions to this question and some, such as Germany, 
supported strategically important renewable technologies through feed-in tariffs 
while others, such as the UK, sought more technology-neutral approaches such 
as a renewable energy tradable quota system known as the renewable 
obligation (RO) (Woodman and Mitchell, 2011).  
In the EU 2030 targets debate, the two ideas of targeted technology policy and 
technology-neutrality were both important because a decision for single or 
multiple targets taken at a European level would have implications for the types 
of policy implemented to fulfil them at both European and member state level. 
As we shall see later, the tension between the ‘idea’ that EU climate and energy 
policy should be technology neutral and driven primarily by its price instrument 
(the EU ETS) and the idea that continuing to support specific technologies 
(such as renewable energy and energy efficiency) was crucial to the debate 
about the 2030 targets. 
1.5 Defining a research question 
Having described the historical and policy context of the EU 2030 climate and 
energy framework, noted the limited study of the interest group politics of EU 
climate and energy policy and the significance of the policy change that 
occurred between the 202020 package and the 2030 framework, this section 
builds towards a research question that will act as a guide for the remainder of 
the thesis. 
As described above, the 2030 targets represent a significant change in EU 
climate and energy policy from the 202020 package. The level and nature of the 
targets are less ambitious than those agreed in 2007 and there has relatively 
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little scholarly attention paid to attempting to explain this change. At the same 
time, the nature of the change – argued to be a shift towards technology-
neutrality – suggests that the debate among policy specialists in Brussels was 
not a simple case of more versus less ambition on climate and energy. A more 
complex and dynamic situation is hinted at. The fact that energy transitions 
have been shown to be profoundly political is a steer in that direction 
(Meadowcroft, 2009; 2011). 
Interest representation in the EU has received a great deal of scholarly attention 
with the theoretical and empirical considerations inspiring a wide range of 
publications. Much of this work, however, is at a very general level and 
considers EU interest representation as a somewhat monolithic phenomenon 
with the detailed case-specific studies that have been carried out rarely 
covering EU energy policymaking (Richardson and Coen, 2009). In general, the 
role of ideas in shaping outcomes is overlooked (Greenwood, 2011). This is 
especially significant when one considers that the sustainable energy debate 
has been in large part defined by attitudes to the idea of technology-neutrality 
(Mitchell, Bauknecht and P.M. Connor, 2006; Woodman and Mitchell, 2011; 
Mitchell, 2010; Ringel, 2006). 
In order to guide a thorough investigation of the 2030 climate and energy 
targets, and the role that non-official actors played in the decision-making 
process, a suitable research question is: 
“How did Brussels-based interest groups influence the decision not 
to include binding national renewable energy and energy efficiency 
targets in the EU climate and energy framework for 2030?”  
1.6 Structure of this thesis 
The research reported here is structured along the lines of an analytical 
framework known as the multiple streams approach (MSA) (Kingdon, 2010), 
which will be described in detail in Chapter 2. Chapters are assigned to the 
main structural elements central to MSA. This thesis proceeds in three parts 
and nine chapters:  
Part I: Introductory chapters 
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 This introduction provides the research context and situates this multi-
disciplinary study relative to several fields of research; 
 Chapter 2 (page 47) establishes some important definitions and outlines 
the conceptual framework, research design and research methodology; 
Part II: Results chapters 
 Chapter 3 (page 93) provides an overview of the important decision-
making processes and actors that feature in the analysis; 
 Chapter 4 (page 135) provides an account those problems with which 
policymakers may be concerned and how various actors seek to frame 
those problems; 
 Chapter 5 (page165) provides a chronological account of the developing 
policy ideas and proposals available to policymakers and those being 
promoted by various actors between 2009 and 2014; 
 Chapter 6 (page 213) provides an account European and member state 
political trends and events and changes to the personnel in key decision-
making institutions; 
 Chapter 7 (page 239) describes the processes by which ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ seek to push their proposals at an opportune moment; 
Part III: Concluding chapters 
 Chapter 8 (page 275) synthesises the findings laid out in the previous 
four chapters and provides and discusses a summary of the study’s 
findings; 
 Chapter 9 (page 297) summarises and concludes 
1.7 Summary and conclusion 
Having providing an account of the policy and research context, this chapter 
surveyed several areas of academic literature. It showed that while EU climate 
and energy policy is a thriving research area, which has grown with the policy, it 
is often overlooked by studies of the politics of the policy process and little work 
has been carried out which explicitly examines the process by which the 2030 
targets were selected.  
 45 
A plurality of analytical approaches is used to illuminate issues of EU political 
life and policy making. Among these is the study of European interest 
representation. This field is highly disparate with a range of approaches taken 
and a large number of case studies carried out across policy areas and issues. 
Despite this growing body of literature, climate and energy policy has been 
largely overlooked.  
The study of socio-technical transitions is a varied and rapidly growing field. The 
literature shows that not only are the 2030 targets effectively a decision to divert 
from the sustainable path established by the 202020 framework but that the 
nature of the transition Europe’s energy system must undergo means that 
political factors are unavoidably important. 
This review has identified a gap relative to three distinct fields of literature: EU 
studies, socio-technical transitions and interest representation. Figure 2 
demonstrates the situation relative to the three fields. As will be explained in the 
next chapter, a theoretical framework drawn from the public policy analysis 
literature will be used to explore the research topic. 
 
Figure 2: Situation within existing literature 
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Chapter 2. Concepts, framework, methods 
 
 “Everything we see hides another thing; we always 
want to see what is hidden by what we see.” -René 
Magritte 
  
In this chapter key concepts and terms are defined, the analytical framework 
based on the multiple streams approach is introduced and described and the 
approach to research including practical and ethical issues is presented. 
Section 2.2 sets out the key concepts and definitions used in this thesis. Section 
2.2 introduces and describes the analytical framework or ‘lens’ through which 
the subject  - the debate about the 2030 targets in Brussels - is observed, 
section 2.4 sets out the research design and methods, section 2.5 explains the 
steps taken to ensure that the research is trustworthy and section 2.6 
concludes. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the study that is reported in this thesis and 
provided the policy and political context and made the case for an in-depth 
study into the role of companies and other non-official actors in the policy 
process that set the agenda for the EU 2030 climate and energy framework. It 
also reviewed previous scholarly work relevant to the subject area and clearly 
showed the role of non-official actors and interest groups in EU climate policy 
has been somewhat overlooked. It concluded that rigorous analysis of these 
processes would be a valuable addition to the literature in this area. The 
introduction ended with a statement of the research question that will guide the 
rest of this thesis. As set out in the introduction, the research question is: 
“How did Brussels-based interest groups influence the decision not 
to include binding national renewable energy and energy efficiency 
targets in the EU climate and energy framework for 2030?”  
2.2 Key concepts 
In order to proceed, a few definitions and clarifications are required. Firstly, 
what is meant by the term ‘policy’ and EU policy, in particular is defined in 
section 2.2.1. Secondly, the meaning of ‘agenda’ and ‘agenda-setting’ is 
described in section 2.2.2 and finally who or what are meant by ‘business and 
civil society representatives’ or ‘interest groups’ is explained in section 2.2.3. 
2.2.1 What is policy? 
There are several possible interpretations of what ‘public policy’ is, with a single, 
neatly defined scope as yet not available (Birkland, 2010) and several 
competing definitions apparent in the literature. Most generally, ‘a policy’ might 
be thought of as ‘whatever government’s choose to do or not do’ (Dye, 2012) or 
‘action by government, party, ruler, statesman, etc.” (Hill, 2009). To 
acknowledge that the policy process is inherently subject to power, we could 
say that policy is ‘the outcome of the struggle in government for who gets what’ 
(Cochran et al., 2011).  
More specifically, public policy can be defined as “a set of interrelated decisions 
taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals 
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and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” 
(Jenkins, 1978, p.15). It is this definition that will be used throughout this thesis. 
The existence of several conflicting interpretations of what policy is illuminates 
the dual nature of policy as both outcome and process. Distinguishing between 
the two interpretations allows for policy analysis to focus on either the policy 
outcome – by asking normative questions such as ‘did the policy achieve the 
goals that were set for it?’ and ‘how might that policy have been better 
designed?’ or on the policy process – by asking positive questions like ‘how 
was the policy formed and how did this influence the outcome?’. This thesis is 
an example of the second type of analysis and its focus is on a particular part of 
the policy process – agenda setting.  
2.2.2 What is agenda setting? 
The breaking up of the policy process into distinct temporal stages as an 
heuristic tool used for understanding and explaining has been used since the 
1970s (Nowlin, 2011; Sabatier, 2007; Sabatier, 1991). There have been many 
analytical models proposed for the stages of the policy process. It has been 
thought of as a purely linear ‘sequence’ of events in which each step, once 
completed, gives way to the next (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) or as a sequence 
in which there is ‘feedback’ between stages. The stages may also be 
conceptualised as an infinite cycle as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: the cycle of policy stages (Nowlin, 2011; Sabatier, 2007) 
While the number and nature of - and interrelation between - stages varies, in 
all versions of the stages heuristic, the process begins with activities related to 
identifying the problem to be solved, diagnosis and deciding the objectives of 
the policy. Collectively, these actions can be known as ‘agenda setting’. While 
final policy decisions may be taken by one or few people, since “no society or 
political system has the institutional capacity to address all possible alternatives 
to all possible problems that arise at any one time” (Birkland, 2010), the list of 
possible problems and solutions from which they are choosing must be limited 
in some way. It is the policy agenda and the agenda-setting process which 
determines the list of options from which a choice is eventually made. For this 
reason, the ability to influence the policy agenda: to re-frame the problems 
faced by decision makers, to add or remove policy options for addressing those 
problems is an important indicator of an actor’s or group of actors’ capacity or 
‘power’ to influence policy outcomes. 
There are several possible definitions of the word ‘agenda’, a commonly cited 
one being “those demands [or ‘issues’] made upon government to which 
policymakers choose or feel obliged to pay serious attention” (Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984; Tosun et al., 2015). While distinctions can be made between 
different types of agenda shaping such as agenda-setting (getting issues onto a 
political agenda), agenda-structuring (emphasising or de-emphasising issues 
already on the agenda) and agenda-exclusion (blocking issues from reaching 
the agenda) (Tallberg, 2003), here the terms agenda-setting and agenda-
agenda setting
policy 
formulation and 
legitimation
implementation
evaluation
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shaping are used interchangeably to describe all three. It is also possible to 
consider two periods of agenda setting: a discussion agenda which in which 
general concepts and principles are discussed and a decision agenda in which 
issues under serious consideration by policymakers is discussed (Cobb and 
Elder, 1972; Cobb et al., 1976). The same concept may also be expressed in 
terms of several levels of agenda, ranging from the ‘agenda universe’ 
comprising all conceivable options at one extreme to the ‘decision agenda’ 
which comprises the relatively small number of options faced by decision 
makers. Political actors’ role, then, is to strive to move their issues closer to the 
decision agenda and/or to block the progress of competing ideas and issues 
(Birkland, 2010). Figure 4 illustrates the concept. 
 
Figure 4: Levels of the agenda (Birkland, 2010, p.108) 
 
The specific definition of ‘agenda’ used throughout this thesis, as suggested by 
Kingdon (2010, p.3) is ‘the subjects or problems being given serious attention 
by EU officials involved in deciding the content, form and ambition of the 2030 
climate and energy framework.’ 
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2.2.2.1 When is the agenda set? 
Critically for this research, in the case of the 2030 climate and energy 
framework, the decision-making process requires two separate, consecutive 
processes. First, the level and overall structure of the targets are set and, 
secondly, the process for deciding how the targets should be met begins. This 
two-part process does not make a clear identification of the policymaking stages 
straightforward, with agenda setting activity possible in both processes. There 
are, in effect, two agenda setting periods – one in the search for the appropriate 
target level and structure and one in the definition of the appropriate legislative 
response. This thesis is concerned with the first of these two periods – that is, 
the selection of targets themselves rather than the approach to meeting them. 
The agenda setting stage here is the period immediately preceding the October 
2014 European Council at which the level and structure of the targets was 
agreed. 
 
Figure 5: Stages of the 2030 framework policy process. Agenda setting period with which this thesis is concerned 
is in red. 
Since the ability to influence the agenda is an indicator of relative power over 
policy outcomes, agenda setting is both important for outcomes and for the 
behaviour and interaction of actors and groups with an interest in the outcomes. 
Focussing on the agenda setting process explicitly limits the period of time 
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covered by this study to the run up to the decisions made by the European 
Council in October 2014. While, as we shall see in later chapters, accounts vary 
of when this process began, a reasonable starting point is the immediate 
aftermath of the Copenhagen UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP15) 
international climate talks at the end of 2009. However, much of the activity 
occurred closer to the decision and took place between 2011 and 201410. 
By focussing on the agenda setting process, this thesis explicitly contributes to 
an explanation of the policy outcome but it is important to acknowledge that it 
does not fully explain it. Following the agenda setting process that preceded the 
decisions taken in 2014 that gave the 2030 climate and energy framework its 
broad shape were the beginning of a process of turning the political will of the 
European Council into European legislation. The final form of the legislation that 
emerges from the process was an open question at the time of writing. After all, 
as Kingdon (2010, p.23) points out ‘setting the agenda and getting your way are 
two very different things’.  
2.2.3 What is interest representation? 
Climate and energy policy is one of the most heavily lobbied policy portfolios in 
EU policymaking (Transparency International, 2015). The research question 
focuses the study on two particular groups of actors: business and civil society 
interests, collectively known as interest groups. A full description of the key 
actors and their roles is provided in Chapter 3 which outlines the character and 
membership of the relevant policy networks but it is important that the analytical 
focus is clear at an early stage.  
The research sets out to explain, as fully as possible, the role played in the 
agenda setting process by actors with no formal policymaking responsibility and 
therefore understand the power that these actors have in the policy process – 
power over which a monopoly is granted by much EU integration theory to 
formal bodies (Rosamond, 2000). That is, the influence those actors which are 
                                            
10 see Chapter 5 for a detailed chronology of events 
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not members of the European Commission, national governments, European 
Parliament or any other institution of the EU, have over policy.  
In order to take as broad a view as possible, all of these actors are defined 
within the umbrella term ‘business and civil society’ or ‘interest groups’. This 
group can and does include interest groups such as trade associations, private 
companies, environmental campaign groups and NGOs, trades unions and 
others (Kohler-Koch, 2010; 2013). Although they may have different meanings 
in different contexts11 and there remains disagreement about the universal 
definitions of the terms (Greenwood, 2011), the terms ‘interest group’, ‘civil 
society’ and ‘lobbying group’ are used interchangeably in this thesis since 
wherever they are discussed they refer to non-official actors attempting to 
influence policy outcomes. While the research question singles out this group, it 
should not be thought of as restricting the actors on which the analysis is 
focused in any way. Indeed, it is in many ways it is the interaction between 
those inside and outside the EU decision-making machinery that this study is 
most interested.  
2.3 Analytical framework 
The previous section defined the key concepts and terms that will be used in 
the remainder of the thesis including ‘policy’, ‘agenda setting’ and ‘interest 
representation’. This section introduces and describes the analytical approach 
taken to answering the research question. Section 2.3.1 sets out the importance 
and role of a coherent analytical framework and the process by which one was 
selected from the literature. Section 2.3.2 introduces the multiples streams 
approach (MSA) used to guide this analysis. Section 2.3.3 lays out the 
structural elements of the MSA framework and section 2.3.4 examines criticism 
of the approach and its applicability to this research. 
2.3.1 Introduction: choosing a framework 
This thesis provides an analysis of the agenda setting processes that preceded 
formal decisions about the 2030 climate and energy framework. As with many 
processes of policymaking, perhaps especially in the EU, agenda setting is 
                                            
11 For example, a civil society group may not necessarily engage in attempting to influence policy 
 55 
extremely complex (Tosun et al., 2015). To simplify and understand anything 
complex we, as human beings, begin with a set of presuppositions about how 
things work. These simplifying presuppositions are present whether we explicitly 
acknowledge and define them or not. So we face a choice: to proceed with a 
‘common sense’ approach reliant on the categories and assumptions that have 
arisen from our own experience, which may be riven by “internal 
inconsistencies, ambiguities, erroneous assumptions, and invalid propositions” 
or to proceed on the basis of ‘clear and logically interrelated propositions” 
(Sabatier, 2007, p.5). This thesis takes the second approach. This section 
presents the choices made to establish an explicit framework that at once 
focuses the analysis on the most important elements of the agenda setting 
process and defines the categories into which the findings can usefully be 
grouped. 
There are a great many frameworks for analysis of the policy process from 
which to choose. Sabatier (2007; see also Sabatier and Weible, 2014) outlines 
a selection of seven distinct, qualified approaches, each with its own theoretical 
and empirical literature. The theories, specifically chosen because they are 
currently being developed, discussed and applied, includes: 
 The multiple streams approach; 
 Punctuated equilibrium theory; 
 The social construction of target population framework; 
 Policy feedback theory; 
 The advocacy coalition framework; 
 The narrative policy framework; 
 The intuitional analysis and development framework. 
Of these, two in particular have features which may lend themselves to the 
research question: the multiple streams approach (MSA) and the advocacy 
coalition framework (ACF). Both frameworks seek to explain outcomes in the 
policymaking process in which technical information, the personal beliefs of 
participants, and large scale political factors are important factors in explaining 
outcomes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Kingdon, 2010). They also 
emphasise the role that communities of experts (or, in the language of ACF, 
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policy subsystems), including civil society actors, play in negotiating outcomes 
and are presented as alternatives to the so-called ‘stages heuristic’ discussed in 
section 2.2.2 (Howlett et al., 2016). However, while ACF is an attempt to create 
a model of the entire policy process, MSA was developed with agenda setting in 
mind (Kingdon, 2010; Zahariadis, 2014). Since the research question focuses 
the study tightly on the agenda setting process, MSA12 has been adopted as the 
analytical framework used by this research. 
2.3.2 The multiple streams approach  
Originally developed by John Kingdon in 1984 specifically to explain the 
agenda-setting process, MSA has inspired tens of thousands of publications, 
empirical and theoretical covering dozens of countries and policy domains 
(Zahariadis, 2014; Cairney and Jones, 2016; Jones et al., 2016). MSA is still 
very much an active topic in policy theory development (Weible and Schlager, 
2016). 
Since, as will be shown later, communities and inter-personal connections are 
of primary importance when exploring EU climate and energy policy, this 
analysis combines multiple streams with the concept policy networks and policy 
communities as well as a more detailed specification of an important element of 
MSA – the concept of the policy entrepreneur, making use of a specification 
proposed by Mintrom and Norman (2009)13. The following section demonstrates 
that the suitability of the framework for this research is based on three main 
points: 
1. MSA’s emphasis of ambiguity in the policy process; 
2. The significance of the concept of the policy community in the 
framework; and 
3. The importance the framework ascribes to the role of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’. 
                                            
12 Also known as a ‘framework’ and sometimes a ‘lens’. This thesis will use the terms interchangeably  
13 see page 55  
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With the intention of understanding why “an idea’s time comes” or, more 
specifically, why some issues and not others are attended to by those in and 
around government, Kingdon set out to create a framework that could help to 
answer four straightforward questions: 
 How do subjects come to officials’ attention?  
 How are governmental agendas set?  
 How is the list of public policy alternatives narrowed to the ones that 
actually receive serious consideration?  
 Why does an idea’s time come when it does? 
Kingdon’s original 1984 formulation drew its inspiration from Cohen, March and 
Olsen’s (1972) so-called ‘garbage can’ model of organisational choice - a view 
of the world in which collective decision making is a largely chaotic process of 
‘organised anarchy’ in which, rather than a purely rational, linear decision 
making, structural and cognitive factors playing significant roles in generating 
outcomes (Zahariadis, 2007). At the heart of the approach is a conception of 
three independent streams of activity which flow through the policy process:  
 The problem stream; 
 The policy stream; and 
 The politics stream 
Although Kingdon worked with multiple streams in a federal US setting, MSA 
has been successfully discussed, applied tested and adapted for the EU policy 
environment, as discussed on page 68 (Ackrill et al., 2013; Ackrill and Kay, 
2011; Herweg, 2016).  
The following pages briefly describe the framework, its underlying assumptions 
about the policy process and its structural elements. An explanation of how it 
was used to guide and focus this study follows. 
2.3.2.1 A framework for ambiguity 
Kingdon’s original intention was to explain the policymaking process in 
situations where there is more than one way of viewing the same thing 
(Zahariadis, 2007). This condition – ambiguity – is distinct from uncertainty in 
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that uncertainty can be reduced with new information while ambiguity is immune 
to it. Ambiguity is assumed by MSA to be an integral part of the policy process. 
An illustration of the concept relevant to this thesis might be the fact that, by 
modelling the European energy system to an appropriate level of detail, it is 
possible to increase policymakers’ certainty over the economic and 
environmental impacts of various policy formations. At the same time, however, 
the policymaking context is ambiguous. What role should today’s incumbents 
play in the future energy system? Should Europe pursue market-based policy 
solutions as a matter of principle? What is the appropriate distributional 
outcome? To questions such as these, there are no straightforward answers 
that, with appropriate information, can satisfy everybody involved in discussing 
policy. It is possible for two people to hold well-reasoned but opposing views 
and the appropriate solution – or even definition of the problem – depends, to a 
great extent, on factors such as how it is framed and the political environment in 
which it is being discussed. 
MSA considers three sources of ambiguity: unclear goals, fluid participation and 
unclear or opaque organisational technology (Zahariadis, 2008): 
 Unclear goals 
The goals or preferences of actors in the policy process are often unclear 
– “quite often time constraints force [actors] to make decisions without 
having formulated precise preferences” (Zahariadis, 2008). That is, in 
some rapidly changing, dynamic situations, politicians or other actors 
may have to take decisions about issues without giving the topic the level 
of scrutiny they would like, given unlimited time and resources.  
 
 Fluid participation 
As a policy moves through the process, there is a fairly high turnover of 
participants. For example, some actors such as desk officers in the 
European Commission or certain civil society actors may be deeply 
involved in early discussions but be excluded from later decision making 
and vice-versa. 
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 Opaque organisational technology14 
The policymaking context is often extremely complex, perhaps especially 
in the EU (Ackrill et al., 2013). Actors may have a clear view of their 
immediate role and responsibilities, but often their understanding of the 
entire policy process is basic or flawed (Zahariadis, 2008). In many 
cases, responsibility is not clearly demarcated and between departments 
or units - and tensions may arise or ‘turf battles’ may break out, 
especially in situations where several institutions or directorates-general 
share a portfolio. 
MSA also assumes that policymakers and other decision makers have limited 
time available and that managing time, rather than tasks, is their major 
challenge (Zahariadis, 2014). Since the number of issues that could receive 
attention is very long and time is short, problems compete for policymakers’ 
attention. Under conditions of ambiguity and time constraint, a purely rational 
approach to problems solving in which decision makers identify problems, 
formulate solutions and make choices is impossible.  
2.3.3 Structure of MSA 
The MSA has five elements that interact to produce policy outcomes – the three 
streams (policy, problem and politics) which are assumed to flow through the 
decision making system independently of one another, policy windows which 
are opportunities that occur when the three streams coincide and policy 
entrepreneurs, skilled individuals who are able to couple the streams and take 
advantage of windows of opportunity. Figure 6 shows the structure of MSA as 
applied here in schematic including some augmentation of the role of the policy 
entrepreneur, discussed on page 66. 
                                            
14 In this context Zahariadis uses the term ‘organisational technology’ to describe the overall process by 
which collective decisions are taken or “an organisation’s processes that turn inputs into products” 
(Zahariadis, 2007) 
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Figure 6: The structure of the MSA (adapted from Zahariadis, 2014; Mintrom and Norman, 2009) 
The following subsections examine each of the structural elements in turn. 
2.3.3.1 Problem stream 
The problem stream is made up of the conditions that policymakers, on behalf 
of citizens, would like to address. These may include issues like climate 
change, energy security, economic crisis or the cost of energy for households 
and businesses. It is important to recognise that ‘conditions’ do not become 
‘problems’ automatically. Kingdon (2010) proposes that problems are framed 
and receive attention in three separate ways – indicators, feedback and 
focusing events.  
 Indicators tend to be more-or-less objective assessments of a condition. 
An indicator could be, for example, high electricity prices for households 
or the carbon intensity of the European economy. Indicators may be 
combined with powerful emotive symbols to attract attention to a problem 
– for example, to make a case that industry is being forced to locate 
outside the EU due to the ‘burden’ of climate policy, some actors might 
invoke symbols of Europe’s proud industrial heritage.  
 Feedback is information about the performance of previously 
implemented policies. As we shall see in later chapters, central to 
discussions about what the EU should propose for climate and energy 
policy in 2030 was the earlier (2007) policy for 2020 and on-going 
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discussions about the effectiveness of the EU’s emission trading 
mechanism, the EU-ETS.  
 Focusing events bring into focus particular issues associated with 
conditions. In EU climate and energy policy this may include the 
economic crisis dogging Europe during the period of time covered by this 
study or the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes that flared up at a critical 
moment in 2014. The capacity of policymakers to tackle new problems is 
also considered to be finite. Zahariadis (2007; 2014) points out that the 
‘load’ on the policymakers at the time a condition becomes a problem - 
that is, the number of things already on their agenda – is a good 
predictor of how far up the agenda it will rise. 
2.3.3.2 Policy stream 
The policy stream is a “primaeval soup” of ideas vying for acceptance within the 
relevant policy community of specialists involved in a particular policy area – in 
this case EU climate and energy policy (Zahariadis, 2014; Richardson, 2005). 
Kingdon (2010) and Zahariadis (2014) both describe the policy community as 
networks of officials, academics, think tanks and other researchers. However, 
as demonstrated in later chapters of this thesis and in-line with Rozbicka and 
Spohr’s (2015) article looking at EU chemical’s policy, interest groups such as 
campaign organisations, NGOs and trade associations are also important 
members of the policy community and are able, through political manipulation of 
information and persuasion, able to wield considerable power (Zahariadis, 
2014). It is this community, organised as a network, which allows ideas and 
issues to be handled in parallel rather than series, to some extent mitigating the 
effect of time-scarcity (Zahariadis, 2014). The term ‘policy subsystem’ is 
sometimes used to capture the concept (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; 
McCool, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999; Sabatier, 1998; Börzel, 
1998). 
Defining what ‘ideas’ are is not necessarily straightforward. At the most 
fundamental level, they may be considered the ‘substantive content of 
discourse’ (Schmidt, 2008, p.306). In a policy context, the concept may me 
operationalised at three levels. The first level is ideas as specific policies or 
policy solutions, for example a policy implementation such as the EU-ETS or a 
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specific energy target. The second level is the more general principles that 
underpin the policy solution, for example, the idea of technology-neutral climate 
policies. Finally, at the most basic level are the ‘public philosophies’ or 
worldviews that make up the ideological background and underlying 
assumptions about the way the world works (Schmidt, 2008; 2010). MSA tends 
to be primarily concerned with foreground ideas. That is, the first and second 
level - policy solutions and policy principles - which are regularly debated rather 
than the more core ideas which tend to remain unchallenged exempt in 
extremis. 
The rate at which a policy idea rises or falls on the agenda within a community 
is a function of the properties of the particular policy network. More integrated 
networks, which are smaller and more consensual with restricted access, tend 
to see ideas emerge rather faster than in larger, more competitive and less 
restricted networks. Kingdon also stresses the importance of a process he calls 
‘softening up’ (Kingdon, 2010, p.127). By exposing both policy communities and 
the wider public to new policy ideas, advocates prepare the ground for an 
opportunity to link problem and policy.  
As shown in later chapters and as Boasson and Wettestad explain in their 
(2013) book, the characteristics of network interaction matter in EU climate and 
energy policy with the ability to make use of networks of support for an idea or 
‘network entrepreneurship’ an important factor in determining an idea's chances 
of success. 
Central to the policy stream is the concept of a policy community. The 
community, through which ideas and proposals move, is often presented as a 
‘network’ of actors. So-called 'policy networks' and their analysis has become 
widespread and covers a broad and sometimes confused range of approaches 
and theories (Rhodes, 2006; Börzel, 1998). At the heart of the concept is the 
comprehensible and immediate metaphor of the network in which "regular 
communication and frequent exchange of information lead to the establishment 
of stable relationships between actors and to the coordination of their mutual 
interests" (Adam and Kriesi, 2007, p.129). The “network of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
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authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-
area” is often referred to an ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992a; 1992b; Toke, 
1999; Dunlop, 2000). 
The concept has been applied to the policymaking process in several ways, 
including as a definition of a particular form of governance and as a strictly 
quantitative analytical technique for describing and characterising networks of 
relationships and ascribing qualities such as the degree of centralisation, 
connectedness, density etc. (Adam and Kriesi, 2007; Zeng and Battiston, 2016). 
The most relevant application of the policy networks here is as Marsh and 
Rhodes (1992) defined policy networks: a 'meso level concept' "that links the 
micro-level of analysis, dealing with the role of interests and government in 
particular policy decisions, and the macro-level of analysis, which is concerned 
with broader questions about the distribution of power in modern society" 
(Rhodes, 2006, p.427). 
The structure of policy networks can be thought of as being defined by resource 
interdependency between actors (Benson, 1982) with the most basic network 
models of interest mediation modelled as a game in which non-state actors 
deployed their endowment of resources to influence policy outcomes while 
policymakers depend on these resources for the functioning of the policy 
machine. The resources most commonly attributed to actors are financial, 
informational, political, organisational and constitutional-legal (Marsh and 
Rhodes, 1992). Much work has been focused on attempts to create typologies 
of policy networks, with the types of networks differentiated along various 
dimensions such as stability/instability, scope, restriction to membership, 
number and type of actors, function of the network, corporatist/pluralist nature, 
strong/weak state and others (Börzel, 1998; Toke, 1999; Haas, 1992a; Dunlop, 
2000; Rhodes, 2006). An often favoured classification is the distinction between 
tight-knit ‘policy communities’ and loose-jointed ‘issue networks’.  
Rhodes (1992) sets out the dimensions on which policy networks may vary 
(membership integration and resource distribution), and notes that between 
these two poles there exists a continuum of types of policy network (Börzel, 
1998).  
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Some writers highlight the fact that it is not a fundamental theory of political 
science and the policy networks concept is often referred to as a 'mere 
metaphor' without explanatory power (Dowding, 1995; Börzel, 1998). Others fret 
that the fluidity of EU policymaking defies capture by the networks approach 
(Kassim, 1994). The absence of an analogy for the network leads some to 
question whether it is even a metaphor. After all, policymaking is a literal 
network of actors linked by their interactions (Rhodes, 2006). But, despite the 
ambiguity of its theoretical status, network analysis has proven itself to be, at 
the very least, a useful analytical tool in a wide range of policymaking 
environments.  
2.3.3.3 Politics stream 
The politics stream is the wider political environment in which the policy process 
is embedded. It includes the ideological tendencies of EU member state 
governments, the preferences of the political leaders of the European 
Commission and inter-institutional issues such as the balance of power in and 
between the Council and Parliament. Kingdon, as well as later contributors to 
the MSA, make the case that interest group activity is part of this political 
stream (Zahariadis, 2014; Ackrill et al., 2013). The work of Rozbicka and Spohr 
(2015), however, makes a case for a larger role for interest group activity across 
all three streams with actors engaged in framing in the problem stream, 
developing and negotiating proposals in the policy stream and skilfully 
deploying resources at the right time to make the most out of windows of 
opportunity in the politics stream.  
Whether an issue receives attention or an idea will gain traction depends, to 
some extent, on the political ‘mood’ (Kingdon, 2010; Zahariadis, 2014; Ackrill 
and Kay, 2011; Ackrill et al., 2013). For example, at a time when the European 
zeitgeist is one of austerity and fiscal prudence, policy ideas that are presented 
as more economically ‘efficient’ or lower cost are more likely to receive approval 
in political circles. Changes to political personnel also play a role in determining 
the political priorities as an incoming Commission President, for example, seeks 
to play the role of ‘new broom’ (Zahariadis, 2007). 
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In a national or federal context, the multiple streams approach (MSA) tends to 
include three main elements within the politics stream: the national mood, 
pressure group campaigns and administrative or legislative turnover. Some 
modifications are needed to translate the framework to an EU context and 
Zahariadis (2008, p.518) puts forward four components that make up the EU 
politics stream. They are: 
 The European political mood; 
 The ideological balance of parties in Parliament;  
 Member state national and partisan affiliation; and 
 The balance of the Council (or European Council) 
2.3.3.4 Policy windows 
Policies are selected and applied to problems during periods of time described 
by Kingdon as ‘policy windows’. These windows of opportunity are open for a 
finite duration and see advocates of particular policies push their proposals or 
bring attention to a specific problem. Windows may open to due unpredictable 
external events such as large-scale electrical power outages affecting the 
politics of the situation or may open on a regular basis due to entirely 
predictable legislative or other timetables. The bringing together of policy and 
problems streams – known as coupling – occurs only during a policy window. In 
MSA it is assumed that policy actors themselves do not control when or how 
wide the window opens. The hypothesis is that policy actors are somewhat like 
surfers waiting for waves to catch (Boscarino, 2009; Kingdon, 2010). 
Kingdon (2010) borrows the term ‘spillover’ from Ernst Haas’ 1958 (2003) 
theory of neofunctionalism in order describe the influence that one policy 
window may have on another. Kingdon suggests that spillover may occur when 
a principle is established or a precedent set which alters the terms under which 
a policy topic is discussed in the future - perhaps changing the political 
dynamics of the situation. Kingdon also suggests that success by a policy 
entrepreneur in one area may impact what happens in other, adjacent or 
overlapping policy area. This could be because it appears that a particular type 
of policy idea (Kingdon uses the example of deregulation), once shown to be 
successful in one field then becomes attractive to entrepreneurs seeking 
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success in another. It could also be the case that “…the coalition that was built 
and nurtured to establish the new policy can be transferred to other fights” 
(Kingdon, 2010, p.192). 
2.3.3.5 Policy entrepreneurs 
Key to the coupling of the streams is the efforts of policy entrepreneurs. These 
uncommonly skilled individuals are adept at packaging problems and solutions 
in a way such that - once a policy window opens - they are able to respond 
appropriately. Predictors of policy entrepreneurs’ prospects for success include 
access to key policymakers, the resources they have available to them and the 
strategies they use to couple the problem, policy and politics streams as well as 
their political acumen. Entrepreneurs without formal institutional roles tend to 
rely on framing problems as a key strategy for influencing policy (Klüver et al., 
2015). A wide range of types of entrepreneurship has been identified (Roberts 
and King, 1991). The most striking of these in the EU climate and energy policy 
community is the concept of network entrepreneurship. A network entrepreneur 
is one that is skilled at “creating networks and agenda setting opportunities” 
(Boasson and Wettestad, 2013). As mentioned earlier, the specification of 
policy entrepreneurship offered by MSA is rather cursory and, since a key 
objective of this study is to identify and describe policy entrepreneurs, Kingdon’s 
specification appears inadequate to this task. To compensate this apparent 
shortcoming, a supplementary specification is added. 
Mintrom and Norman (2009) set out four characteristics that can be used in 
order to identify policy entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. These are: 
 Social acuity or perceptiveness and understanding others when 
engaging in policy conversations – general demonstrated by making 
good use of policy networks and by “understanding the ideas, motives, 
and concerns of others and responding effectively” (Mintrom and 
Norman, 2009, p.652); 
 Defining problems in ways that influence who pays attention to them; 
 Building teams or the ability to work effectively with others by, for 
example building coalitions of people with complementary skills; and  
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 Leading by example by, for example, turning an idea into action to 
demonstrate the concept to overcome the reservations of generally risk-
averse policymakers and “signal a genuine commitment to improved 
outcomes” (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, p.653). 
While entrepreneurship by civil society actors may not offer a complete 
explanation for policy outcomes, entrepreneurship is necessary for such actors 
to wield influence over outcomes. 
2.3.3.6 Implementing the framework 
The framework described above influenced the research in a number of ways. 
Firstly, it informed the coding scheme used to arrange sources and text into 
appropriate groupings. Secondly, it informed the chapter structure of the thesis 
with the findings presented in a way that reflects the structural elements of 
MSA. Finally, it provides a straw-man against which the findings can be tested – 
ultimately enabling a commentary on the usefulness of the framework and 
validity of its assumptions. 
2.3.4 Criticism and application of MSA 
Despite being apparently useful and highly cited, the MSA does have some 
critics. Kingdon’s original work emerged from the ‘garbage can’ model 
organisational choice developed in the 1970s (Cohen et al., 1972), an approach 
which, while influential, was criticised on grounds of inconsistency and opacity 
(Bendor et al., 2001). The empirical testing and theoretical refinement of the 
original work, especially the improved specification of policy entrepreneurs, 
carried out by Kingdon and others, however, sets MSA apart from the original 
garbage can that inspired it. 
Much criticism of MSA focuses on the underlying assumptions of the 
framework, most notably the assumption that the three streams (problem, 
policy, politics) are independent at all times other than during ‘coupling’ during a 
window of opportunity. Critics question this separation and argue that the 
streams are more interdependent than allowed for in MSA (Mucciaroni, 1992; 
Bendor et al., 2001), a factor which puts MSA at odds with the advocacy 
coalition framework in which the three streams of activity are effectively fused 
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; 1999). In defence of the independence of 
 68 
the streams, Zahariadis (2014) argues that the empirical evidence for solutions 
being developed in the absence of problems (the case of the Bush 
administration’s drifting justification for deposing Saddam Hussein is cited) 
strongly supports the conceptual device of stream independence.  
Indeed, the separation of the streams is likely reinforced in the context of this 
study by the fact that, almost by definition, interest group actors have a solution 
– in the form of a preferred policy - which they would like to couple with any 
appropriate problem. 
2.3.4.1 Application to the EU 
Although the origins of the multiple streams framework are in the analysis of US 
Federal policymaking, the basic assumptions have been shown to be valid other 
contexts, including the EU policy process with studies published on topics as 
diverse as sugar reform, gas market liberalisation and chemicals regulation 
(Ackrill and Kay, 2011; Ackrill et al., 2013; Rozbicka and Spohr, 2015; Herweg, 
2015). In fact, when applying MSA to the EU policy process, it was found to 
takes in its stride some of the EU’s peculiarities such as “institutional fluidity, 
jurisdictional overlap, endemic political conflict, policy entrepreneurship and 
varying time cycles” (Ackrill et al., 2013, p.871). 
One modification to the MSA that has been proposed for use in the EU is the 
addition of a second coupling process to reflect the fact that EU policymaking is 
protracted and often spans more than one legislative term. The stream coupling 
processes are first the opening of an ‘agenda window’ in which the model 
functions in precisely the same way as the original version and places a policy 
proposal into the policy stream which feeds into the opening of a second 
‘decision window’ (Herweg, 2015), as illustrated in Figure 7. For the research 
reported in this thesis, however, the modification is unnecessary since the 
research question is concerned explicitly with the ‘agenda’ window, as 
discussed in section 2.2.2 on page 49. 
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Figure 7: Multiple streams framework modified for the EU (source: Herweg, 2013; 2015) 
The two primary justifications for the use of MSA are firstly that MSA was 
originally put forward as an approach to understanding the agenda-setting 
process15 and as such it has proven itself to be versatile and useful in a wide 
range of setting and policy areas including energy policy (e.g. Carter and 
Jacobs, 2014; Herweg, 2013) and EU policymaking (Ackrill et al., 2013; Ackrill 
and Kay, 2011; Zahariadis, 2008).  
Secondly and equally importantly, the framework’s agnostic stance on where 
power lies in the policy process – which MSA sees emerging more from 
mastery of the EU policy process than from institutional hierarchies (Zahariadis, 
2008) – means that the framework is able to account for political activity by a 
wide range of actors both inside and outside formal policymaking institutions, 
including civil society interest groups (Ackrill et al., 2013).  
2.3.4.2 MSA and interest representation 
Despite being a key feature of Kingdon’s original formulation, the MSA literature 
has, to a large extent, given a minor role to interest groups and civil society in 
the policymaking process, often relegated to a position as a variable in the 
politics stream. This apparent neglect of the role played by interest groups in 
the policy process presents an immediate challenge to the researcher wishing 
                                            
15 Although Zahariadis’ more recent refinements expand the scope of MSA to include the entire policy 
process (Zahariadis, 2014)  
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to make use of the analytical approach to study interest groups. For MSA to be 
useful for answering a research question explicitly concerned with civil society’s 
engagement with the policy process, it is important to establish firstly in what 
way the framework limits the study of these actors and secondly what needs to 
be done, if anything, in order for the framework to better accommodate them. 
That interest groups can and do play an important agenda setting role - by 
promoting new policy direction (entrepreneurship) or by seeking to push change 
off the agenda – is well documented (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991; Weible et 
al., 2012; Boscarino, 2009).  
Starting from this observation, Rozbicka and Spohr (2015) argue that leaving 
interest groups to languish in the politics stream fails to capture the crucial role 
played by these actors in the problem and politics streams. It is appropriate, 
they argue, to allow for a role for interest groups and civil society in all three 
streams – framing problems and offering solutions by expert engagement with 
policymakers as well as bringing their considerable membership to bear on 
politics. 
Overall, despite the somewhat overlooked role for civil society in MSA, there 
appear to be no impediments to exploring the role that these actors play in all 
three streams – both as entrepreneurs and by actively resisting policy change. 
Indeed, analysing the deployment of their resources, their framing skill and 
ability to engage in information exchange in order to develop a fuller picture of 
their role appears to be a fruitful new direction for MSA research (Rozbicka and 
Spohr, 2015). This thesis, therefore, provides an important test of the suitability 
of MSA to interest group research as well as the recent theoretical development 
expanding the role of interest groups into all three streams. 
2.3.5 Summary of analytical framework 
This section introduced and described the multiple streams approach used as 
an analytical framework used in the thesis. It set out the principal assumptions 
that underpin the framework and the structural elements that are used to 
structure this thesis. The core assumptions are: 
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i) That policy is made in an environment of ambiguity – a condition 
prevalent in climate and energy policy; 
ii) that time available to policymakers (and other actors) is scarce and 
that while the number of issues that can be  attended to by an 
individual is small, as a community a much larger number can be 
considered;  
iii) that the three streams (problem, policy, politics) flow independently 
through the policymaking process and that solutions (such as 
technology neutrality) may well pre-date the problems they are 
invoked to solve 
This section also set out the approach to understanding the policy community 
as a network, showed that the MSA is especially appropriate for this study, with 
the weaknesses identified in the literature either not applicable in this context or 
having been overcome by some of the recent developments in the framework. 
The thesis provides an important test of the ability of the framework to 
accommodate interest group activity across all three streams, rather than simply 
as a factor in the politics stream. The next section outlines the approach to 
research methods. 
2.4 Research design and methodology 
Having described the context, analytical task and framework in preceding 
sections, this section now turns to the practical issues of designing and carrying 
out the qualitative, empirical research on which this thesis is based. The overall 
research strategy, research method and data collection and analytical 
considerations are introduced in section 2.4.1, section 2.4.2 sets out the 
approach to research ethics and section 2.4.3 describes the process of data 
analysis.  
2.4.1 Research strategy 
The approach to answering the question is that of a case study undertaken by 
process tracing. A case study is a research strategy that “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 
1994, p.13). The case study has been described as an ‘all encompassing’ 
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research strategy that “relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing 
to converge in a triangulating fashion” and “benefits from the prior development 
of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis”. The case study 
is a particularly appropriate research strategy in situations where: “a ‘how’ or 
’why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which 
the investigator has little or no control (Yin, 1994, p.9; see also Bennett and 
George, 2005).  
2.4.1.1 Process tracing 
Process tracing or ‘analytic narrative’ links events of a case in temporal order to 
explain the outcome (Vennesson, 2008). It is a widely used method for within 
case (as opposed to cross-case) analysis which allows descriptive (Burnham et 
al., 2008) and (in some cases) causal inferences to be drawn from a sequence 
of events (Collier, 2011; Bennett, 2010; Beach and Pedersen, 2013; Kittel and 
Kuehn, 2012). There are three main uses to which it can be put: theory testing, 
theory building and explaining outcomes. The latter application of process 
tracing, for explaining outcomes, is distinguished from the other two more 
theory-centric applications in that it seeks to explain a particular case or 
instance of a phenomenon rather than generate generalizable explanations16 
(Beach and Pedersen, 2013). For example, this study seeks to provide a 
detailed description of agenda setting during a particular period of time in the 
EU’s climate and energy policy community and not necessarily ‘discover’ or test 
possible ‘principles’ of agenda setting of the European stage. Process tracing is 
an especially valuable approach for use alongside MSA, a model in which “who 
pays attention to what and when is critical” (Zahariadis, 2014, p.28). More 
recently, process tracing – combined with case study research approaches – 
has been shown to be particularly useful to exploring cases of interest 
representation, especially when the aim of the study is to understand framing 
processes (Voltolini and Eising, 2016). 
                                            
16 Although there is no reason that findings explaining-outcome research should not provide useful insight 
for other similar (in this case) EU negotiations (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p.63) 
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2.4.1.2 Data collection 
The key to process tracing is the construction of the sequence of events from 
carefully collected evidence (Collier, 2011). The evidence used in this thesis is 
varied. Wherever available, primary, first-hand sources such as interviews with 
individuals with privileged positions relative to the policy process (so-called 
élites (Richards, 1996)) have been used in order to reduce the influence of the 
‘indeterminacy and bias’ that is inherent in much data from secondary sources 
such as government documents and journalistic accounts (Moravcsik, 1998). 
Nevertheless, secondary sources have proved invaluable in building a complete 
picture of the negotiations. Strict ‘quality control’ of secondary sources 
somewhat analogous to testing the ‘admissibility’ of evidence in a law court was 
used (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). 
The data collection proceeded in three stages:  
1. a desk study to identify primary data sources and collect secondary data;  
2. field research to collect primary data; and  
3. supplemental research to fill in gaps that emerged following analysis of 
the first two stages.  
Throughout, the research drew on two types of evidence: i) documentary 
evidence and ii) evidence collected in a series of 32 élite interviews. The 
collection and handling of each is now discussed in turn. 
2.4.1.2.1 Documentary evidence 
Documentary evidence, as with any other evidence, risks presenting an 
incomplete picture or being biased or inaccurate (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). 
This thesis’ mitigation of these risks is twofold. Firstly, careful categorisation of 
documents as primary (documents produced at or by the event in questions), 
secondary (information produced soon after the event or tertiary (data 
reconstructed or synthesised sometime after the event) with more weight given 
to primary than secondary or tertiary (Burnham et al., 2008, p.187). Secondly, 
additional documentary and interview data were assembled which both 
completed the picture and triangulated a piece of evidence by verifying it from 
multiple sources.  
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The institutions of the European Union put forth a great many documents during 
their day-to-day activity. Official conclusions of meetings and summits, policy 
proposals, parliamentary committee minutes and so on. At the same time, other 
actors in the policy subsystem produce a wide range of their own documents 
such as position papers, responses to formal consultations by the European 
Commission17 etc. Together, these documents are an invaluable contribution to 
creating the detailed account required to effectively trace the agenda setting 
process. Details of these documents can be found in footnotes or in the 
reference list at the end of the thesis. 
2.4.1.2.2 Evidence from interviews 
A major source of evidence was data collected through semi-structured élite 
interviews with relevant participants in - and observers of - the negotiations and 
debates from which the agenda emerged. Élites are defined here to be 
“individuals, who hoId, or have held, a privileged position in society and, as 
such, as far as a political scientist is concerned, are likely to have had more 
influence on political outcomes than general members of the public” or, at very 
least, have observed events closely (Richards, 1996, p.199). There are many 
benefits of élite interviewing including access to information that is not, or may 
never be, available in documentary form, providing important context to the 
research area and provide an opportunity to build a network of further 
interviewees as well gaining an understanding beyond that available through 
other means. In particular, information about values, beliefs and the way in 
which actors frame their views, both important elements of MSA, may not be 
possible to glean from documentary sources (Richards, 1996; Hochschild, 
2009).  
The interviewing process took place over the space of approximately one year 
between April 2015 and April 2016. The following pages describe the steps 
taken to ensure the appropriate quality and quantity of interview data. The 
primary challenges associated with collecting this evidence are: 
                                            
17 The European Commission’s 2013 green paper ‘A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies’ 
received more than 550 detailed responses 
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i) identifying and securing interviews with people appropriate to the study: 
and 
ii) eliciting appropriate testimony (Burnham et al., 2008; Beyers et al., 
2014). 
Identifying interviewees and gaining access 
Identifying and gaining access to appropriate participants was a major task. 
One of the objectives was to develop an image of the EU climate and energy 
policy community during the negotiation of the post-2030 framework. For this 
reason, it was clear from an early stage that the identities of all appropriate 
interviewees could not be determined ex-ante. Instead, an iterative approach 
was taken in which the interviews with community members themselves were 
used to identify other members, an approach sometimes called ‘referral 
sampling18’ (Burnham et al., 2008). During interviews participants were invited - 
and often willing - to suggest or introduce other participants.  
The objective of the interviews was to gain insight into the workings of the 
‘policy community’ active at the time the 2030 framework was being negotiated, 
defined by Kingdon as a group of “specialists in a given [policy] area” who we 
might expect to be “scattered through and outside of government19” (Kingdon, 
2010, p.117). Though the list of organisations actively seeking to influence 
policy in Brussels is quite long (Greenwood, 2011), membership of the policy 
community requires a certain level of expertise, and the list of effective 
members should, therefore, be shorter. Kingdon lists academics, think-tanks, all 
technical and political bodies of the formal decision-making bodies, 
consultancies and other analysts as possible locations for members of the 
community. Rozbicka and Spohr (2015) add interest groups to the list. 
By attending policy events, observation of social media hashtags such as 
#EU2030 and online EU policy TV station Vieuws.eu and other print and online 
media as well as paying attention to which organisations had participated in the 
European Commission’s (2013e) consultation on 2030 energy and climate 
                                            
18 Also known as ‘snowballing’ 
19 In the European context ‘government’ may be read as the institutions of the EU 
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policy, a good ‘first-pass’ of which organisations should participate in the 
research was assembled (Burnham et al., 2008). This initial analysis of the 
debate produced a target list of organisations and individuals. This ‘target-list’ 
included people from: 
 EU Commission political level and services; 
 Corporations and companies; 
 Trade associations; 
 NGOs; 
 Select parliamentarians active in agenda-setting; 
 Think tanks; 
Conducting interviews 
The semi-structured approach to interviewing is the most effective way to obtain 
information about decision-making processes in situations where interviewees 
can be considered experts in the relevant field (Burnham et al., 2008, p.231). 
Broad topics for discussion were kept constant across all interviews with 
prompting questions simply used to keep the interview on track. The interview 
questions focus on: interests and policy issues, the strategies for pursuing those 
interests (or, in the language of MSA, coupling the streams), of both the 
participant (where relevant) and of other actors. Importantly, rather than simply 
treating participants as informants and asking direct questions about the power 
and frames at play in the debate, they were treated as respondents who were 
given the freedom to propose such information, thus revealing what was active 
in the mind of important policy actors (Boräng et al., 2014).  
The most important part of any interview was the introduction, in which the 
study and its aims and objectives were described. In many cases, this 
introduction provided the interviewee with enough guidance to talk freely about 
their experiences with very little input or further questioning by the interviewer. 
One feature of élite interviewing, especially in the field of interest 
representation, is the information advantage held by the interviewee (Beyers et 
al., 2014), not to mention their professional role as persuader and framer of 
issues and facts. In order to be able to address this possible source of bias, 
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familiarity with the topics to be discussed is essential for effective élite 
interviewing (Burnham et al., 2008, p.239). Immediately before every interview, 
background reading was conducted to ensure that the interviewer was familiar 
not only with the overall subject to be discussed but, where possible, the 
specific role of the participant in question. All relevant and documents, 
especially those published by the interviewee or their organisation were read 
and their position on important policy issues - and how that position had 
changed over time – was ascertained. Transcripts of previous interviews in 
which their name had been mentioned were reviewed. Importantly, this 
preparation reduced the need for lengthy explanations of basic facts, which 
could take up much interviewing time.  
In order to enable the creation of verbatim transcripts and in addition to note-
taking, an audio recording of all interviews was made, except in cases where 
interviewees were unwilling to be recorded. This occurred only once, with an EU 
official, requiring that handwritten notes were used in place of a transcript. 
Number of interviews 
When selecting the appropriate number of interviews, there is no definitive or 
obvious answer to the question ‘how many is enough?’ – a researcher may as 
well be asking ‘how long is a piece of string?’. One study into the number of 
interviews conducted over the course of more than five-hundred qualitative UK 
PhD theses found a range of between one and ninety-five interviews, with a 
mean of thirty-one (Mason, 2010).  
The appropriate number depends on, among other things, the total number of 
potential interviewees that hold useful knowledge or information – a function of 
the overall size of the policy community, the availability of information from other 
sources, the willingness of interviewees to talk openly about their involvement in 
the policy debate etc. It is also quite possible, of course, that practical 
constraints on time and access to élites could limit the number of interviews 
available (Burnham et al., 2008). 
In order to measure whether enough interviews had been conducted, two 
simple criteria were used. The first is coverage of the target list. The test for 
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coverage is: ‘have representatives from all relevant organisations or sectors in 
the target list been interviewed?’ 
Once coverage of the target list has been achieved, the value of successive 
interviews declines and each yields less new information than the last until 
‘saturation’ is reached at which point the value of new interviews is low or zero 
(O’Reilly and Parker, 2013; Burnham et al., 2008).  
 
Figure 8: Saturation in interviews (Bonde, 2013) 
The number of interviews required to achieve saturation cannot be known in 
advance, which means carrying out analysis of interviews in order to discern 
whether enough have been conducted. A clear understanding of what 
constitutes ‘new information’ was also required. Two criteria were used to 
assess whether saturation had been reached: the first was that no significant 
additional themes were added to the coding scheme (see page 81 below) and, 
when asked for suggestions of names to interview, interviewees proposed no 
new names. 
Despite having a clear plan of when to stop, the problem of where to start 
remained. The scope of the study, the nature of the research question and the 
possible size of the population being sampled (the EU climate and energy policy 
community, estimated by interviewees to include between 50 and 200 people) 
all give some indications about the appropriate sample size. Based on an 
assumption that saturation would not be reached with fewer than twenty 
interviews, twenty interviews were conducted, analysed and reflected on. Since 
more were deemed necessary, a further five were carried out, repeating the 
analysis to ascertain whether enough data had been collected. This iterative 
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process continued until coverage across the interviewee types20 was achieved 
and that no new themes or names of community members were emerging. The 
final count was thirty-two interviews with thirty-five individuals (three 
organisations opted to field two subjects). Interview subjects are broken down 
into categories as shown in the table below. A full list of interviewees and 
interview dates can be found in the appendix. 
Table 1: Interviews by type 
Type Subtype Role Number Comments 
European 
Commission 
DG Energy Directorate A (energy policy), 
unit 1 (policy coordination) 
1 Team leader 
“ “ Directorate C (renewable 
energy and energy efficiency) 
2 Director and head of unit 
“ “ Member of energy 
Commissioner’s cabinet 
1  
“ Secretariat 
General 
Directorate D3 resource 
efficiency policy coordination 
2 Head of unit and policy officer 
European 
Parliament 
MEP Member of the 
Greens/European Free 
Alliance 
1 Member of Industry, Research 
and Technology Parliamentary 
Committee (ITRE) and 
Environment, Public Health 
and Food Safety Parliamentary 
Committee (ENVI). Also 
President of Parliamentary 
Group: European Forum for 
Renewable Energy Sources 
(EUFORES) 
Lobbyist Trade 
association 
representative 
EWEA 1  
“ “ Eurelectric 2 (Former head of EU affairs and 
current policy specialist 
“ “ International Emissions 
Trading Association 
1 Head of EU affairs 
“ “ Solarpower Europe 1 Senior public affairs 
                                            
20 EU Commission political and services; Corporations and companies; Trade associations; NGOs; Select 
parliamentarians active in agenda-setting; Think tanks 
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“ “ European Ocean Energy 1 Senior European affairs 
(former EWEA EU policy 
specialist) 
“ “ Euroace 1  
“ “ Business Europe 1  
“ “ Eurogas 1  
“ “ Euracoal 2  
“ Energy 
intensive 
consumers 
ArcelorMittal 1  
“ Energy 
efficiency 
equipment 
producers 
Velux 1 Former head EU lobbyist for 
the Danish Energy Industry 
Association 
“ Utilities RWE 2  
“ “ Engie (former GDF Suez) 1 (GDF Suez) 
“ “ SSE 1  
“ Oil majors Statoil 1  
“  Shell 1  
Climate and 
environmental 
groups 
Campaign 
organisations 
Greenpeace 1  
“ “ Friends of the Earth Europe 1  
“ “ Change Partnership 1  
“ Think tanks and 
foundations 
E3G 2  
“ “ European Climate Foundation 1  
“ “ Prince of Wales’ Corporate 
Leaders Group 
1  
“ “ European Policy Centre 1  
Other “ Corporate Europe Observatory 1  
2.4.2 Ethical considerations 
All social research has moral and ethical implications. Alongside the imperative 
to create a piece of research which does not misrepresent or distort any 
findings, the main ethical consideration for this study was the proper treatment 
of interview subjects and handling of the information they provided. In line with 
commonly accepted research guidelines, five ethical principles were followed 
during the research, particularly during data collection: 
1. Beneficence/non-malfeasance or the avoidance of harm; 
2. Veracity or the avoidance of deception; 
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3. Autonomy or individuals’ right to limit information about themselves; 
4. Confidentiality or individuals’ right to control information about 
themselves; 
5. The principle of informed consent (Burnham et al., 2008, p.286).  
In line with these principles, while the intention was to make an audio recording 
of all interviews, participants were given the option to decline to be recorded. 
Also, if a participant asked to review their testimony or interview transcript, 
relevant passages were provided. Each participant was shown and asked to 
acknowledge a release form that clearly states the terms under which the 
researcher/interviewee relationship would proceed.  
To maintain the appropriate level of anonymity, care has been taken not to 
quote people directly in the findings who were unwilling to be quoted or to 
present testimony that could identify them directly without their express 
permission to do so. Instead, in the majority of cases the link between the data 
and findings has been maintained by numbering and citing interviews – e.g. 
(Interview 21). 
2.4.3 Data analysis 
Between interview transcripts, notes and observations and documents 
produced by members of the community, a large volume of data was collected. 
For this reason, a common method for handling all data sources was adopted.  
2.4.3.1 Coding 
To assist with the organisation and categorisation of data, specialist qualitative 
data analysis software application, NVivo21 was used. The software allowed 
collation of evidence of all kinds and to categorise them appropriately. NVivo 
also has the ability to ‘code’ portions of the text. Coding is a “data condensation 
task that enables [the researcher] to retrieve the most meaningful material, to 
assemble chunks of data that go together and further condense the bulk into 
analysable units” (Miles et al., 2013, p.73). In this case ‘first cycle’ codes were 
generated  which were relevant to the theoretical propositions made by the 
Multiple Streams Approach. Often, the same portion of the text was coded with 
                                            
21 http://www.qsrinternational.com/products_nvivo.aspx 
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more than one code, a technique known as ‘simultaneous coding’ (Saldana, 
2009). 
In addition to these ‘core codes’, more codes were added ‘on the fly’ in 
circumstances where it was clear that a piece of text was relevant to the 
analysis and retrieval may be necessary at a later date but it was not 
immediately clear where in the coding structure it would best fit. This 
precipitated a ‘second cycle’ of coding in which similar codes were merged, 
codes that had very few references were dropped and the structure of the 
coding schema reconfigured to result in a narrower and more useful set of 
codes (Saldana, 2009). 
The codes were handled hierarchically with the coding of a portion of text as a 
‘child’ automatically coding the same portion as that code’s ‘parent’. This 
allowed the analysis to move easily between more general information (for 
example all data relevant to the ‘problem’ stream) and more granular 
information (for example, that data relevant to ‘indicators’ or a specific indicator 
such as fuel prices). In total, 264 codes were used in the first cycle of coding 
which following a second cycle was reduced to around 20. 
Care was also taken to categorise documents based on type (transcript, 
position paper, consultation response etc.), actor type, and the individual’s role 
within the organisation and industry sector. Prior to coding, each interview or 
other piece of evidence was read fully to gauge the overall content, then it was 
re-read, applying codes as appropriate to selections of the text (Saldana, 2009).  
2.4.3.2 Chronology 
An important factor in constructing the case study and tracing the processes at 
work was the temporal order in which things happened (Beach and Pedersen, 
2013; Kittel and Kuehn, 2012; Collier, 2011; Bennett, 2010). To enable the 
construction of a timeline(s), Data was handled in two ways: first, from the 
outset of the research, a spreadsheet that served as an ‘events register’ was 
maintained. It was used to list any event that appeared significant such as 
publication of position papers, official documents from the EU, public meetings 
etc. The column headings included date, type of event and category of actors 
involved and the URL or file location of any supporting evidence. Secondly, any 
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reference to key dates or timings of events in interviews was coded with the 
label ‘timing’ to allow any information held in interview transcripts to be 
transferred to the events register at a later stage. 
2.5 Creating trustworthy research 
Having set out the practical and ethical concerns of data collection and analysis 
in the previous section, this section describes the steps taken to ensure that the 
research was trustworthy and of high quality. 
In order to ensure that the findings of this research are sound, of high quality 
and can be considered ‘worth paying attention to’, the methods were measured 
against four evaluative criteria; credibility (section 2.5.1), transferability (section 
2.5.2), dependability (section 2.5.3), and confirmability (section 2.5.4) (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). Section 2.5.5 explores some of the potential limitations of the 
research approach and mitigations taken. 
2.5.1 Credibility 
Lincoln and Guba describe the credibility of research to be the extent to which 
the researcher can be confident that it is ‘internally valid’ – that is, the findings 
are congruent with reality (Shenton, 2004; Loh, 2013). Another interpretation of 
the credibility criterion is that the phenomena under investigation are accurately 
represented in the research.  
Care was taken to ensure prolonged engagement with and persistent 
observation of the research setting by engaging with the Brussels energy policy 
community and its debates in action, through social and traditional media as 
well as spending a significant amount of time in Brussels over the course of a 
year and a half (see Box 1, below). Care was also taken to triangulate sources 
of data. At a basic level, this meant following up documents alluded to by 
participants during interviews to verify their interpretation of the content or 
seeking third-party verification of claims from alternative sources such as media 
reports or official document. More subtly, it demanded that the selection of 
interviewees, in addition to fulfilling the criteria of coverage and saturation also 
represented a wide a range of views as possible. Many interviewees were very 
willing to discuss the project and it was possible, during the course of the 
interviews and subsequent conversations, to discuss some of the analytical 
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choices, data sources and options as well as preliminary conclusions. This 
‘member checking’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) proved extremely useful with 
participants willing to provide alternative interpretations or additional information 
– although care was taken to recognise the fact that the participants’ interests 
and those of the researcher are clearly not necessarily aligned. The objective 
was ‘member checking’ not ‘member validation’, as Loh (2013) puts it.  
Box 1: Immersion in the community: the Brussels bubble 
 
At the heart of this study is a community: the community of people bound by a shared 
interest in EU climate and policy outcomes. While decisions and interactions that impact EU 
policy can happen in national capitals or other locations in the EU, the undoubted focus of 
policy debates in the agenda-setting phase of any policy is the de-facto capital of the EU, 
Brussels.  
 
So distinct is the policy community that it has often been described informally as the 
‘Brussels Bubble’ found in a relatively small geographical area of Brussels known as the ‘EU 
Quarter’. The vast bulk of interaction between the lobbyists, journalists, academics, national 
representatives and EU officials that comprise the policy community takes place within a 
few hundred metres of Rond-Point Schuman, home to the European Commission and the 
epicentre of Brussels policymaking.  
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Figure 9: Schuman Roundabout in the EU quarter of Brussels. The European Commission's Berlaymont Building 
and the Justus Lipsius Building, home of the Council of the European Union and the European Council 
 
Aside from the benefits of face-to-face interviews, such as developing rapport (Burnham et 
al., 2008), the interviews may well have been conducted by telephone or video conference 
without missing much or any of the information required to complete the study. But four 
visits to Brussels between Spring 2015 and Spring 2016 provided more than improved 
interview transcripts. By renting space in a shared office on Rond-Point Shuman within sight 
of the Commission and Council buildings, working regular hours during visits and attending 
events at which EU climate and energy policy was debated, it was possible, for short 
stretches of time, able to experience something of life in the bubble.  
 
Connections could be made that would otherwise have been difficult by approaching 
potential interviewees in person at networking events, for example. It was also possible to 
follow-up suggestions of potential interviewees immediately; in some cases the ability to be 
at an interviewee’s office within ten minutes of calling to arrange an interview granted 
access that, due to busy diaries and reluctance to commit valuable time to researchers, 
would otherwise have been impossible. 
 
2.5.2 Transferability 
Described by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as a kind of ‘external validation’, 
transferability refers to the applicability of the research to other settings. Unlike 
much positivistic scientific research, qualitative research tends to be highly 
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context-specific and lack wider generalizability to other settings, populations etc. 
(Shenton, 2004). Even if the findings in this thesis have applicability in other 
settings, the burden of assessing its transferability cannot rest with the 
researcher but with the person seeking to transfer the findings between settings 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985). In order to provide the best chance of future 
researchers being able to assess the findings’ comparability with their own 
research setting, as much contextual information has been included as 
possible. This approach to rich or ‘thick’ description aims to provide “a full 
description of all contextual factors impinging on the inquiry” (Guba, 1981). 
2.5.3 Dependability 
In quantitative fields, it is normal to view reliability as the repeatability or 
replicability of a particular study (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The test for a 
researcher is whether the same procedure, carried out under the same 
conditions, would yield the same result. In qualitative research, on the other 
hand, the same concept is captured by the less strict idea of dependability. 
While care should be taken to ensure that a future researcher could repeat the 
work, the expectation that the same result would emerge is relaxed (Shenton, 
2004). To ensure dependability, this thesis contains a detailed account of all 
research processes including a reflective appraisal of the approach to the 
research (see section the epilogue on page 309. 
2.5.4 Confirmability 
Confirmability in qualitative research is analogous to the objectivity sought by 
positivistic researchers. As Shenton puts it: “steps must be taken to help ensure 
as far as possible that the work’s findings are the result of the experiences and 
ideas of the informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the 
researcher” (Shenton, 2004, p.72). As a research technique, process tracing is 
one way to help ensure that the findings clearly flow from the data (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013), especially since an audit trail of data was created in the 
process. Triangulation of sources is also important in minimising investigator 
bias (Shenton, 2004).  
 87 
2.5.5 Limitation of this research approach 
This thesis is based on a single, in-depth case study. An analysis based on few 
or one case studies faces what is often described as the ‘small-N problem’ 
which tends to hinge on the perception that it is not possible to draw 
generalizable findings from a single instance of a particular phenomenon 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006; Yin, 1994; Blatter and Haverland, 2012). The ‘problem’ is 
countered by asserting that it is perfectly possible to view social science as an 
exercise in ‘knowing’ rather than ‘proving’. That is, abstract (context 
independent) knowledge is not necessarily more valuable than the concrete 
(context specific) knowledge that one can expect to be produced from a case 
study (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
2.6 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has provided the definitions and assumptions that underpin the 
research reported in this thesis. It introduced and described the analytical 
framework, as well as the rationale for its use and the implications for the 
research the structure of the thesis. Also in this chapter was a detailed account 
of the research processes including the research strategy, data collection, 
ethical considerations, potential shortcomings of the approach, and the steps 
taken to mitigate them.  
While there are a number of competing definitions of the terms ‘policy’ and 
‘public policy’, the definition used in this thesis is “a set of interrelated decisions 
taken by a political actor or group of actors concerning the selection of goals 
and the means of achieving them within a specified situation where these 
decisions should, in principle, be within the power of those actors to achieve” 
(Jenkins, 1978, p.15). The thesis’ primary focus is the policy process rather than 
outcome; it is primarily interested in how decision was taken rather than 
whether those decisions were necessarily the right ones. 
Agenda setting is the process, early in a policy’s life during which ideas 
compete for approval and acceptance. The definition of agenda used here is: 
‘the subjects or problems being given serious attention by EU officials involved 
in deciding the content, form and ambition of the 2030 climate and energy 
framework’.  This definition broadly limits the temporal focus of the study to the 
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period between COP15 in December 2009 and the European Council in 
October 2014. 
Interest representation is defined here as the activity of business and civil 
society actors which attempts to influence the outcome of the policymaking 
process.  
While there are many theoretical frameworks that may be useful for conducting 
an analysis of the EU policymaking process, this thesis uses the multiple 
streams approach for three main reasons: 
1. It assumes that ambiguity is rife within the policy process and that 
instead of firmly held, well thought-through and externally determined 
preferences, actors are often taking decisions fast and with limited 
information – meaning that preferences about policy are an output rather 
than an input to the interaction between actors; 
2. MSA breaks with the assumption that policy is made in a linear, rational 
manner with problems identified first, solutions developed second and 
choices made between options last. Instead, MSA acknowledges that, in 
many cases, policy proposals or ideas pre-date the arrival of a problem 
onto the agenda and are, in effect, solutions searching for problems 
(Kingdon, 2010); 
3. MSA is agnostic about the location of political power in the policymaking 
process. While many models of policymaking assume that power lies 
within formal decision-making bodies, the analytical device of the policy 
entrepreneur allows for any participant to manipulate ideas, problems 
and the political context in order to influence the agenda – especially 
valuable when analysing the activity of civil society actors; 
Two changes from the framework set down by Kingdon (2010) are made. The 
first is that the role of interest groups and civil society is expanded, as 
recommended by Rozbicka and Spohr (2015). While in Kingdon’s model, 
interest groups were given an important role within the politics stream, here the 
ability of interest groups to engage in political manipulation and framing within 
the problem and policy streams and to act as fully-fledged policy entrepreneurs 
is assumed. This is particularly important in the EU context where civil society 
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tends to have especially good access to key officials and the deliberation 
process (Richardson and Coen, 2009; Greenwood, 2011). Secondly, the 
definition of policy entrepreneur is more closely defined than in Kingdon’s 
original formulation. Four criteria suggested by Mintrom and Norman (2009) are 
used to identify policy entrepreneurship: social acuity, problem definition, team 
building and leading by example. 
The research design is based on a single, in-depth case study of the 
policymaking and agenda-setting process. In order to ensure the greatest 
analytical value is derived from the data, process tracing is used to connect 
events and outcomes. Data are collected from a wide range of documents and 
thirty-two élite interviews with thirty-five people closely involved in the EU 2030 
climate and energy package in a professional capacity. Interviews and other 
data were coded using specialist software, with the propositions derived from 
the MSA theoretical framework used as a starting point. Particular attention was 
paid to the temporal order of events. To ensure that the research is as 
trustworthy as possible and the findings emerge directly from the evidence, 
steps to ensure the credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability of 
the findings were taken.  
The following five chapters present the findings of the study. Chapter 3 provides 
an overview of the key actors and formal processes within which they interact; 
Chapter 4 describes the problem stream; Chapter 5 the policy stream and 
Chapter 6 the politics stream. Chapter 7 sets out the coupling of the streams by 
describing the policy window and presents evidence of policy entrepreneurship. 
  
 90 
  
 91 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II: Results chapters 
  
 92 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 93 
Chapter 3. Actors and processes 
“Don’t hate the playa, hate the game” Ice-T 
This chapter presents an overview of the institutions and processes as well as 
civil society groups and individuals involved in setting the agenda for the 2030 
climate and energy framework between 2009 and 2014. It is based on the 
interviews described in Chapter 2, literature review and other sources where 
relevant.  
Section 3.2 introduces and describes the institutional actors, the European 
Commission, and European Parliamentarians as well as member states and the 
European Council. It then examines the process by which the various parts of 
the Commission coordinate to turn ideas into Commission proposals in section 
3.3.  
Section 3.4 discusses the drivers of the relationship between the policymakers 
and business, environmental and industrial interests in Brussels. Section 3.5 
describes the main business and industrial interests’ organisations and roles, 
section 3.6 describes some important cross-sectoral coalitions of actors and 
section 3.7 presents an overview of two main types of environmental interests in 
Brussels: environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and philanthropic foundations. Section 
3.8 identifies and describes the groupings of EU member states salient to the 
EU 2030 agenda setting process. Section 3.9 concludes. 
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3.1  Introduction 
The European policymaking process is often characterised as pluralist and 
multi-levelled and involving many diverse actors and coalitions of actors – 
perhaps especially so in politically contested policy areas such as climate and 
energy (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; Rosamond, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 
2001). To interest groups, the institutional complexity of the EU’s system of 
multi-level governance presents multiple ‘access-points’ for attempts at 
influencing policy outcomes. It has been observed that interest groups may 
target different parts of the EU’s decision-making machinery depending on a 
range of factors and actors may be ‘promiscuous’ in their dealings with the 
various bodies as they engage in ‘venue-shopping’ in pursuit of their goals 
(Mazey and Richardson, 2001; Richardson and Coen, 2009). 
Which actors are involved and are of interest to the researcher varies with the 
policy area, the stage of the policy process and the particular peculiarities of the 
debate in question (Greenwood, 2011; Richardson and Coen, 2009; Hill, 2009). 
The following sections provide an overview of the key actors and their role 
relative to EU policy. The list of actors included here is informed both by 
literature review and the in depth interviews described in Chapter 2. 
3.2 European policymakers 
Central to any discussion about European policymaking are the institutions of 
the European Union. These formal and unique decision-making bodies (of 
which there are precisely seven22 provided for in the Lisbon Treaty alongside 
many others with wide-ranging statuses in decision making (Wallace and Reh, 
2015)) provide the official means by which the EU proposes and passes 
European law. This chapter focuses on the institutions most relevant to policy 
formulation: the European Commission discussed in 3.2.1, the EU Parliament 
(3.2.2) and the European Council (3.2.3). In the agenda-setting phase, by far 
                                            
22 the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union (simply called 'the 
Council'), the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central 
Bank, and the Court of Auditors – although there are other institutions not mentioned in the Treaty such 
as the Eurogroup of Eurozone finance ministers 
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the dominant institution is the European Commission (Richardson and Coen, 
2009) although Parliamentarians can and do play a role while the Commission 
works hard to produce policy that aligns with member states’ preferences since 
national governments will eventually need to approve any proposal.  
3.2.1 European Commission 
As the EU’s Executive, the European Commission enjoys a near monopoly on 
policy initiation and a role as the "conditional agenda setter" of the Union 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p.12). It is apparent from the literature, however, that 
there are many sometimes conflicting interpretations of the nature and role of 
this unusual institution. 
Often studied by intergovernmentalists as a principal-agent problem with the 
Member States as principal and the Commission as their agent (Pollack, 2009, 
p.9), there are two possible ways in which the Commission may act 
independently: by setting the agenda and by exerting bargaining power over the 
Council and the Parliament (see e.g. Maltby, 2013). However, a more detailed 
analysis of internal workings of the Commission demonstrates that the process 
by which decisions are taken are more complex than the principal-agent model 
might suggest (Hartlapp et al., 2014). 
The Commission is not a monolith. It is, in effect, a hybrid institution with two 
conjoined parts: a political part in the form of the College of Commissioners and 
an administrative part in the form of the Commission services. In addition to this 
vertical differentiation, there are also important horizontal differentiations and 
tensions between the sectoral Directorates-General (DGs) into which the 
Commission services are organised (Hartlapp et al., 2012; Hartlapp et al., 2014; 
Cini, 1995), especially in a case where there is more than one than one ‘lead’ 
DG on an initiative – as was case for the 2030 framework. The following 
sections describe relevant actors and processes at work in the College of 
Commissioners, the services the coordination efforts within the Commission. 
3.2.1.1 The College of Commissioners: political level 
A Commission President, approved by the European Parliament to serve a five-
year term, heads the European Commission. José Manuel Barroso filled the 
office of President in two terms (known as Barroso I and II) from 2004 to 2014. 
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Jean-Claude Juncker succeeded Barroso in 2014. The President currently 
heads a ‘College’ of twenty-eight Commissioners (including themselves); one 
nominated by each Member State. Commissioners are allocated a role in the 
college by the President, which must be approved by plenary vote in the 
Parliament. The College is currently structured to have a high representative for 
foreign affairs, a first vice President, five vice Presidents and twenty 
Commissioners with various portfolios of responsibility. While the President, 
First Vice President and Vice Presidents have crosscutting responsibilities, 
other members of the college tend to have a specific DG(s) under their remit. 
The appointment of Commissioners and Vice Presidents is highly political and 
often difficult business (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999; Peterson, 2012; 
Egeberg, 2013). 
Members of the college are expected to work in the interest of the Union as a 
whole, regardless of the nationality and even take an ‘oath’ of independence 
from their country of nationality. They are expected to publically support any 
and all decisions taken by the College by simple majority vote, regardless of 
whether they voted in favour of the decision (Peterson, 2012).  
In addition to the President, the two most important members of the College 
during the debate about the 2030 targets in 2013 and 2014 were Vice President 
for Energy, Günther Oettinger and Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie 
Hedegaard, two politicians with different responsibilities and starkly different 
views of how best to proceed with climate and energy policy. While Hedegaard 
tended to be in favour of more ambitious action on tackling the issue of climate, 
Oettinger tended to be more inclined to consider the implications of such action 
on the cost of energy and more open to appeals made by Europe’s industries 
which wished to limit ambition (Eikeland, 2012; Buchan and Keay, 2014; Bürgin, 
2015). Oettinger, as a Vice President was also more senior and from Germany, 
a country with a powerful domestic energy industry while Hedegaard is from 
smaller, Denmark; a disparity which was probably exacerbated to some extent 
by a perception within the policy community that he was the more formidable 
politician (Interviews 2, 30, 4, 8). 
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3.2.1.1.1 Cabinets 
Each member of the College of Commissioners is resourced with a small staff 
or cabinet. These small teams of between six and eight advisors act as a 
personal political secretariat for each Commissioner. The most senior members 
of the cabinets are the Chefs de Cabinet or chiefs of staff and their deputies 
who often stand in for Commissioners at speaking engagements or other events 
(Egeberg, 2013). Although the cabinets were once seen very much as enclaves 
of the national interest of whatever member state the Commissioner is from, 
more recent rule changes on the nationality of Chefs de Cabinet and other 
members of the cabinets mean that this is no longer perceived to be the case 
(Peterson, 2012). The cabinets play an important coordinating role within the 
Commission by acting as a bridge between Commissioners and between the 
political level and the services. All of the Chefs de Cabinet meet weekly at a 
meeting known as the ‘Hebdo’ and chaired by the Secretariat General (Hartlapp 
et al., 2012; Hartlapp et al., 2014). 
3.2.1.2 The European Commission services 
The main administrative activities of the European Commission’s bureaucratic 
services are divided into policy areas, each one assigned to a particular 
Directorate-general (DG) of which, at the time of writing, there are 33. The two 
DGs important for the 2030 energy and climate framework are DG Climate 
Action (DG Clima) and DG Energy (DG Ener), which held joint drafting 
responsibility for the Commission’s proposals. There are also internal services 
which support and coordinate the activity of the DGs including Legal Services, 
the Statistical Office (Eurostat) and the Publication Office. By far the most 
politically important of these ‘horizontal’ services is the Secretariat-General (SG) 
(Hooghe and Kassim, 2013, p.182). 
3.2.1.2.1 Directorates-general 
Each DG is headed by a Director General who oversees a number of functional 
Directorates, each with a Director and comprised of several specialist units. The 
organisational and reporting structure of DG Energy and DG Clima are shown in 
the figures below. It should be noted that resources available to DG Clima with 
139 members of staff are significantly less than those available to DG Energy 
with more than 500 (European Commission, 2016b): 
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Figure 10: DG Energy organisational chart, December 2014. Source: Europa.eu 
 99 
 
Figure 11: DG Climate Action organisational chart, December 2014. Source: Europa.eu 
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3.2.1.3 Coordinating the Commission 
The independence and separated nature of DGs mean that there is often 
conflict between personnel and policy ideas from different DGs (Hartlapp et al., 
2014). As one policy officer close to the 2030 framework put it in an interview:  
“When we, in the Commission, elaborate a piece of legislation or even 
our communications these days, and we have these inter-service 
consultations, I can assure you it’s more difficult, usually, than afterwards 
negotiating with Parliament and member states. So basically, internally, 
there’s [sic] a lot of people who think they know it all and they very much 
specialise in their own thing, and the discussions can be very, very 
tough”…”I see that as a good thing but, of course, from the outside it can 
look like we’re all over the place and we’re killing each other” (Interview 
7). 
Figure 12 shows the hierarchical layers within the European Commission and 
the political/administrative boundary. 
 
Figure 12: Stages of coordination in the European Commission (Hartlapp et al., 2012) 
3.2.1.3.1 The Secretariat General 
The Secretariat-General (SG) is, in effect, the Commission President’s 
permanent office and is headed by the most senior official in the European 
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Commission services and ‘Captain of the Ship’,(Hooghe and Kassim, 2013, 
p.182) the Secretary General, a post held by Catherine Day from 2005 to 2015. 
The official objective of the SG is to ensure that the policy output from the DGs 
is coherent and in line with the rules and procedures of the Commission. The 
SG also plays an important role in ensuring that coordination and liaison with 
the other institutions such as the Council and the Parliament are conducted 
properly. During Barroso’s tenure as Commission President, the role of the SG 
strengthened and Catherine Day was seen by some to be acting to increase the 
President’s reach into the day-to-day business of the services (Egeberg, 2013; 
Peterson, 2012; Hooghe and Kassim, 2013; Kassim et al., 2016). 
3.2.2 European Parliament 
The European Parliament (EP) is the directly elected institution in the EU’s 
bicameral legislature. There are currently 751 Members of the European Union 
(MEPs) with each country’s representation a function of its population. The 
committees and political groupings of the European Parliament play an 
important role in EU policymaking (Shackleton, 2012). Through its formal role in 
the legislative process, the European Parliament can table amendments to 
Commission proposals and, if it is unable to adopt the Council's position, block 
the proposal. The EP is also instrumental in determining the character of the 
Commission. The political makeup of the Parliament strongly influences the 
selection of the Commission president through the 'Spitzenkandidat' process23 
and all newly designated Commissioners endure a hearing before the relevant 
committees of the Parliament with an EP vote on whether or not to approve or 
reject the list put forward by the Commission President.24  
MEPs are organised by political affiliation into European political groups of 
which there are currently eight25 (seven during the time period in which the 
                                            
23
 http://euobserver.com/eu-elections/124796 
24
 http://ephearings2014.eu/ 
25 Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats), Group of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, European Conservatives and Reformists Group, 
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Confederal Group of the European United Left 
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research was conducted). Voting by Members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) has been found to align far more closely to their European political 
grouping than their country of origin. Also, although members' positioning in the 
Parliament is multidimensional, it has been shown that groups broadly occupy 
positions within a two-dimensional policy space defined by their position on 
European integration (more versus less) and their more general left versus right 
political inclination (McElroy and Benoit, 2011; McElroy and Benoit, 2007). 
Figure 13 shows the makeup of the 2009-2014 European Parliament by number 
of MEPs per grouping. 
 
Figure 13: Makeup of the 2009-2014 European Parliament by MEPs per grouping (source: europarl.europa.eu) 
Formally, as a primarily legislative body, the Parliament is largely excluded from 
the agenda setting phase (Shackleton, 2012). However, MEPs’ role in the policy 
process can and does also go beyond their legislative duties. For example, 
members have been shown to play important roles in shaping debates about 
policy with Green Group MEP Claude Turmes shown to play a crucial 
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networking function in the negotiation of the 202020 targets in 2007 (Boasson 
and Wettestad, 2013). 
As in many national legislatures, MEPs are able to participate in cross-party 
initiatives to stimulate discussion on a specific topic. In the European 
Parliament, the European Forum for Renewable Energy Sources (EUFORES) 
was established in 1998 by Spanish MEPs and would go on to become an 
important pro-renewables and energy efficiency player in the discussion about 
the 202020 targets (Boasson and Wettestad, 2013; EUFORES, 2000). Claude 
Turmes has been president of EUFORES since 2010. 
3.2.2.1 Parliament committees 
The Parliament undertakes most of its work in specialist standing committees of 
a few dozen members. In addition to the Chair, the most important member of a 
parliamentary committee on a particular brief is the Rapporteur. The Rapporteur 
is elected by the members of the committee to be responsible for presenting the 
work of the committee to the Parliament. Two committees were jointly 
responsible for the response to the 2030 climate and energy framework, the 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety committee (ENVI) and the 
Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) committee. The Rapporteurs were Anne 
Delvaux (European Peoples Party) from ENVI and Konrad Szymański 
(European Conservatives and Reformists) from ITRE. 
3.2.3 The European Council and member states 
The European Council exists to provide the EU with its political impetus (EU, 
2008; de Schoutheete, 2012). It is (currently) made up of the 28 heads of state 
or government of the European members as well as its own president and the 
president of the European Commission. The naturally intergovernmental 
institution, which meets several times each year, has no legislative powers but 
as a strategic body, it is a “formidable locus of power” (de Schoutheete, 2012). 
The President of the European Council is elected by the heads of state and 
government to serve a thirty-month term. The current President is former Polish 
Prime Minister, Donald Tusk who succeeded Herman Van Rompuy in 
December 2014. Decisions taken by the European Council are generally taken 
by consensus; that is, no official objections to a position are forthcoming.  
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Despite only being made a formal institution of the EU by the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009, the European Council has played a significant role in shaping the EU, 
particularly at times of crisis or difficult political circumstances (de Schoutheete, 
2012). The European Council approved the 2030 climate and energy framework 
in the conclusions of its meeting in October 2014 (European Council, 2014). 
In addition to their political role in the European Council and legislative role in 
the Council of the European Union, member states are also involved in agenda 
setting as a member of the policy community. Member states may be invited to 
sit on Commission expert groups (after all, the Commission’s aim is to propose 
legislation that will pass and understanding possible member state objections 
early can be valuable), may support industrial think tanks and other community 
actors or apply pressure directly to members of the College of Commissioners 
(Interview 4, 6, 8).  
3.3 European Commission decision-making process 
The EU has many decision-making processes for determining outcomes as 
diverse as creating new legislation and deciding the make-up of the European 
Commission. Following an outline of procedures relevant to the EU 2030 
targets, this section examines the phenomena of inter-service consultation 
(ISC) and impact assessment (IA). 
Within the European Commission, the generic decision-making procedure for 
agreeing on the content of legislative proposals and non-legislative initiatives is 
a sequence of steps that begins with the services, sees coordination between 
the various departments of the bureaucracy, an impact assessment and review 
and, finally, a vote in the College of Commissioners. Figure 14 conceptually 
illustrates the process by which a proposal makes its way from the 
administrative to the political level. 
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Figure 14: European Commission decision-making stages (source: Hartlapp et al., 2014) 
Figure 15 shows the steps of the generic process in more detail with 
approximate timings. 
 
Figure 15: Generic EU Commission decision-making process (IAB=Impact Assessment Board, ISC=Inter-Service 
Consultation) 
The timeline of events with dates for the important events in the Commission 
process for producing the EU 2030 climate and energy targets is shown in 
Table 2, showing that just over a year and a half elapsed between the public 
consultation and the final decision. This timeline is expanded on in Chapter 5. 
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Event Institution Date 
Opening of public 
consultation 
Commission 27/03/2013 
Draft impact 
assessment submitted 
to IAB 
Commission 24/10/2013 
IAB hearing Commission 20/11/2013 
IA resubmitted Commission 12/12/2013 
IAB approval Commission 09/01/2013 
Publication of 
Communication 
Commission 22/1/2014 
Impact assessment 
published 
Commission 22/1/2014 
2030 Energy Efficiency 
Communication 
Commission 23/07/2014 
European Council 
takes final decision  
European Council 23/10/2014 
Table 2: Timeline of institutional decision-making process (source: author's own elaboration) 
In order to foster coordination between DGs and between the services and the 
political level, a number of steps are taken. Following the completion of the 
appropriate impact assessment and informal coordination between DGs, the 
DG leading the proposal (in this case, DG Ener and DG Clima) must seek the 
formal opinion of all DGs and services with an interest in the policy area in a 
process known as inter-service consultation (ISC).  
Prior to undertaking any legislative or non-legislative initiative, the services of 
the European Commission must undertake an impact assessment (IA) which 
must “set out the logical reasoning that links the problem, its underlying drivers, 
the objectives and a range of policy options to tackle the problem. [It] must 
present the likely impacts of the options, who will be affected by them and how” 
(European Commission, 2015c). Producing an impact assessment requires 
public consultation as well as a quantification of impacts, as far as is possible. 
This is often achieved through the use of scenario modelling the methods and 
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implications of which are described in more detail in Chapter 5. The impact 
assessment board (IAB)26, a panel of nine senior officials and experts scrutinise 
every initiative (legislative and non-legislative) proposed by the Commission. 
3.4 External stakeholders and civil society 
The previous sections examined key institutions and processes in EU decision 
making. This section examines the relationship between EU policymakers and 
external interests.   
The weakness of representative democracy in the EU sometimes is referred to 
as the ‘democratic deficit’ (see Hix, 2013, p.67 for various diagnoses of the 
concept;  and Follesdal and Hix, 2006 for a more detailed discussion). One 
implication of poor voter turnout and weak links with civil society due to the 
Brussels’ remote position relative to European society, among other problems, 
the institutions, especially the Commission, exist in a kind of participatory 
symbiosis with other élite actors and lobby groups (Greenwood, 2011). This 
section introduces and discusses the actors involved or seeking to be involved 
in the discussion about the 2030 framework. 
The relatively under-resourced European Commission (the Commission staff is 
much smaller than even a middle-sized national bureaucracy) often looks 
outwards to the wider policy community for technical and sometimes political 
information (Richardson and Coen, 2009; Hartlapp et al., 2014). Indeed, the 
involvement of outside interest groups is considered a valid and important 
element of deliberation and discussion of policy topics (Richardson and Coen, 
2009; Greenwood, 2011). In cases where a large amount of technical or 
analytical expertise is required, the role may be especially important. The 
Commission services will often seek formal policy input through its many ‘expert 
groups’ which focus on a specific narrow topic and may have members from the 
member states, industry or other stakeholders (European Commission, 2016a). 
The Commission may also engage bilaterally with organisation and groups. 
These external stakeholders engage with a view to influencing policy outcomes 
                                            
26 Replaced by the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) in 2015 
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in their favour, an activity often referred to a ‘lobbying’ or ‘interest 
representation’ (Greenwood, 2011; Richardson and Coen, 2009). 
External interests’ channels of influence vary across the policymaking process. 
For example, in the early stages of agenda setting and policy formulation, 
interests may engage with the European Commission, while during the 
legislative phase they may be more engaged with the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union and during policy implementation in the 
member states, national governments may be targeted (Interview 1, 2, 8, 25; 
Greenwood, 2011). In some policy areas, perhaps Climate policy in Particular, 
there is a growing trend for business, NGO and official actors to form coalitions 
and work together on policy issues (see e.g. Fairbrass, 2013). 
The networks concept used widely across social sciences has been applied to 
the policy community (Atkinson and Colemna, 1992; Coen and Richardson, 
2009; Coen, 2007b) and has been found to be useful description of interest 
intermediation at the European level (Kohler-Koch, 1998; Kohler-Koch and 
Eising, 2003, p.6). The information processing ‘policy community’ proposed by 
Kingdon to be made up of the people who have in common their “shared 
concern with one area of policy problems” and “know each other’s ideas, 
proposals and research” (Kingdon, 2010) is, at a European level, a network of 
élites.  
The following sections introduce and discuss the salient characteristics of the 
actors identified in the course of this research as part of that network. That is, 
those actors which were interacting with each other and the institutions of the 
EU with a view to influencing the 2030 framework.  
3.5 Business and industry interests 
Business and industry have had a voice in European policymaking since the 
Union’s earliest days, with the intensity of interaction between business and the 
institutions of the EU steadily growing with time (Greenwood, 2011; Richardson 
and Coen, 2009). In climate and energy policy, the most relevant businesses 
are those either involved in the production and distribution of energy (e.g. 
utilities and oil companies) or those for which energy is an important factor of 
production (e.g. steel or other manufacturers). While there are many 
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approaches to EU lobbying, each with its own set of rules and logic 
(Greenwood, 2011), in the 2030 framework debate, a limited number of types of 
political actor was observed, most of which represent a form of collective action. 
While a very large number of companies have a representation in Brussels, it is 
relatively rare that a company will engage in lobbying without some form of 
coordination with other interests (Greenwood, 2011, p.92).  
Group membership, however, is a poor indicator of an individual company’s 
strategy or position. Often, firms are members of many groups, not all of which 
they are able to come to an agreement with on all issues. In some cases the 
decision to join a group (and accept the fees) is taken and rarely reviewed, 
perhaps continuing for many years (Interview 24; Greenwood, 2011). In other 
cases, it could be that a group takes a divergent position from a member but the 
member maintains its membership in order to a) influence the position and limit 
the damage it may do or b) make use of the grouping on a different issue later 
on (Interview 1). It could also be that a company is a member of a federation 
through national-level associations in parallel with its Brussels public affairs 
operation. Nevertheless, the groups themselves are important actors which 
have distinct characteristics. 
Section 3.5.1 describes the two main mode of business association in EU 
interest representation - European trade associations and the phenomenon of 
more fluid, ad-hoc policy coalitions. Section 3.5.2 describes the specificities of 
the electricity value chain, section 3.5.3 looks at the energy intensive industries, 
section 3.5.4 the energy efficiency industries, section 3.5.5 the renewable 
energy industries, section 3.5.6 the oil and gas producers and 3.5.7 the natural 
gas supply chain. Finally, section 3.5.8 introduces key actors in the coal 
production industry. 
3.5.1 Modes of association 
3.5.1.1 Trade associations 
Trade associations are a familiar and enduring feature of the Brussels political 
landscape. These membership organisations tend to display different 
characteristics than national-level groups. Firstly they are, more often than not, 
 110 
federated27. That is, they are associations of associations, most commonly 
made up of national trade bodies, thus maintaining a link with member state 
politics. Secondly, they tend to focus exclusively on political representation and 
not engage in some of the more ‘pastoral’ activities such as training and 
voluntary standards setting undertaken by national bodies (Greenwood, 2011). 
A growing number of organisations, however, are tending towards a more 
hybrid model of organisation in which both associations and multinational 
companies may be members and some sectoral organisations also play a role 
more similar to national associations by providing training, seminars and other 
activities. These organisations, since they persist through time, have an 
opportunity to form long-term, institutionalised relationships with policymakers 
based on mutual resource dependence (Greenwood, 2011; Richardson and 
Coen, 2009; Eikeland, 2011). 
3.5.1.2 Ad-hoc coalitions 
A major disadvantage of formally constituted trade associations and federations 
is that aggregating the interests of thousands or even millions of members can 
be very slow and often fraught with conflict, leading to ‘lowest common 
denominator’ outcomes which are “generally fairly bland” (Interview 3; 
Greenwood, 2011). Instead, a common approach is to form fluid, informal 
coalitions designed to coordinate actors’ responses to a particular issue and to 
share important resources such as intelligence, campaigning knowhow and 
even office space (Interview 30). These groups may be entirely organic with 
little or no visible secretariat or they may develop more formal structures over 
time. They may come into existence very quickly as a need arises and 
disappear just as quickly once they have “outlived their usefulness” (Interview 
31) or may be repurposed to address another issue. Importantly, the visibility of 
these ad-hoc groups depends to a great extent on their strategy. For example, 
they may have a distinct public presence and engage with the public discourse 
and senior politicians or be entirely invisible to all but the closest observer, 
seeking to engage specific policymakers on items of detail. 
                                            
27 Also known as ‘umbrella organisations’ 
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The following sections outline the key features of the most important sectoral 
interests in the 2030 debate: the electricity value chain (3.5.2), energy intensive 
industries (3.5.3), energy efficiency industries (3.5.4) renewable energy 
producers (3.5.5), oil and gas producers (3.5.6), the natural gas value chain 
(3.5.7) and coal producers (3.5.8). 
3.5.2 The electricity value-chain 
An important and well-established actor in the Brussels policy community is 
Eurelectric, a federation of national electricity industry trade associations. 
Eurelectric has actively participated in the policy process since 1989 with 
particularly notable influence on policies associated with the internal market for 
energy (Eikeland, 2011). Eurelectric’s primary membership is national trade 
associations and its board is made up largely of utility companies but it does 
also have a number of direct corporate members. As with any large 
membership organisation seeking to take positions on policy issues, alignment 
of the membership can prove difficult. In Eurelectric during the 2030 debate, 
there was a distinct schism between the Polish member association (which was 
especially unhappy about supporting a common position which endorsed 
ambitious climate action) and the secretariat (Interview 8, Eurelectric, 2013; 
Eurelectric, 2014).  
3.5.2.1 Energy utilities 
One of the types of businesses closest to energy policymaking is the energy 
utility. These firms, which produce and transport energy and sell it to 
businesses and households, often in high-regulated markets, are especially 
sensitive to changes to policy that may impact on the profitability of current or 
future investments. Despite having undergone significant recent privatisation 
and liberalisation and increasingly international investment portfolios, the 
natural monopoly in markets for infrastructure such as electricity networks 
means that the energy suppliers of Europe still have a distinctly national 
character with some utilities remain partially or fully state-owned and with strong 
connections to – and sometimes influence over - national politics (The 
Economist, 2010). The table below lists Europe’s major energy utilities. 
 
 112 
 
 
Company 
Member State 
HQ 
% direct 
state ownership 
Total assets 
(m$) 
Electricite de 
France SA 
France 85% $    327,230 
GDF Suez SA France 33% $    268,853 
Enel SpA Italy 25% $    224,578 
E.ON SE Germany - $    183,720 
Iberdrola SA Spain - $    126,665 
RWE AG Germany 
- (15% owned 
by DE 
municipalitie
s) 
$    115,395 
Gas Natural SDG 
SA 
Spain - $     61,342 
EDP-Energias de 
Portugal, SA 
Portugal - $     55,770 
EnBW Energie 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg AG 
Germany 47% $     48,106 
Centrica plc 
United 
Kingdom 
- $     33,775 
CEZ, a.s. 
Czech 
Republic 
70% $     32,282 
Fortum Oyj Finland 51% $     32,221 
SSE plc 
United 
Kingdom 
- $     31,689 
DONG Energy Denmark 60% $     21,390 
Public Power Corp 
SA 
Greece Public $     21,010 
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Polska Grupa 
Energetyczna SA 
Poland 60% $     17,835 
Vattenfall Sweden 100% $     13,069 
Table 3: Europe’s largest retail energy utilities, ranked by total assets. (Source: Platts top 250 energy companies 
2013 and company annual reports) 
In October 2013, the CEOS of 10 of Europe’s largest energy utilities met at a 
museum in Brussels dedicated to the surrealist art of René Magritte in order to 
create a common lobbying platform to influence, among other things, the EU 
2030 framework. Convened by Gérard Mestrallet, CEO of GDF Suez (now 
Engie), a founding partner of the museum, the group (pictured in Figure 16) 
agreed on a mission to:  
“All together to team up, to go beyond our divergences, beyond our 
differences, and to deliver a strong common message towards the EU 
leaders” - Gérard Mestrallet 
 
Figure 16: Magritte Group at its first meeting, October 2013 
The group, which adopted the title ‘The Magritte Group’ given to it in media 
reports (Interview 1), became an important feature of the policy landscape and 
remained so for the duration of the agenda-setting period and beyond. The 
group’s strategy generally seen to be effective (Interview 3 10, 11, 30) preferred 
high-level meetings and press conferences to detailed policy discussions with 
desk officers. 
In an attempt to replicate the high-impact strategy of the Magritte Group, a 
group of energy utilities calling themselves the ‘Coalition of Progressive Energy 
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Companies’ emerged in support of renewable energy (EUFORES, 2013; 
Beckman, 2013). The group, originally conceived in 2012 specifically to engage 
with the debate about the post 2020 EU energy policy (Neslen, 2012), had a 
variable membership which, in late 2013 included: Scottish and Southern 
Energy (SSE) from the UK, EWE and Stadtwerke Muenchen (SWM) from 
Germany, DONG Energy from Denmark, EDP from Portugal, Acciona from 
Spain, Enovos from Luxembourg and Eneco from the Netherlands. It remained 
intact throughout 2013 and into 2014 (Coalition of Progressive Energy 
Companies, 2014). There were concerns, however, that these smaller firms 
could find themselves to be no match for the “firepower” of the Magritte group 
and its powerful CEOs (Interview 22, 5, 23, 31). 
3.5.3 Energy intensive industries 
The energy intensive industries are those in which energy is a particularly 
important factor of production. They are differentiated from energy utility 
businesses firstly because they are energy consumers rather than producers 
and secondly because they are part of an international market in traded 
products. Unlike gas and electricity suppliers which depend on domestic or 
European infrastructure, they are unable to pass costs (such as carbon prices) 
onto consumers without facing price competition from firms based outside the 
EU (Interview 20, 15). There is no concrete and universally accepted definition 
of what makes a sector ‘energy intensive’ (Grave et al., 2015). Some definitions 
refer to the total energy consumption (e.g. Friends of the Earth UK, 2011) and 
some by the proportion of gross value added (GVA) made up by energy costs 
(Enevoldsen et al., 2007). But for the purposes of a political analysis, it is more 
appropriate to understand the energy intensive industries in terms of how they 
present themselves and how they engage with policy issues.  
The energy intensive industries have organised at a European level for at least 
two decades with a group of eight manufacturers known as the ENER-G828 
formed in the mid-1990s to lobby on the internal energy market. More recently, 
                                            
28 BASF (chemicals), AZKO Nobel (chemicals), Mercedes Benz (automotive), DOW (chemicals), ICI 
(chemicals), Pilkington (glass), KNP BT (paper), Thyssen (steel) 
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the energy intensive industries have formed a number of formal and informal 
groupings such as the Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review, an ad-hoc 
group established specifically to obtain concessions from the European Union 
emissions trading system (EU-ETS)29 in the form of the carbon leakage list in 
2007 (The Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review, 2007; Wettestad, 2009). 
The International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers in Europe (IFIEC 
Europe) was established in 1989 and represents the interests of 16 national 
energy intensive industry associations and is registered with permanent offices 
in Brussels, membership is shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: IFIEC Europe membership (Source: IFIEC Europe) 
                                            
29 see Chapter Chapter 4 for more detail about the EU-ETS 
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An alternative European grouping known as the Alliance of Energy Intensive 
Industries (AEII) is made up of sector-specific European associations has been 
active since at least 2006. Its membership has varied somewhat but tends to 
include a wide range of industries as well as IFIEC:  
 CEFIC, the European Chemical Industry Council 
 CEMBUREAU, the European Cement Association 
 CEPI, the Confederation of European Paper Industries 
 CERAME-UNIE, the Liaison Office of the European Ceramic Industry 
 EULA, the European Lime Association 
 EURO ALLIAGES, the Association of European ferro-alloy producers 
 Euro Chlor, the voice of the chlor-alkali industry 
 EUROFER, the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries 
 EUROGYPSUM, the voice of the European Gypsum Industry 
 EUROMETAUX, the European Association of Metals 
 EXCA, the European Expanded Clay Association 
 FuelsEurope, the European Petroleum Industry Association 
 Glass Alliance Europe, the European Alliance of Glass Industries 
 IFIEC EUROPE, the International Federation of Industrial Energy 
Consumers 
A number of large industrial companies also had a distinct individual profile in 
the 2030 debate. Notable among these are German chemicals giant, BASF 
(Interviews 14, 16, 19, 2, 30, 8) and some of the steel manufacturers, in 
particular, the large multinational players such as Tata Steel and ArcelorMittal. 
The wider steel industry did team up at times, however, with 60 steel industry 
CEOs co-signing a lobbying letter in October 2014 (Köhler et al., 2014). 
3.5.3.1 The Confederation of European Business  
The longest established and biggest of all European industrial interest groups is 
the Confederation of European Business or BUSINESSEUROPE, an 
archetypical example of élite pluralism in European interest representation 
(Coen, 2009). With roots that reach as far back in Europe’s history as the Treaty 
of Rome, BUSINESSEUROPE is a federation of 41 business associations from 
35 European countries including every EU member state. BUSINESSEUROPE 
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claims that this membership enables it to speak on behalf of 20 million 
businesses employing 120 million people (BUSINESSEUROPE, 2012). These 
association members are supplemented by an additional fee-paying ‘corporate 
advisory and support group’ of 68 companies across various industrial and 
business sectors, a position which increases a member organisation’s access to 
the decision-making processes of the group as a whole (BUSINESSEUROPE, 
2016). The influence and credibility of the organisation are drawn largely from 
this very large membership. In the words of an electricity sector lobbyist: 
“The [electricity] sector is roughly speaking three percent of the 
European GDP, something like that. That's quite a big voice to have until 
you’re up against a coalition [BUSINESSEUROPE] that represents 15 
percent of GDP, in which case you look rather puny.” (Interview 8) 
BUSINESSEUROPE’s history and position within the EU mean that it also has 
very strong and well-developed relationships with key influencers within the 
institutions and is seen to play an important role in the policy formulation 
process (Interview 3, 10, 15). 
For such a large membership to reach a common position is not easy and there 
has been criticism of BUSINESSEUROPE’s ability to accurately aggregate the 
interests of their extended membership at the European level. But, while this 
criticism may be dismissed as an easy or ‘cheap’ shot for such a large and 
necessarily complex organisation (Greenwood, 2011), some events indicate the 
energy and climate positions taken by BUSINESSEUROPE cannot always be 
assumed to be representative of the its membership and that the organisation 
tends to take a position more in line with those of heavy industry than other 
members (Interview 8, 1, 10, 2, 24, 25, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9).  
In 2013, for example, BUSINESSEUROPE was strongly lobbying for a shift of 
the focus of energy policy from climate mitigation to industrial competitiveness, 
a position at odds with some of its members. At the same time, the working 
group that oversees its activity in relation to the ETS were seriously divided on 
how and whether to proceed on ETS reform. Some members, such as Unilever, 
felt that BUSINESSEUROPE’s historical opposition to ambitious climate action 
was so far at odds with their own strategy that they opted to leave the group 
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entirely (Euractiv, 2013a; Business Green, 2014b). That BUSINESSEUROPE 
did not fully represent its membership was acknowledged by policymakers 
(Interview 10). At the same time, utility lobbyists admitted that  
“We are a member [of BUSINESSEUROPE] and we participate in the 
meetings. But we are completely opposed to their position” (Interview 1). 
While another claimed that: 
“I’d just go into meetings with government staff and – off the record – with 
the press and with MPs and say, “I’m here to show that 
BUSINESSEUROPE does not speak for business,” absolutely explicit 
about that.” (Anon) 
A view that was echoed inside the Commission:  
“I would say that BUSINESSEUROPE was very clearly representing 
energy-intensive industries.”… “Certainly [BUSINESSEUROPE] was very 
heavily supported by large energy-consuming industries.” (Interview 10) 
BUSINESSEUROPE is also seen by some to have a distinctive style of political 
engagement. The approach is rather direct with some describing it as “a 
bulldozer! A tank!” (Interview 1) or “a ‘bang the table’ approach to 
lobbying”…which is…”big and stupid as opposed to big and nimble” (interview 
8). 
3.5.4 Energy efficiency industries 
A group of industrial interests involved in the manufacture, installation and 
operation of products aimed at reducing energy consumption are very active in 
the debate about EU climate and energy policy. While few if any of the 
companies in this sector are large enough to command a presence singly, there 
were two important groupings of organisations: the European Alliance of 
Companies for Energy Efficiency in Buildings (EuroACE) and the Coalitions for 
Energy Savings 
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3.5.4.1 EuroACE 
EuroACE is a straightforward membership organisation the members of which 
are companies, all of which manufacture products which can improve the 
energy efficiency in buildings and market those products across Europe. The 
organisation exists purely as an advocacy platform and carries out campaigns 
such as the ongoing ‘Renovate Europe’ campaign to increase the rate at which 
Europe’s buildings are renovated in order to meet better energy efficiency 
standards (Euroace, 2014). EuroACE is also a member of the European 
Council for an Energy Efficiency Economy (ECEEE), a membership-based non-
profit organisation. 
3.5.4.2 Coalition for energy savings 
The Coalition for Energy Savings is a semi-formal group of 30 organisations 
with a common mission to advocate for greater ambition in the EU’s energy 
efficiency policy. Although it has a formal structure, secretariat and steering 
committee, its activity tends towards what might be expected from an ad-hoc 
coalition of organisations such as sharing intelligence and other resources 
(Greenwood, 2011). An unusual feature of the organisation is that its 
membership is very diverse and includes companies such as manufacturers, 
environmental NGOs, representatives of local authorities and other membership 
organisations including EuroACE. 
3.5.5 Renewable energy industries 
Due in part to the impact of the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive, by time the 
2030 targets were being discussed, the design, manufacture, installation and 
operation of renewable energy installations has become a substantial industry 
in Europe employing more than half a million people and turning over as much 
as €70bn (EREC, 2011). This growth was accompanied by the emergence of a 
distinctive, organised representation in Brussels, based on technology niches. 
The two largest representations were the European Wind Energy Association 
(EWEA) and SolarPower Europe (formerly EPIA) representing wind energy and 
solar energy industries respectively. EWEA and SolarPower Europe both 
operate on a hybrid model with memberships made up of both national 
associations and corporate members. There were several smaller associations 
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on similar lines representing the interests of biomass, geothermal energy, 
ocean energy and hydropower.  
From 2008 onwards, also driven by the Renewable Energy Directive, 
investment by utility and other conventional energy firms in renewables 
accelerated rapidly (Boasson and Wettestad, 2013). This expansion of 
conventional energy actors into the renewables sector led naturally to greater 
membership and participation by these firms in the renewables trade 
associations, especially EWEA and SolarPower Europe. Some observers 
associated the greater involvement in the business of the trade associations 
with a softening of their position in support of renewables and closer working 
relationship with gas interests (Neslen, 2015a) but the significance was 
downplayed as a “conspiracy theory” by others who suggest that it is a natural 
consequence of the liberalisation of European energy markets and attendant 
diversification of some of the big companies’ portfolios (Interview 2, 22, 24, 13). 
There is also some speculation about whether this “watering down” effect on the 
ability of trade associations to take unequivocal positions at least partly explains 
the number and variety of ad-hoc groups participating in the 2030 debate 
(Interview 22). 
From 2004 to 2014, European renewable energy industry advocacy was 
organised under an umbrella organisation known as the European Renewable 
Energy Council (EREC) which represented the technology-focussed 
associations. EREC was an important coordination body during the negotiation 
of the 202020 framework in 2006/7. It enabled the renewable energy industry to 
lobby as a unified front and to overcome some of the potential problems of 
sectoral fragmentation along technology lines (Interview 13; Boasson and 
Wettestad, 2013). However, following the demise of EREC (see Box 2) the 
ability of the renewable energy industries to work together was sharply 
diminished (Interview 7, 13, 6). 
Box 2: Renewable Energy House, 63-67 rue d’Arlon and the demise of a 
coordinated renewables industry 
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Since 2000, several Brussels-based renewable energy trade associations 
began sharing office space but after a few years, growth in numbers led them 
to look for larger premises (EREC, 2006). In 2006, HRH Prince Laurent of 
Belgium, known for his interest in sustainability issues, acquired three 
neighbouring neoclassical mansions (pictured in Figure 19) on the outskirts of 
the EU quarter in Brussels and equipped them to the highest standards of 
energy efficiency with the intention of creating a shared base for the 
renewable energy associations in Brussels (EWEA, 2006; BBC, 2006). The 
lease for all 2000m2 of the green technology showcase that became known as 
Renewable Energy House was signed by the European Renewable Energy 
Council (EREC) with an unusually long term of 27 years and an 
understanding that the offices in the building would be sub-let to the 
technology specific member organisations of EREC (Interview 13; Beckman, 
2014).  
 
 
Figure 18: Prince Laurent and Princess Claire (source: Getty Images) 
Soon after completion, the building was occupied by a wide range of 
organisations representing the full spectrum of renewable energy 
technologies as well as the Global Wind Energy Council (GWEC) and the 
EUFORES parliamentary group’s secretariat. The atmosphere was that of a 
“nice, big, happy family” (Interview 13). But by the time the 2030 framework 
was being discussed, the Renewable Energy House project had run into 
some difficulties (Interview 2; Beckman, 2014). The cost of the refurbishments 
was taking its toll and the rent that EREC was forced to charge to the other 
tenants of the building was significantly higher than the going rate elsewhere 
in the city. At the same time, some of the EREC member organisations grew 
 122 
large enough to begin to looking elsewhere for dedicated office space. The 
European Wind Energy Association (EWEA), one of the largest and most 
important tenants moved to bigger offices on the other side of the same street 
in 2010 and SolarPower Europe (formerly EPIA) moved into the building next 
door (GSTEC, 2014). 
 
Unable to attract new tenants due to the high cost of rent and poor condition 
of the building, EREC nevertheless remained liable for the overall cost of the 
under-occupied building and fell behind in its payments. Subsequently, 
Renewable Energy Construct Arlon 67, the company set up and operated by 
Prince Laurent and his wife, Princess Claire, began to run into financial 
difficulties (L’avenir, 2013). 
 
EREC began to reduce costs where possible, mainly by reducing headcount, 
leaving the remaining staff in a position where advocacy work was secondary 
to the need to manage the ongoing rent and legal disputes, a situation that 
persisted through 2013. EREC also attempted to renegotiate its membership 
fees to improve its standing (Interview 13). But, after a final failed attempt to 
renegotiate the terms of the lease with the landlord, EREC entered voluntary 
liquidation on the 6th of March, 2014; just six weeks after the Commission 
published its Communication on the 2030 framework (Interview 2; Keating, 
2014).  
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Figure 19: Renewable Energy House (source: PHICAP) 
 
 
 
3.5.6 Oil and gas producers 
The two most prominent international oil and gas producers in the debate about 
the 2030 framework debate were Norwegian state-owned Statoil and Royal 
Dutch Shell. While the upstream oil and gas industry does have representation 
in Brussels in the form of the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
(IOGP), this membership association is not prominent or seen as an especially 
effective lobbying platform (Interview 9). Instead, both Shell and Statoil were 
active in various cross-sectoral groupings. 
3.5.7 Natural gas value chain 
The natural gas wholesale, retail and distribution sectors are represented at the 
European level by a number of membership organisations. National 
associations are able to join the Eurogas federation, as are some individual 
corporations such as Shell and RWE. Eurogas, in turn, is a member of 
GasNaturally, an initiative that also includes producers, research organisations 
and infrastructure companies, although the producer members represented by 
the IOGP limited the degree to which it was able to engage in the 2030 debate 
(Interview 16). In addition to these fairly formal membership groups, six gas 
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companies led by Shell set up a more ad-hoc coalition known as the European 
Gas Advocacy Forum (EGaF) (European Gas Advocacy Forum, 2011)30.  
3.5.8 Coal producers 
The interests of European coal producers are represented in Brussels by The 
European Association for Coal and Lignite (Euracoal), the membership of which 
is made up of national associations and some companies (Euracoal, 2015b). 
Seen by many as the dirtiest of the fossil fuels, it is widely accepted that so-
called unabated coal combustion, i.e. without the application of CCS 
technology, is not compatible with the depth of emissions reductions required to 
tackle climate change (Stern, 2007). 
3.6 Cross-sectoral coalitions 
The previous section examined sector-specific interests and their organisation. 
This section looks at coalitions which spanned two or more sectors. 
A number of coalitions in the policy community broach sectoral divides to create 
heterogeneous ‘coalitions of the unlikely’ (Monciardini, 2016), many of them as 
part of an overt strategy to mitigate potential accusations of narrow self-interest 
and allowing them to claim to represent a broader constituency when delivering 
advocacy messages (Interview 8). Some of these cross-sectoral groupings 
were ad-hoc in nature while others have a more formal and enduring structure. 
Section 3.6.1 describes the Prince of Wales’ Corporate Leaders Group, section 
3.6.2 the International Emissions Trading Association, section 3.6.3 describes 
an ad-hoc coalition calling itself the ‘Single Target Coalition’, section 3.6.33.6.4 
outlines a large coalition called ‘Friends of ETS’. Finally, section 3.6.5 presents 
a comparison of the size of business interests’ constituencies. 
3.6.1 Prince of Wales’ Corporate Leaders Group 
The Corporate Leaders Group (CLG) was established in 2005 and with a 
secretariat provided by the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability 
Leadership (CISL) under the patronage of the Heir to the UK Throne, Charles, 
Prince of Wales. The CLG is based in Brussels and works to “advocate for 
                                            
30 Later renamed to European Gas Forum since ‘advocacy’ was seen as too explicit (Interview 11) 
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policy change in relation to climate change and a low carbon transition” (CLG, 
2016). The group’s membership includes a wide range of household brands, 
many from outside the energy industries. Many of the executives which 
represent the member brands have also participated in a Cambridge-run 
education programme in business and sustainability (CISL, 2016). The CLG 
generally tends to seek ‘business friendly’ policy solutions such as carbon 
trading rather than regulatory approaches (Interview 29). The group has seen 
some controversy around its membership with international oil and gas firm, 
Royal Dutch Shell, ejected in 2015 over concerns about the company’s 
environmental performance in the Canadian oil sands and Arctic (Stacey, 
2015). 
3.6.2 International Emissions Trading Association 
The international emissions trading association (IETA) is a straightforward 
company-member trade association set up to advocate for greater use of 
market instruments such as emissions trading to tackle climate change. The 
association is global in scope but, because Europe is home to the largest 
emissions trading system in the world (the EU-ETS), it has a particularly active 
advocacy profile in Brussels.  
3.6.3 Single target coalition 
An ad-hoc coalition of companies from the utility, oil and gas and nuclear sector, 
the so-called single target coalition was led primarily by Royal Dutch Shell and 
lobbied for a very specific policy outcome, as will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters. The members were Areva, CEZ, Enel, GDF Suez (now Engie), 
Fortum, RWE, Shell and Statoil. Despite the significantly overlapping 
membership with the Magritte Group of utilities, the overall approach and 
strategy were very different, targeting the Commission Services and MEPs with 
detailed arguments rather than the highest political levels (Interview 1, 25). 
3.6.4 Friends of ETS 
An informal, ad-hoc coalition of more than 40 organisations, set up with the 
express purpose of advocating for reform of Europe’s emissions trading system, 
the ‘Friends of ETS’ brought together an uncommonly broad range of 
organisations. Utilities, renewable energy producer interests, a furniture brand, 
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think-tanks, and manufacturers of energy efficiency equipment and energy 
generation plant were all represented alongside industry groups Eurelectic and 
Eurogas (interview 1, 8, 16). Although not visible on the groups’ formal 
publications, at the heart of the coalition was a very small climate NGO called 
Change Partnership, a one-person operation in Brussels with a CEO whose 
political judgment and policy knowledge was well regarded in many quarters 
(Interview 15, 18, 26, 8). The coalition was financially supported by the 
European Climate Foundation (ECF) among other donors (Change Partnership, 
2014). 
3.6.5 Comparison of business interests’ size 
The scale of the various business interest groups varies a great deal. One of 
the major qualification points used by many business groups trying to establish 
themselves as an authoritative voice in policy discussions is the number of 
workers employed by the businesses that they represent. By far the largest 
group on this measure is BUSINESSEUROPE which claims to speak on behalf 
of companies employing 120 million people, several hundred times more than 
most other business voices in the policy community. Figure 20 compares the 
self-declared31 employment of firms represented by selected key groups. Note 
that BUSINESSEUROPE’s very large claim necessitates a logarithmic scale.  
                                            
31 Note that these figures a self-reported and may vary from independently derived figures 
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Figure 20: Comparison of self-declared employment of represented companies, selected business interest groups 
(Source: Magritte Group, 2013; EWEA, 2014a; SolarPower Europe, 2015; Eurogas, 2014) 
3.7 Environmental NGOs, think tanks and other campaigning 
organisations 
The centrality of climate change to debates about energy policy means that it is 
not surprising that organisations established to protect the environmental seek 
to be involved in the policymaking process. Since the 1990s, NGOs In Brussels 
have become increasingly organised, partly due to the support of the 
Commission which was ostensibly to ‘level the playing field’ in which business 
interests had become dominant (Long and Loerinczi, 2009; Greenwood, 2011, 
p.136). By 2013, many of the environmental organisations active in Brussels 
received some or most of their funding through grants made by the European 
Commission through programmes such as its LIFE+ programme in order to 
“strengthen the participation of NGOs in the dialogue process” (European 
Commission, 2013c). Although supporting these organisations has been argued 
to be an important and largely effective means of addressing imbalances in 
representation (Sanchez Salgado, 2014), funding of NGOs which may go on to 
lobby the Commission has been criticised as ‘a cash carousel’ and creating an 
“echo-chamber” by some opposed to the activity of ENGOs in Brussels 
(Mendick and Malnick, 2013; Interview 27). 
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At the same time as being criticised for receiving funding from the European 
Commission, environmental organisations in Brussels are playing a role in a 
larger trend towards more business-orientated modes of campaigning practice. 
The last two decades has seen a trend towards global campaigning 
organisations which “come to look, think and act like corporations” (Dauvergne 
and LeBaron, 2014). This ‘corporatisation’ has seen activists such as ENGOs 
“communicating, arguing and situating goals within a corporatized frame and 
seeing corporate-friendly options as logical and effective strategies for 
achieving their goals” (Ibid). One wide-spread manifestation of corporatisation is 
the partnering of campaign organisations with business interests in 
campaigning or political settings (Dauvergne and LeBaron, 2014, p.31). 
The following sub-sections introduces and discusses the main actors in the 
discussion about the 2030 framework which may be described as 
environmental NGOs (ENGOs), although, as we shall see, there was significant 
variety in the types of organisations participating. ENGOs have shown 
themselves to be effective and influential actors during the agenda-setting 
phase of the policy process. For example, in the early 2000s, the intense and 
effective lobbying by ENGOs such as WWF is often cited as emboldening the 
Commission to propose tough new rules for the chemicals supply chain, in the 
form of Regulation, Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH) (Long 
and Loerinczi, 2009; Greenwood, 2011). Section 3.7.1 introduces the large, 
public-donation funded campaign groups, 3.7.2 describes an alternative version 
of campaigning organising that is funded through philanthropic foundations and 
section 3.7.3 discusses the role and character of the think-tanks involved in the 
2030 debate. 
3.7.1 The Green 10: the institutional campaigners 
Often synonymous with the concept of ‘green’ or environmental NGOs, 
membership-based campaign groups and networks such as Greenpeace and 
WWF and Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE) have a long history of engaging 
with the European policymaking process. While largely politically and financially 
independent32, these groups often engage with other campaign organisations 
                                            
32 Although most receive some funding from the European Commission, with the exception of Greenpeace 
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and since 2002 the ten largest organisations33 have coordinated lobbying 
activity in a loose platform known as the Green 10 (Long and Loerinczi, 2009; 
Greenwood, 2011). 
3.7.2 Foundational grant-makers: the specialists 
In addition to the membership-based organisation like those that make up the 
Green 10, a fairly new entrant to the European policy community is the single-
issue philanthropic grant-making organisation. Describing itself as a ‘foundation 
of foundations’ (ECF, 2013), the European Climate Foundation (ECF) has, 
since its establishment in 2008, become an important actor and voice in all 
areas of policy that relate to climate change. Funded by a number of 
philanthropic foundations in the Netherlands, Switzerland, USA, UK and 
Denmark, the ECF undertakes two primary roles. First, it supports a large 
number of smaller environmental organisations through its grant-making 
activity. In 2014, for example, ECF-supported 160 grantees with a total of 
€16.6m (ECF, 2014). Secondly, it seeks to play an important coordination role 
in the policy community by undertaking its own initiatives and identifying 
opportunities to deploy non-financial resources such as connections and 
analysis. In 2011, for example, ECF established a form of coalition by creating a 
cross-sectoral working group known as the ‘roadmap 2050 reflection group’ to 
inform a piece of analysis that was designed to contribute to the agenda-setting 
for what became the 2030 targets. 
ECF’s role as a background player is expressed by some as its commitment to 
“the cause, not the brand” (Interview 11). That ECF has become an important 
player in climate and energy policy is illustrated by the fact that the European 
coal lobby group, Euracoal felt strongly enough to publish a 16-page report into 
the funding and activity of the foundation (Euracoal, 2015b). 
The grant-making and network-building activities of ECF put them at the centre 
of a large network of environmental organisations. A smaller subset of these 
                                            
33 BirdLife International (European Community Office), Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe), CEE 
Bankwatch Network, European Environmental Bureau (EEB), European Federation of Transport and 
Environment (T&E), Health and Environment Alliance, Friends of the Earth Europe (FoEE), Greenpeace 
Europe, Naturfreunde Internationale (NFI), WWF European Policy Office 
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organisations made visible contributions to the debate about the 2030 
framework. Significant among these is E3G, a UK-based environmental 
organisation which specialises in building coalitions and undertaking detailed 
policy analysis (Interview 2; E3G, 2014a).  
Aside from their funding arrangements, there are several important points of 
difference between the ‘classic’ NGOs of the Green 10 and the organisations 
that are funded by or work closely with ECF. While the classic NGOs are 
sometimes portrayed as taking ambitious positions for symbolic reasons to 
satisfy supporters, other environmental groups are regarded as more 
‘pragmatic’ and “[working to] bring forward the right solutions [while]…the NGOs 
are predominantly campaign groups” (Interview 18, 24) - a distinction that leads 
some to state that they “are not NGOs” at all (Interview 29). Indeed, 
organisations such as E3G are often described as ‘think tanks’. 
3.7.3 Think tanks 
Often presented as “independent, non-profit research institutes with a policy 
orientation” that act to inject analysis and knowledge into policy discussions, 
think tanks are often a distinct type of political actor (Stone, 2007, p.261) . While 
not as densely populated as Washington, DC, Brussels is home to many think 
tanks, several of which actively engage on issues of climate and energy policy. 
In addition to environmentally focussed think tanks such as E3G34, several 
types of Brussels think tank have been identified including member-state 
orientated and pan-European think tanks. (Ullrich, 2004). Pan-European think 
tanks were more present in the 2030 debate than member-state oriented think 
tanks. Think-tanks which played a role in climate and energy policy are the 
European Policy Centre (EPC), the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
and Bruegel. CEPS has a team dedicated to European climate and energy 
issues called the Energy Climate House (ECH). The EPC has strong links to the 
European institutions as well as former and current European politicians 
(European Policy Centre, 2016). Bruegel is an economic think-tank which takes 
                                            
34 Since E3G is based out of the UK it may be considered member-state orientated although most of its 
activity in Brussels takes a pan-European perspective 
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a special interest in the design and functioning of the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU-ETS) (Bruegel, 2013; Zachmann, 2013). 
3.8 Member state coalitions 
In addition to organised business, industrial and civil society voices, there were 
a number of formal and ad-hoc coalitions of member states engaged in actively 
seeking to influence the Commission’s proposals independently of their role on 
the European Council. The two most pronounced groups were known as 
VISEGRAD and the Green Growth Group. 
3.8.1 VISEGRAD 
The VISEGRAD group of four central European Countries, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, also known as the V4 was established in 1991 
and all four members joined the EU in the 2004 enlargement. The position of 
the V4 in climate and energy policy is generally not in favour of EU-level or 
ambitious targets for climate policy (van Renssen, 2014b). The V4 also 
contributes in coordination with Romania and Bulgaria in a formation known as 
V4+2.  
3.8.2 Green Growth Group 
The Green Growth is a ministerial-level group of member states which entered 
the debate in 2013 to call for strong and urgent action on climate change 
(Green Growth Group, 2013). It includes ministers from the UK, Germany, 
France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, Slovenia and Estonia. On the level of policy detail, however, the group 
split quite soon after formation with a subgroup including Germany, France, Italy 
Austria, Denmark, and Portugal arguing for a different type of policy package 
(see section 5.4.2 on page185) from the others, especially the UK. 
3.9 Conclusion 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, EU policy making involves a 
plurality of actors representing a wide range of interests with varied roles. 
The European Commission plays an especially important role in the early 
phases of a policy’s life (Hartlapp et al., 2012; 2014). The dual 
administrative/political nature of the institution and the possibility of tensions 
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between departments mean that not only must policy action be carefully 
coordinated and negotiated within the Commission services but that the 
personalities and beliefs of key personnel, especially Commissioners, are 
important. While the European Parliament does not play a formal role in the 
process of determining the content of non-legislative outputs, Parliamentarians 
can and do play important roles in shaping the debates that surround them.  
External interests or civil society pursue all available channels of influence 
within the institutions developing quite intense relationships with officials 
(Greenwood, 2011). In interview, a Commission official said: 
“they [lobbyists] are repeat businesses to different parts of the 
Commission, obviously. I think one thing I would say is that these 
external stakeholders don’t just try and knock on one person’s door, they 
go round and round and round, so they’ll be talking to the various 
cabinets, the various DGs, and it’s just presence, and repeat presence, 
and trying to influence anybody who can possibly have an involvement in 
the policymaking” (Interview 3). 
Since barriers to participation are lowest in the agenda-setting phases of the 
policy process, it is during this period that the widest variety and diversity of civil 
society actors are involved (Long and Loerinczi, 2009, p.177; Coen, 2009). 
Interests engage in collective action for three primary reasons:  
i) To neutralise potential accusations of ‘narrow self-interest’ and to 
demonstrate that an idea has broad or diverse appeal among the policy 
community; 
ii) to exchange important resources such as political intelligence or even 
office space; and 
iii) to increase the credibility of a message or voice using a “surround 
sound” or “hydra-headed” approach to magnify and diversify an 
advocacy message (Interview 8, 12, 16, 1).  
Business interests can be organised in many forms that range from ‘classic’ 
highly institutionalised trade federations to temporary, informal coalitions each 
based on a distinct interest aggregation model. As well as Europe’s traditional 
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industries and energy companies there is an active and engaged community of 
‘new’ energy interests involved in renewable energy and energy efficiency.  
Environmental NGOs are important actors in many policy fields, perhaps 
especially in climate and energy. In addition to the Green 10 membership-based 
organisations such as Greenpeace and WWF, the European Climate 
Foundation is a very different type of organisation in both funding and lobbying 
style, backed by philanthropists and apparently more willing than classical 
NGOs to engage in low-profile, pragmatic policy engagement. At the same time, 
the NGO sector, think-tanks and industry work closely in cross-sectoral 
coalitions which are often ad-hoc and short-lived.  
This chapter introduced the key decision-making processes and actors involved 
in EU energy policy agenda setting. With such a range of actors, operating in 
varied and often fluid networks, identifying and understanding their influence on 
a particular policy outcome is not trivial. The following chapters apply the 
multiple streams approach to analysing this influence, starting with what 
Kingdon (2010) calls the problem stream. 
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Chapter 4. The problem stream 
“Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it 
everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly, and applying 
the wrong remedies” Groucho Marx 
 
This chapter describes what Kingdon (2010) calls the ‘problem stream’ and is 
the first of three parallel chapters which describe each of the three streams of 
MSA, the others being the policy stream (0) and the politics stream (Chapter 6), 
as illustrated in Figure 21. The objective of this chapter is to set out the energy 
and climate topics and issues vying for European policymakers’ attention in the 
year or so leading up to the European Commission’s 2014 Communication on 
the Energy and Climate Framework for 2030. As Kingdon (2010) points out, the 
conceivable list of potential problems relevant to the policy area may be 
extremely large but the list that actually receives attention is necessarily much 
shorter.  
Section 4.2  of this chapter recaps the role and characteristics of the problem 
stream in MSA from Chapter 2, section 4.3 details the problems related to 
security of energy supply, 4.4 explores problems related to environmental 
sustainability and 4.5 looks at the problem of energy cost in Europe at a time of 
poor economic performance. Section 4.6 summarises and concludes the 
chapter. 
 
 
Figure 21: the problem stream identified in MSA 
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4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter described the processes and actors critical to EU climate 
and energy policymaking.  
This chapter draws from contemporary documentary evidence and interviews to 
describe the EU climate and energy problems facing policymakers at the time 
the agenda was being set for the 2030 climate and energy framework. It 
provides an account of Kingdon’s (2010) problem stream from which the 
problems that are deemed to require attention emerge. 
In discussion about energy it is common to discuss the problems facing 
policymakers as a ‘trilemma’ in which three conflicting goals must be reconciled, 
typically energy security, energy equity and environmental sustainability (World 
Energy Council, 2015; Carbon Brief, 2013; Falkner, 2014). The European 
Commission also refers to three core objectives including security of supply and 
sustainability but ‘equity’ is replaced with ‘competitiveness’ (European 
Commission, 2006). Competitiveness in this instance is largely taken as a proxy 
for maintaining affordable energy supplies as well as the long-term Commission 
goal of completing the EU’s internal energy market. The following sub-sections 
present the problems posed by each of the three objectives. 
During the debate about the 2030 targets, security of energy supply was 
perceived to be a growing problem. This impression was heightened by the 
Russia-Ukraine gas dispute – a powerful focussing event. Civil society actors 
sought to frame the issue of security of supply in various ways with both 
dependence on third countries for imports and electricity generation adequacy 
important to the debate. 
Issues of environmental sustainability were focussed on the problem of 
combating climate change through GHG emissions reduction. By 2014, there 
were concerns about the EU’s ability to maintain its global leadership on climate 
change. At the same, time some industries sought to promote a sense of 
tension between climate action and Europe’s industrial base. Also, the EU’s 
primary climate policy, the EU-ETS was widely perceived to be failing in its 
mission to put a price on emissions with a persistently low price for emissions 
allowances. Consequently, reform of the policy was being negotiated within the 
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policy community at the same time as the 2030 targets. Various diagnoses of 
the cause of the EU-ETS’ problem were put forward and were used to frame the 
problem of the ETS in different ways. 
4.2 MSA and the problem stream 
According to Kingdon (2010), problems may become relevant for three main 
reasons. First, there may be a change in some more-or-less objective 
‘indicator’. An example of a relevant indicator here may be the price at which 
emissions permits are traded in the EU Emissions Trading System. Indicators, 
as seen by Kingdon, are not mere statements of the facts relevant to a problem. 
Often, different actors can interpret indicators in quite different ways as they 
seek to construct a problem to which they have an appropriate policy solution. 
Secondly, problems may swing into view as a result of some ‘focusing event’ or 
crisis. A focusing event relevant to the energy and climate policy area may be a 
heightened focus on the cost of energy due to economic crisis unfolding during 
the negotiations. As with indicators, the means by which this mechanism brings 
problems to the attention of policymakers is not always straightforward. As well 
as making policy choices ‘black and white’ by making all other problems appear 
trivial, an event may be a ‘symbol’ for a subject that was in the minds of 
decision makers already. 
Finally, problems may become important due to perceptions of the performance 
of other policy decisions. In this instance, the policy for energy and climate for 
2020 implemented in 2009 could provide such ‘feedback’ to actors in the policy 
subsystem about what works and what does not. Feedback may come from 
officially collected statistics35 about the state of an earlier policy implementation, 
from complaints by the public at-large or by a particular policymaker’s personal 
experience of administering the policy. 
As the following sections shows, all of these mechanisms were active in 
bringing problems to the attention of policymakers during the negotiation of the 
2030 framework. In addition, it is important to acknowledge the role of actors in 
                                            
35From Eurostat, for example 
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and around the policy process, such as interest groups, in framing a ‘condition’ 
as a ‘problem’ about which something ought to be done (Knaggard, 2015).  
4.3 Problems of security of energy supply 
Energy security is a notoriously slippery concept that evades neat definition 
(Chester, 2010). Indeed, it has been argued that any analytical benefits gained 
from clear definition of the term do not necessarily translate into traction against 
real-world policy problems – at least partly because every actor in every system 
holds their own view about what ‘energy security’ may or may not mean 
(Mitchell and Watson, 2013).   
In the Brussels climate and energy policy community, the discussion of energy 
security problems tends to focus on one of two distinct concepts or meanings of 
the term, both related to the secure supply of energy. Most commonly referred 
to is the secure supply of primary energy products, especially when these are 
imported from non-EU countries and is often concerned with issues of 
geopolitics and reducing imports by securing greater domestic (EU) resource. 
The second definition emphasises a technical concern about the reliable 
operation of the electricity system and is especially concerned about questions 
of ‘keeping the lights on’ by ensuring that electricity supply is able to meet 
demand at all times36.  
Here the former is captured by the term ‘import dependence’ and the latter by 
the term ‘generation adequacy’. Each of these concepts is now discussed in 
turn: 4.3.1 examines Europe’s chronic energy import dependence as well as the 
acute crisis which arose as a result of Ukraine and Russia’s gas dispute. 4.3.2 
shows how Europe’s energy utilities, facing a threat to their business model, 
sought to frame renewable energy as a threat to electricity grid reliability and 
therefore energy security. 
4.3.1 Import dependence 
The dependency of the European economy on imported energy sources is a 
perennial topic in EU energy policy with interest ‘spiking’ from time to time 
                                            
36 Although generation adequacy is only one factor in ensuring reliable electricity supplies and others 
include frequency stability etc. (Cañizares et al., 2009). 
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(Interview 19). The supply of energy in the European Union has undergone 
some significant shifts in recent decades. Production of formerly dominant fossil 
sources such as coal, oil and gas has waned while renewable energy sources’ 
contribution to primary production has increased dramatically, especially in the 
last 10 years. Figure 22 shows this shift in the relative contribution of various 
energy sources compared to a 1990 baseline: 
 
 
Figure 22: Relative change in primary production of various energy sources in the EU, 1990-2015. 1990=1. 
(Source: Eurostat dataset nrg_100a) 
However, the growth in renewables’ contribution to total primary production has 
not been sufficient to offset the decline in fossil fuel production and total primary 
energy production in the EU fell between 1990 and 2014, as shown in Figure 
23. 
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Figure 23: EU total primary energy production by source, 1990-2015. (Source: Eurostat dataset nrg_10a) 
Resultantly, more than half (53.2%) of the EU’s gross inland consumption was 
imported from non-member countries in 2014 (Eurostat, 2014a). This 
proportion, known as the EU’s ‘energy dependence’, varies very significantly by 
both energy source and member state although no EU member states are 
currently net exporters of energy. Figure 24 shows the development of the 
energy import dependence of selected EU member states and the Union as a 
whole since 1990: 
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Figure 24: Energy dependence of selected EU member states, 1990 -2015 (Source: Eurostat Code: tsdcc310) 
Over the last decade, Russia has come to dominate the EU’s supply of fossil 
fuel imports, accounting for approximately one-third of all imports of solid fuels, 
crude oil and natural gas, as shown in Figure 25: 
 
Figure 25: Imports from Russia as a proportion of all imports by energy source (Source: Eurostat) 
The vulnerability to a potential disruption to supplies from Russia varies a great 
deal between member states with the Baltic and some eastern European 
countries especially vulnerable. Figure 26 illustrates an assessment of the 
variation in vulnerability to Russian gas supply disruption experienced among 
EU member states. The y-axis shows the dependence on Russia for natural gas 
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and the x-axis the member states’ ability to cope with a supply disruption 
through gas storage. The size of the bubbles represents the volume of Russian 
gas imports. Central European and Baltic states are shown to be the most 
vulnerable EU members. 
 
 
Figure 26: Variation in vulnerability to Russian gas supply disruption in EU member states. Green bubbles denote 
states with no or limited exposure, purple states with significant exposure but viable mitigation options and red 
those states heavily dependent on Russia for gas supplies. (Source: Chyong and Tcherneva, 2015) 
By 2014 the worry that the EU’s dependence on a single energy supplier 
heightens energy security risk has been part of the discourse about security of 
supply for many years (Dickel et al., 2014; Monaghan, 2005; Helm, 2005). This 
concern was underlined in 2006 and 2009 when gas supplies through Ukraine, 
an important route into the EU from Russia, accounting for about half of all 
Russian imports, were destabilised by a long-running contractual dispute 
between Russian and Ukrainian counter-parties (Łoskot-Strachota and 
Zachmann, 2014; IEA, 2016).  
The dispute escalated once more in 2014 with the Russian annexation of 
Crimea on March 18, 2014. As part of the wider political crisis, gas supplies 
were again cut to Ukraine on 16 June 2014 leading to speculation about 
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disrupted gas supplies to the EU the following winter, especially in the Baltic 
region and some Eastern European member states (Dickel et al., 2014). The 
result of the dispute in 2014 was a powerful focusing event in shaping 
perceptions of the problems the 2030 energy and climate framework was 
setting out to address (Interview 9, 30, 25, 19, 13, 22, 2, 16, 21). 
For example, the day after Ukraine’s gas supply from Russia was interrupted, 
ministers from seven member states37 wrote to Barroso, Oettinger and 
Hedegaard warning that:  
“The current situation in the Ukraine emphasises the importance of 
reducing dependence on imported oil and natural gas” (Wathelet et al., 
2014). 
The issue of EU security of energy supply was framed in different ways by 
various actors and with varying degrees of success. In one example, at an 
informal meeting of EU energy ministers in Athens on 16th May 2014, the 
European Alliance of Companies for Energy Efficiency in Buildings (EuroACE) 
presented analysis aimed at drawing attention to the issue of European energy 
dependence (Interview 12, Greek Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union, 2014; Joyce, 2014). The presentation introduced the concept of ‘energy 
dependence day’ - the theoretical point in the year after which Europe is ‘100% 
dependent’. For example, as shown in Figure 27, in 2011 the EU’s energy 
dependence was 54% - putting energy dependence day 46% of the way 
through the year or 18th June - 38 days earlier than in 1995 when the EU’s 
energy dependence was 43%38, demonstrating the increasing reliance on non-
EU suppliers.  
 
                                            
37 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal 
38 Eurostat Code: tsdcc310 
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Figure 27: Energy dependence day in 1995 and 2011 (source: Joyce, 2014) 
4.3.2 Electricity generation adequacy 
The previous subsection looked at the problem of import dependence. This 
subsection focuses on electricity generation adequacy. 
In late 2007, the 20 largest European energy utility firms had a combined 
market capitalisation of an estimated €1 trillion. By the autumn of 2013 the 
companies’ value had fallen by more than 50% (The Economist, 2013). 
Germany’s two largest utilities, EOn and RWE, lost more than three-quarters of 
their value during this period (Andresen, 2014). A number of discrete events 
and ongoing trends were cited as responsible for the fall in values these of 
firms. Among these were political factors such as the popular German decision 
in 2011, prompted by the nuclear disaster at Fukushima in Japan that year to 
accelerate its withdrawal from nuclear energy in which several major utilities 
remained invested. Other factors include the economic crisis that depressed 
economic activity and therefore electricity demand and a significant fall in the 
wholesale price of electricity, due in part to the displacement of conventional 
generation by zero-marginal-cost renewables.  
As a result, in 2011/12 up to 20GW of gas–fired generation capacity was 
mothballed across Europe, much of it recent additions to the Utilities’ fleets 
(McDaniels and Caldecott, 2014). In 2013, the Magritte Group claimed that as 
much as 54GW of serviceable plant was unavailable to the Europe’s electricity 
grids (Interview 4, Magritte Group, 2013). 
There was disagreement about both the causes and the implications of the 
overcapacity of gas-fired electricity plant. While some pointed to the utilities 
 145 
‘failure to adapt’ to a changing world (Dallos, 2014), the Magritte Group blamed 
it on new renewable capacity undermining existing generation and a carbon 
price too low to encourage coal-to-gas switching (meaning that the additions of 
zero marginal cost renewables pushed out gas, rather than coal). The group 
pointed out that, by 2013, significant conventional electricity generation capacity 
had been mothballed due to unprofitability. They put forward an argument which 
stated that the excessive subsidisation of new ‘intermittent’ renewable capacity 
was pushing out ‘dispatchable’ generation and thereby undermining Europe’s 
ability to maintain the security of electricity supply. They argued that despite 
very high levels of generation capacity, variable renewables cannot be relied 
upon to provide energy when needed. Magritte Group founders, GDF Suez 
(now Engie) put it: 
“Indeed, Europe has annual average power production overcapacity but 
lacks capacities to address consumption peaks” (GDF Suez, 2013) 
The idea that renewables undermine the security of electricity supply has a long 
heritage but was not universally accepted within the European Commission or 
the wider policy community. But, despite the availability of plenty of counter 
arguments (For some examples, see: Awerbuch, 2006; Lund and Mathiesen, 
2009; Valentine, 2011; Gardner et al., 2012; Fürstenwerth et al., 2015), the EU 
renewables sector did not engage directly with the specific problem of electricity 
network security. Instead, they tackled arguments about insecurity due to 
resource imports: 
“better exploitation of the indigenous and unlimited renewable energy 
resources means a decrease in imports of ever more expensive fossil 
fuels“ (Coalition of Progressive European Energy Companies quoted in 
Beckman, 2013) 
The result was that the Magritte Group utilities’ argument that renewables 
growth resulting from the Renewable Energy Directive had become an 
electricity reliability problem went largely unchallenged. 
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4.4 Problems of environmental sustainability 
The previous section explored issues of security of energy supply from the 
perspectives of import dependence and electricity generation adequacy. This 
section explores the problems of environmental sustainability facing the EU 
pertinent to the research question, which were: 
 Europe’s role as a global leader on climate change discussed in 4.4.1; 
 the perceived risk that constraining emissions in the EU could encourage 
emissions elsewhere - so-called ‘carbon leakage’ discussed in 4.4.2; and 
 the issue of low allowance prices in the EU-ETS covered in 4.4.3 
4.4.1 The problem of EU leadership on climate change 
In October 2009 the heads of state and government of the EU set an objective 
for the EU39 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 - a 
political goal that has played a major role in defining the terms of climate and 
energy policymaking since (European Council, 2009). Within the policy 
community, despite the misgivings of some industries, the decarbonisation 
objective is rarely explicitly questioned (with some notable exceptions, e.g. 
Euracoal, 2014) and provides the overarching frame in which discussion is 
conducted (Interview 1, 8, 15, 25). 
The EU has played a leading role in the international climate negotiation sphere 
since the 1990s (Oberthür and Roche Kelly, 2008; Oberthür, 2011). However, 
following a poor leadership performance at the COP 15 conference in 
Copenhagen, the ability of the EU to claim leadership status was called into 
question (Groen et al., 2012; Oberthür, 2011). It enabled actors interested in a 
less ambitious approach including BUSINESSEUROPE and some central and 
eastern European member states make the case that, as one lobbyist put it:  
“…no-one is doing anything similar across the rest of the world”…“[the 
EU] is a leader with no followers” (Interview 29). 
                                            
39 And called on other developed countries to do the same 
 147 
4.4.2 The problems of ‘carbon leakage’ and deindustrialisation 
Having won a concession in the form of a ‘carbon leakage list’ of sectors which 
are deemed to be at particular risk of being forced to relocation outside of the 
EU by climate policy costs and therefore eligible for free emissions allowances 
(Juergens et al., 2013), the energy intensive sectors continued throughout 2013 
and 2014 to noisily draw attention to what is known as the ‘carbon leakage’ 
issue - alongside the threat of de-industrialisation - as the major problem faced 
by EU climate and energy policy (Interview 15, 7, 20; IFIEC, 2014).  
The perceived potential for the unintended increase of (GHG) emissions outside 
the EU due to constrained emissions inside the EU has been part of the EU 
climate and energy conversation since at least the launch of the ETS in 2005 
(Babiker, 2005).  
Generally taken to refer to either the relocation of industrial plants to - or an 
increase in imports from - countries with less stringent emissions constraints, 
one of the earliest uses of the term ‘carbon leakage’ was by alliance of energy 
intensive industries in 2007 in a contribution to the Commission’s stakeholder 
engagement process leading up to a revision of the ETS Directive in 2008 (The 
Key Stakeholders Alliance for ETS Review, 2007; Koch and Mama, 2016). The 
cost impact and the ability to pass those costs along the supply chain (typically 
to consumers) are the two major risk factors determining the risk of carbon 
leakage from a particular industry, clearly distinguishing between the electricity 
generation sector which is largely able to pass costs onto consumers from the 
manufacturing sectors which face competition from non-EU suppliers (Marcu et 
al., 2013). Concerns about the impact of climate policy on European industry’s 
global competitiveness  are compounded by the fact that industry’s share of 
European GDP has been continually declining for 25 years (European 
Commission, 2013f).  
4.4.3 The problems with EU-ETS 
This section reviews three key areas of the EU-ETS policy relevant to the 
problem stream: the fact that reform of the policy overlapped with the debate 
about the 2030 framework (4.4.3.1), the disagreement about the causes of the 
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collapse in the price of allowances in the trading system (4.4.3.2) and the 
various ways in which the problems with the ETS were framed (4.4.3.3) 
During 2012 and 2013 a very large oversupply of allowances developed and the 
Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) price fell to well below €10 per tonne (as 
shown in Figure 28) - a price that most agreed was too low to have a 
meaningful impact on investment decisions in the energy sector (for example, 
EWEA, 2014; IETA, 2012;European Commission, 2014). As in an indicator, the 
price was taken by many to be a clear demonstration that the EU-ETS was 
failing to perform as an effective instrument.  
 
Figure 28: EUA prices in €/tonne, 2011 to 2013 (Source: Bloomberg) 
 
Box 3: Overview of the EU-ETS 
 
Implemented in 2005, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) is the 
world’s first and most comprehensive international greenhouse gas (GHG) 
cap-and-trade system and covers around half of the EU’s emissions. 
Although it is often described as Europe’s ‘flagship’ climate policy, the EU-
ETS was not the first attempt by the European Commission to introduce 
legislation that put a price on emissions from energy use across the EU. A 
Commission proposal was made in 1992 for a carbon energy tax, which faced 
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significant opposition from Member States unwilling to cede fiscal control to 
Brussels and by businesses wary of the costs a new tax would imply. 
Ultimately, the tax was abandoned by the Commission in 1997 and a cap-
and-trade system selected as the primary means by which the EU would 
demonstrate compliance with the Kyoto Protocol (Convery, 2009).  
 
The EU-ETS is a system by which an absolute cap is placed on emissions by 
approximately 12,000 electricity-generating stations and industrial plants in 31 
countries (28 EU Member States plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein). 
The cap is established through the allocation of allowances (EUA) for 
installations covered by the system. Each allowance enables the holder to 
legally emit a metric tonne of CO2. The basic premise of cap-and-trade allows 
installations which emit less than their cap to sell the remainder while obliging 
over-emitting stations to purchase additional allowances, either from with the 
EU or from certified projects in third countries under the clean development 
mechanism (CDM). The price of exchange of certificates represents a ‘price 
on carbon’ that, it is hoped, encourages lower-carbon alternatives to be 
selected and for innovation to occur that can reduce emissions.  
 
The EU-ETS has proceeded in three ‘phases’. Running from 2005 to 2007, 
phase one was deemed a ‘pilot phase’ in which allowances were freely 
allocated at the member state level based on estimates of the emissions and 
was used to monitor and verify actual emissions. Phase two allowed the 
procurement of credits from third countries under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) schemes. The second 
phase also saw the cap reduced compared to 2005 levels by 6.5% - the effect 
of which was outstripped by the depression of demand by the financial crisis 
beginning at around the same time. Some allowances were auctioned in 
phase two although more than 90% were allocated for free (Wettestad and 
Jevnaker, 2016; European Commission, 2016c).  
 
The current phase of EU-ETS trading will run from 2013 to 2020 and is based 
on a cap set for the entire EU rather that by member states and the proportion 
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of allowances auctioned is set to increase annually from 40% in 2013. The 
number of allowances in circulation reduces over time - for the current trading 
period (2013-2020) at a rate of 1.74% per year. It is also important to 
recognise that the EU-ETS covers installations in the electricity sector and 
specific energy-intensive industrial sectors (Ellerman and Joskow, 2008). 
 
 
To give an impression of how widespread the sense that the EU-ETS was 
failing had become, one Commission official in DG Energy stated in an 
interview that: 
“[The] ETS price has never driven any investment, not even the 
management of existing assets from a company, the CO2 price has 
never driven the running or non-running of a renewables versus coal 
power plant of a given portfolio of a company” 
And the chief climate change advisor for Shell, a firm supporter of a ‘strong, 
reformed ETS’ concedes that:  
“…many now perceive that the EU-ETS has become more of a 
compliance formality than an investment driver” (Hone, 2015) 
The fact that the use of coal, the most emissions-intensive electricity generation 
fuel, actually increased in some member states in 2013 (especially Germany) 
served to underline the failure of the trading system to influence decision making 
(Platts, 2013). 
4.4.3.1 ETS reform overlapping with 2030 
For the reasons set out above, during the period in which the 2030 framework 
was under discussion, reform of the ETS was also being negotiated within the 
Brussels climate and energy policy community. The reform options pursued by 
the Commission included ‘backloading’ or temporarily withholding allowances 
scheduled to be auctioned to the market, a proposal that was adopted by the 
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Parliament in July 2013 and the Council in December the same year40. 
Secondly, the Commission proposed structural ETS reform in the form of a 
‘Market Stability Reserve’ (MSR), a mechanism which allows the number of 
permits issued to the market to vary according to the number of allowances in 
circulation. The MSR proposal put forward by the Commission was adopted by 
the Parliament in July 2015 and the Council in October of the same year 
(European Commission, 2014k; European Parliament, 2014a). The MSR will 
enter operation in 2019. The overlap between the debate about ETS reform and 
the 2030 targets had a significant impact on actors’ strategies as well as the 
way in which they framed the problem to be targeted by the 2030 framework 
(Interview 8, 30) which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Figure 29 
shows the overlap in time between events associated with ETS reform and the 
debate about the 2030 framework:  
 
Figure 29: Overlap between EU-ETS reform and 2030 discussions (author’s own elaboration) 
4.4.3.2 Contested diagnosis 
While the collapse of the EUA price provided a very clear and objective 
indicator that all was not well with Europe’s carbon market, there was 
disagreement about the causes of the problem. There are several basic types of 
explanation of the low prices that had currency in the debate:  
                                            
40 Decision No 1359/2013/EU 
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 the decline in demand for allowances resulting from the EU’s economic 
crisis leading to oversupply; 
 an ‘overlap’ from other policies such as those supporting renewable 
energy or energy efficiency reducing emissions and therefore demand for 
allowances; 
 a large volume of allowances created through action in third countries as 
part of the CDM; 
 the lack of ambition in the cap; 
 the rules which governed the allocation of allowances to European 
industry being over generous and the ability to ‘bank’ allowances 
between phases (Laing et al, 2013) 
 over-allocation of allowances by the Member States in the first two 
phases of EU-ETS (it is proposed that the Commission, had it been 
responsible, would have ‘plausibly’ directly allocated fewer allowances, 
should it have been responsible) 
There is relatively little objective analysis to clearly distinguish between the 
explanations although some analysis suggests that the impact of overlapping 
policies may be overstated, especially if the policy assessment considers the 
full range of EU climate and energy policy (Duscha et al., 2016). Some analysis 
calculates that the effect of international offsets was very small and that purely 
economic explanations are able to account for only 10% of the price falls (Koch 
et al, 2014). As we shall see, the ambiguous diagnosis of the problem proved to 
be especially important in the debate about the 2030 targets.   
4.4.3.3 Framing and feedback 
The way in which the various actors prioritise or omit the different explanations 
in their framing of the problem represented by the collapse in the carbon price 
varied markedly. While very nearly all actors acknowledged that the economic 
crisis had a significant role in suppressing the ETS price and therefore the 
policy’s ability to drive low-carbon investment, there was widespread 
disagreement, firstly about which other factors were important and, secondly, 
about the relative significance of these other factors. 
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From industry, the large energy utilities, oil companies, energy-intensive 
industries and the carbon trading industry tended to put forward an argument 
holding that, second to the economic crisis, the major factor explaining the low 
price of carbon in the EU was the impact of additional carbon savings from 
alternative climate policies such as the 2009 renewable energy and 2012 
energy efficiency directives. Some, such as a coalition including Shell and 
Fortum and Areva argued that, in the early trading periods it had been 
international credits adding to supply but that in the most recent phase, the 
most important single factor in explaining the oversupply of EUAs was the 
‘overlap’ between the ETS and renewables and energy efficiency targets 
(Interview 25, 15). Some utility actors made a case that the low ETS price was 
not a problem in and of itself and that it was the independent renewables target 
continuing to drive deployment at a time of low price that was the problem. The 
energy efficiency community went to great efforts to show that energy efficiency 
does not necessarily undermine carbon emissions reduction, as stated by some 
producer industries (Interview 12; The Coalition for Energy Savings, 2013; 
Eichhammer, 2013).  
While some environmental NGOs acknowledged that overlapping policies may 
have a role to play, some described it as “the smallest problem facing the EU’s 
cap-and-trade system” (Sandbag, 2013). Many of the Brussels-based NGOs 
acknowledge that a very low ETS price may be problematic for policymakers 
but do not actively diagnose its cause. One NGO, however, described blaming 
energy efficiency measures for undermining the carbon price as “twisted logic” 
making the case that “the point is that emissions are cut not how they are cut” 
(Friends of the Earth, 2013). Many NGOs are explicit in their assertion that the 
free allocation of allowances in the first two phases of the ETS led to over-
allocation to industry and the ability to ‘grandfather’ or carry over allowances 
from one trading period to the next was to blame for the low prices. The cause 
is identified as both a design flaw of the ETS and the result of successful 
lobbying by industry (Interview 10). There was also some concern that the free 
allowance of allocations had resulted in significant windfalls for some industries 
(Laing et al., 2013).  
 154 
Among member states, the UK pushed its position in support of the principle of 
‘technology-neutrality’ in EU energy policy by citing a range of causes including 
policy interaction. It also stressed the lack of ambition in the 20% target being 
an important factor (DECC, 2013). Conversely, Poland stated that the low 
prices in the ETS were not necessarily a problem, rather a natural outcome of 
the economic downturn (Government of Poland, 2013). 
In the documents supporting the Commission’s proposals for 2030 energy and 
climate policy, there is very little diagnosis of the low prices (European 
Commission, 2013a; European Commission, 2014g). Some utilities point out 
that the ETS did exactly what it ought to do in a recession - reduce the price of 
allowances (Vattenfall, 2013). 
There is some tension within the European Commission about the causes of 
low ETS prices. For example DG Clima, the Directorate-general responsible for 
the design and reform of the ETS raised concerns that renewable energy or 
energy efficiency policy may act to drive down prices in 2011 (van Renssen, 
2011), a position generally at odds with that taken by people working in DG 
Energy (Interview 17, 28). 
Some actors in Brussels sought to frame nearly all climate and energy 
challenges facing the EU as an ETS problem. One campaign, known as the 
‘Friends of ETS’, expended a great deal of effort emphasising the ‘crisis’ in the 
ETS (Interview 30). The primary goal of the campaign was to ensure the 
passage of two ETS reform packages, backloading and the market stability 
reserve through Parliament. One strategy used in this campaign was to attach 
questions of ETS reform to all relevant policy debates in Brussels by 
emphasising crisis in the system. In the words of one of the participants in the 
campaign: 
“So we started to have huge surpluses, the price is falling again; we have 
crisis, crisis, crisis”… “… you’ve always got to have a permanent state of 
crisis.”…“…So every single bit of coverage leading up to any 
communication from the Commission [on energy and climate] we said, 
“We have a crisis in the ETS” (Interview 30).  
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In the run-up to the October 2012 publication of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
implementing the 2020 target, ‘policy overlap’ was invoked by the same 
coalition as a reason for the Commission to focus attention on the ETS:  
“[We knew] the energy efficiency debate meant that [energy efficiency] 
was getting all the coverage. [So we made sure that] every time 
somebody spoke about energy efficiency, the whole discussion was 
about ETS.” 
To underline the crisis in the ETS, the group also pointed to existing and 
proposed policies: 
”So we started writing briefing notes, very discreet briefing notes, just 
effectively saying, ‘The Energy Efficiency Directive will destroy the ETS, 
because it will create additional surplus.’ Again, it’s not factually true. 
Maybe it will do later on, after… Assuming all the energy efficiency does 
happen, but there’s a time lag before that happens. But we said up front 
‘it’s about 400 million tonnes worth the CO2’s going to be taken out of the 
market, that’s going to kill the ETS, it’s a disaster, we have to do 
something!’”. 
And, indeed, an acknowledgement that the two policies were interlinked did 
make its way into the final text of the Energy 2012 Efficiency Directive41. 
4.5 The problem of the cost of energy in recession Europe 
This section considers the implications of rising energy prices in the context of 
weak economic performance. First, the nature and scale of the focussing event 
of the economic crisis is set out in section 4.5.1. Secondly, two associated 
problems are explored. In the 2030 discussion, concerns about the absolute 
and relative cost of energy  - sometimes described as its ‘affordability’ can be 
divided into two main categories: the impact on homes and businesses of 
changes to energy costs, discussed in section 4.5.2 and the widespread 
                                            
41 2012(27)EU 
 156 
perception that supporting renewable energy technologies was a contributing 
factor to rising costs discussed in section 4.5.3. 
4.5.1 Economic crisis 
The single most important event that occurred between the negotiation of the 
20/20/20 package in the 2007 and the discussion about a post-2020 package is 
the ongoing financial crises and European economic recession. Figure 30 
shows the sharp inversion of real GDP growth in 2009 and a sustained period of 
unstable performance from 2007: 
 
Figure 30: Real GDP growth in the EU 28, 2004-2014 (Source: Eurostat code tec00115) 
Although Europe was officially out of recession by 2013, issues of economic 
growth and employment dominated all areas of European political life. In some 
ways there may have been some benefits for ambitious climate policy:  
“So what we were saying is kind of we know we need to get to [80% 
decarbonisation by] 2050, we're in the midst of a recession, in some 
ways a recession is helping us, because obviously we're consuming less, 
we're decoupling from greenhouse gas emissions from growth.” 
(Interview 29)  
But it was not, of course, all good news. Investment and employment were both 
weak and European industries were taking an unexpectedly long time to 
recover. Such recovery that there was seemed weaker than many of the EU’s 
global trading partners, worrying policymakers who blamed the situation, in part, 
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on high energy prices (European Commission, 2013f; European Commission, 
2013i).  
The difficult economic situation had a significant impact on the framing of the 
problems facing climate and energy policy with industry seeking to emphasise 
the state of crisis: 
 “…but then on the other hand it's hitting our industries...our core 
industries very hard. And their intense push-back is really starting to be 
felt across the Commission.” (Interview 29) 
“Don’t underestimate [that] in an economic crisis, policymakers are 
destabilised and it’s the best moment ever for business people. “ 
(Interview 4) 
Feedback from the previously implemented 2020 targets also became a key 
driver of the direction of the debate about the post 2020 policy: 
“In terms of why there has been a change in direction [since 2007] - it's 
the economy, stupid. The cost effectiveness of any policy has become 
more important and as Europe has gone through this economic crisis 
and slump. I think there is no question that [the case can be made that] 
the 2020 targets cost a lot of money.” (Interview 25). 
4.5.2 Focus on the cost of energy 
In light of the ongoing financial crisis, the cost of energy to homes and 
businesses in the EU in 2013 and 2014 was considered to be a major 
challenge. According to a report requested by the European Council in May 
2013 and published by the Commission in January 2014, the price of natural 
gas and electricity showed that average EU household electricity prices had 
risen 4% per year between 2008 and 2012 and gas prices 3% per year - both 
faster than inflation. Industrial retail energy prices had risen less sharply with 
electricity increasing by 3.5% per year and gas by less than 1% per year 
(European Commission, 2014d).  
The perception that overall energy costs in the EU appeared stubbornly high 
was contrasted by a long-term decline in gas prices in the USA, a major trading 
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partner for the EU. This change in the US gas market was largely the result of 
large-scale exploitation of domestic shale gas deposits. Between 2000 and 
2010, shale gas expanded its share of US domestic gas production from less 
than 1% to more than a fifth, leading to a very substantial over-supply and 
consequent price falls, as shown in Figure 31 (Stevens, 2012). 
 
Figure 31: U.S. Nominal Natural Gas Wellhead Price 2008-2012. (Source: EIA) 
As well as the implications for global competitiveness, the so-called ‘shale gas 
revolution’ in the US led to an increase in US coal exports, contributing to a 
reduction in global coal prices during the period in which the 2030 targets were 
being discussed (European Commission, 2014d; Cornot-Gandolphe, 2015). 
Declining coal prices, shown in Figure 32, increased concerns that coal – a very 
emissions intensive source of energy – would be harder than hoped to 
eradicate from the European fuel mix (Zachmann, 2015; Chazan and 
Wiesmann, 2013). 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ju
n
-2
0
0
8
Se
p
-2
0
0
8
D
e
c-
2
0
0
8
M
ar
-2
0
0
9
Ju
n
-2
0
0
9
Se
p
-2
0
0
9
D
e
c-
2
0
0
9
M
ar
-2
0
1
0
Ju
n
-2
0
1
0
Se
p
-2
0
1
0
D
e
c-
2
0
1
0
M
ar
-2
0
1
1
Ju
n
-2
0
1
1
Se
p
-2
0
1
1
D
e
c-
2
0
1
1
M
ar
-2
0
1
2
Ju
n
-2
0
1
2
Se
p
-2
0
1
2
D
e
c-
2
0
1
2
D
o
lla
rs
 p
e
r 
Th
o
u
sa
n
d
 C
u
b
ic
 F
e
e
t
 159 
 
Figure 32: European coal prices, 2011-2015 (source: BP) 
The potential impact on the global competitiveness of the EU’s struggling 
economy and the changes to coal and gas prices were fundamental to the 
terms of the debate about the 2030 targets. In the words of one participant: 
“I would say that the economy and the shale gas revolution in the US 
fundamentally changed the dynamics. It's the reason why we have cheap 
coal. It's the reason EU competitiveness is suffering. These macro 
pictures had a big impact [on the debate]” (Interview 25) 
The increase in energy prices, especially for households, was largely due to 
taxes, levies for specific policies and network costs. Some of these costs are 
associated with climate and energy policies such as supporting renewable 
energy investment42. Supporting renewable energy accounted for 6% of the 
average EU household electricity price and 8% of the industrial electricity price 
in 2013. However, there is significant variation among member states in the 
proportion of electricity prices made up by renewable energy support costs. For 
                                            
42 EU-ETS costs are accounted for in wholesale energy costs 
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example, in Spain and Germany the share was more than 15% while in Ireland, 
Poland and Sweden it was less than 1%.  
4.5.3 The cost of supporting renewable energy 
In 2013 and 2014 the heightened concern about the cost of energy led to a 
focus on the cost of supporting renewable energy in the EU. For at least a 
decade, the most commonly used policy instrument for supporting renewable 
electricity has been the feed-in-tariff (FIT) (Kitzing et al., 2012). The feed-in 
instrument, which offers revenue certainty for projects, has been shown to be a 
very effective means of promoting renewable electricity expansion compared to 
the most commonly used alternative, the tradable quota system (Mitchell, 
Bauknecht and P. M. Connor, 2006; Ringel, 2006). But this success, especially 
as the cost of renewables such as solar photovoltaics (PV) fell rapidly, has 
come at a cost.  
In some EU countries the rate of growth of some renewable energy sources – 
and the associated cost of remuneration – became politically problematic. In 
Germany, for example, in pursuit of the country’s 2020 target, seven gigawatts 
of solar capacity were added to the FIT per year between 2010 and 2013, 
amounting to an addition of more than €10bn to 2014 energy bills through a 
surcharge (umlage) (Weiss, 2014). While Germany acted in 2014 to limit the 
cost of future implementation (BMWi, 2014), very little can be done to reduce 
the impact of the costs of electricity bills save reducing some of the pre-existing 
exemptions for industry to reduce the burden on households. Spain is another 
member state in which FITs had been used to promote renewable energy very 
successfully. As in Germany, the cost of supporting renewables in Spain was 
seen as politically challenging, especially following the financial crisis, leading 
to, from 2010, a series of changes to remuneration levels for new and existing 
projects and eventually a moratorium on new renewable plants (del Río and 
Mir-Artigues, 2012). 
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Figure 33: Evolution of total and per-unit support for solar PV in the EU in the period 2009-2013 showing a 
reduction in the cost of energy from PV at the same time as overall costs were increasing (Source: Mir-Artigues 
and del Río, 2016, p.336) 
The concern over ‘run-away’ renewables costs and its impact on business, 
industrial and domestic energy consumers was taken up at a European level by 
the ‘Magritte Group’ of utility CEOs in 2013 which referred to events in Germany 
and Spain to call attention to the impact on electricity prices and markets43 of 
large volumes of zero-marginal-cost generation (Magritte Group, 2013). 
In June 2014 the European Commission published new guidelines on 
conditions under which government support for renewables would be exempted 
from some elements of European competition law. The new ‘state-aid’ 
guidelines required that all member states refrain from the use of instruments 
such as feed-in tariffs and instead use ‘competitive bidding processes’ such as 
auctions to allocate support to renewables44 - an approach that enables 
governments to control the volume of deployment of renewables much more 
tightly while at the same time promoting competition in the renewables sector in 
the hope of minimizing electricity costs (IRENA and CEM, 2015; Fitch-Roy, 
2016; 2015).  
                                            
43 Through the so-called ’merit order effect’ (see Sensfuß et al., 2008 for more detail) 
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4.6 Chapter summary and conclusion 
MSA suggests that agenda setting takes place with respect to specific policy 
problems and that the problems being discussed and their relative priority 
depends on indicators, focussing events and the framing of problems by 
political actors. This chapter has described what Kingdon (2010) calls the 
problem stream in which problems are identified.  
Is spite of the fact that the EU’s global leadership role had been seen to slip 
following COP 15 in Copenhagen, the primary problem that set the terms of 
discussion in the climate and energy policy community was that of 
decarbonising the European economy by 2050, a timetable set by the European 
Council in 2009.  
But the flagship climate policy, the EU-ETS was widely accepted to be failing in 
its task of creating an incentive to reduce emissions due to very low carbon 
prices. The ‘crisis in the ETS’ was heavily emphasised by some environmental 
and business interests in order to secure ETS reform - a process which spilt 
over into questions about the interaction with other policies. In particular, the 
role that renewable energy and energy efficiency policy could play in 
undermining the carbon price. This framing of the ETS problem as a 
renewables and energy efficiency problem was emphasised by actors such as 
the Magritte Group and the ‘single target coalition’. Even some environmentalist 
actors, attempting to ensure ETS reform, actively promoted an argument that 
pitted renewables and energy efficiency against the ETS. 
The energy intensive industries and BUSINESS EUROPE continued to make 
the case that the cost of climate policy on industry posed a major problem to 
European competitiveness, industrial base and employment, a position they 
have held since the inception of climate policy and carbon trading. 
The pall of Europe’s poor economic and industrial performance hung over 
European political life throughout the agenda-setting phase of the post-2020 
energy and climate policy. The economic crises focussed attention on industrial 
competitiveness and the cost of policy with experience of renewables support 
cost from member states such as Germany and Spain often pointed out as 
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salutary reminders of what can happen when policymakers ‘lose control’ of 
policy costs.  
The political crisis in Ukraine and the threat of disrupted gas supplies was a 
powerful symbol of Europe’s energy dependence and wider issues of security of 
energy supply. The energy efficiency lobby led by Euroace were able to 
associate themselves with the issue through the creation of a useful heuristic 
tool, ‘energy dependence day’. Meanwhile, the Magritte group and others were 
somewhat successful in making a case that the rapid rise of renewables such 
as wind and solar due to the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive was pushing 
more reliable gas plant out of the market and therefore putting the reliability of 
some European electricity systems in jeopardy, a claim that was not forcefully 
rejected by the renewable energy industry. 
This chapter established which problems were pertinent to the debate about the 
2030 targets. MSA suggests that, in order to influence policy outcomes, actors 
must match problems with viable solutions to those problems. The next chapter 
describes the range of solutions which emerge from what Kingdon (2010) calls 
the policy stream. 
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Chapter 5. The policy stream  
“I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have 
is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail.” 
- Abraham Maslow 
This chapter provides an account of the policy stream, or the sifting of ideas 
from the ‘primaeval soup’ within the policy community (Kingdon, 2010) and is 
the second of three parallel chapters which describe each of the three streams 
of MSA, the others being the problem stream (0) and the politics stream 
(Chapter 6), as illustrated in Figure 34. It provides a descriptive account of the 
discussion of ideas and activities in the years and months leading up to the 
European Commission’s proposal on a 2030 climate and energy framework and 
the community of actors, inside and outside the formal institutions of the EU 
working closely on climate and energy policy. 
 
 
 
Figure 34: The policy stream identified in MSA 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the policy ideas that made it onto the climate and energy 
policy agenda in 2013 and 2014, what MSA describes as the policy stream 
(Kingdon, 2010) as discussed in Chapter 2 and recapped in section 5.2 of this 
chapter. It shows that the most contested idea was that of ‘technology-
neutrality’ or a ‘single target’ with a significant cleavage in the policy community 
between advocates of a single GHG emissions reduction target and multiple 
targets including renewable energy and energy efficiency goals. The deepest 
split in the policy community, however, was between a self-appointed 
‘progressive’ group, which accepted and promoted the need for energy system 
transformation and a group of more conservative traditional industries that 
sought to slow or limit the transformation. 
It is shown that energy system modelling was widely used as a political (as well 
as knowledge creation) tool with varying success. It is argued that some actors 
were able to expend significant resources in producing competent and well-
regarded modelling results which bought them a central role in the policy 
community while some of the technical details of the Commission’s own 
modelling became contested.  
Following a recap of the role of the policy stream in MSA in section 5.2, the 
chapter breaks the analysis period into several chronological periods. Section 
5.3 describes an intense period of energy system modelling that continued from 
2009/10 until the end of 2012. Section 5.4 describes the positions taken by 
various actors and groups in the wake of the Commission’s formal consultation 
on a 2030 climate and energy framework in early 2013. Section 5.5 describes 
the various interventions and activities that occurred leading up to and 
immediately following the Commission’s proposals in early 2014. Section 5.6 
describes the important characteristic of the policy network during 2013 and 
2014. Section 5.7 summarises and concludes this chapter. 
5.2 MSA and the policy stream 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) proposes a 
number of factors that influence an idea’s chance of surviving the ‘sifting’ 
process in the policy stream and gaining serious consideration (Kingdon, 2010). 
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Firstly, an idea or proposal needs to be technically feasible. Ideas that do not 
‘stack up’ tend to be overlooked. Secondly, it needs to be acceptable to the 
values of policymakers. For example, ideas that reflect the attitudes towards 
market-based solutions or European integration of Commission officials and 
politicians should fare better than those that don’t. The rate at which ideas are 
sifted also depends on the characteristics, the size, degree of fragmentation 
accessibility etc., of the policy network itself (Kingdon, 2010; Zahariadis, 2014). 
The following sections explores the ideas vying for acceptance in the policy 
stream during the agenda setting phase which led to the 2030 targets and 
identifies those which proved especially significant. 
5.3 2010-2012: analysis, models and roadmaps 
This section charts developments in the policy stream in the immediate 
aftermath of COP 15 in Copenhagen. It has three sub-sections: 5.3.1 sets out 
the first steps toward an understanding of the issues by interest groups and the 
European Commission, 5.3.2 introduces the large number of numerical 
modelling exercises subsequently undertaken by interest groups and 5.3.3 
outlines the Commission’s resulting ‘roadmap’ reports  
5.3.1 Getting the ball rolling 
Following the Copenhagen climate summit, COP 15, in late 2009 and the start 
of the second Barroso Commission in early 2010, the European Union’s climate 
leadership may have been tarnished (as discussed in the previous chapter, see 
) but clear commitments had been set by the European Council to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 (European Council, 2009). A 
framework was in place for the period up to 2020 (although legislation on the 
energy efficiency component was still at an early stage45) but it was understood 
by policymakers that the Union needed a better grasp of the policy options and 
their technical and economic implications after 2020. Box 4 on page 168 
explores some of the ‘modelling’ tools used by policymakers and other actors to 
improve understanding of these issues. 
                                            
45 And there was already significant discussion, in light of the ongoing economic crisis and recession 
dampening energy demand, to increase the 2020 energy efficiency target from 20% to 30% 
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DG Energy, under Günter Oettinger’s predecessor, Commissioner Andris 
Piebalgs had for some time been encouraging the energy industry, especially 
the electricity sector, to engage in some serious thinking about how the goal of 
a decarbonised energy system might be met (Interview 19; European 
Commission, 2009a). The industry responded by producing a detailed piece of 
scenario modelling. ‘Power Choices: Pathways to Carbon-Neutral Electricity in 
Europe by 2050’, published by electricity industry interest group, Eurelectric. It 
presented a scenario of a decarbonised European energy system assuming 
that support for renewable energy is phased out by 2030 and in which the EU-
ETS is the primary tool (Eurelectric, 2009). 
Box 4: Exploring other worlds: uncertainty, policymaking and scenario 
modelling 
At the time of the discussion of 2030 targets, in 2011-14, 2050 was at least 36 
years in the future and 2030 at least 16 years. Over such timescales, the 
energy system and the European political economy more widely is likely to 
change a great deal due, at least partly, to policy choices made at the 
European level. How the changes may occur and what role policy choices 
play in that change is, by nature, highly uncertain. For this reason, the 
European Commission, in common with nearly all energy policymaking 
organisations, engages in various simulation exercises to better understand 
the interaction between factors such as the share of energy from renewables, 
energy prices, demand for energy, energy imports and so on. 
There is a wide range of types of simulation. Models may have a different 
resolution - that is they aggregate the economy into more or fewer units. They 
may take a microeconomic ‘bottom-up’ or macroeconomic ‘top-down’ 
approach. But simulation models themselves are all based on mathematical 
representations of a large number of relationships such as price elasticity of a 
particular commodity, cost curves for a particular natural resource or learning 
curves that link the cost of certain technologies with the volume of 
deployment. In order to interrogate the models, scenarios are constructed that 
effectively ask the model: “what happens to X if we change Y or Z happens?”. 
A ‘baseline scenario’ is usually created against which others can be 
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measured. A baseline scenario typically assumes some measure of continuity 
of current policy. Scenarios may be thought of as alternative hypothetical 
‘worlds’ (Herbst et al., 2012).  
Scenario modelling is an analytical exercise that, at best, provides a stylised 
representation of a future state of the energy system. It is not capable of, nor 
intended to, predict the future (although in the early days of the field in the 
1970s that was the ambition, soon chastened (Smil, 2000)). Instead it is an 
attempt to reveal or uncover the nature of certain relationships and answer 
questions such as: “what are the relative implications for GDP or 
unemployment or GHG emissions in 2030 of policy ‘A’ and policy ‘B’?” (Knopf 
et al., 2013).  
The main energy system model used by the European Commission is known 
as PRIMES, the structure of which is shown in Figure 35. Technically-
speaking, PRIMES is a ‘partial equilibrium’ model, which means that it 
considers the energy sector in isolation from much of the wider economy, 
unlike a ‘general equilibrium’ model which considers the implications of every 
factor on every other factor across the entire economy. The major advantage 
of partial equilibrium modelling is that it allows for a high resolution or level of 
detail to be achieved but it also limits the degree to which the outcomes can 
be described as ‘forecasts’ (E3MLab, 2014). 
 
 170 
 
Figure 35: PRIMES structure (source: E3MLab, 2014) 
Energy models and politics 
Energy system models and modelling are unquestionably able to produce a 
vast amount of highly policy-relevant information. Modelling something as 
complex as the energy system presents some significant methodological 
challenges, however, and a great deal of effort has been directed to 
overcoming them (see Griffin, 1993; Connolly et al., 2010; Herbst et al., 2012 
for a selection of contributions to the field) 
More fundamentally, the wisdom (and practicality) of relying on a purely 
quantitative, technocratic approaches to understanding and guiding an 
inherently socially contingent energy system transformation can, itself, be 
considered at best reductive and, at worst, unhelpful (Stirling, 2010; 2011; 
2014).  
But, from a purely political perspective, especially when it comes to questions 
of power and its distribution, rather than the intricacies and legitimacy of 
modelling itself - and the value of the knowledge derived from it - the role of 
model and modeller in relation to the policy process is interesting.  
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In many ways, the information derived from models and scenarios is 
presented as ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ facts upon which transparent, technical 
decisions about policy can be based. But this view of modelling as a neutral, 
technical activity, free from ‘political and commercial considerations’ has been 
shown to neglect political factors such as contested ideologies, commercial 
interests and institutions. In reality, the inputs to and outputs from models can 
be highly political and instead of merely contributing to rational decision-
making they “define reality, shape political debates, and are, under certain 
circumstances, a tool to legitimate political decisions”. This legitimation role is 
particularly pronounced in situations where the modelling is complex and 
therefore difficult for all but the most expert actors to challenge. Actors with 
greater resources are able to produce dominant or more influential models. 
Modelling may also be seen as a crucial means of framing policy problems 
(Midttun and Baumgartner, 1986, p.220).  
Under these circumstances, rather than an expert tool, energy models 
become a medium of negotiation. Rather than how accurately the model 
represents the ‘reality’ of the energy system, the measure of a model’s 
success might be thought of as how reasonable a compromise between 
affected parties the model represents (Midttun and Baumgartner, 1986; 
Robinson, 1988).  
Crucially for the story of the 2030 targets, models have also been shown to 
act as means of access to the policymaking process. In this conception of the 
role of models, they act as symbols to draw attention to particular actors and 
their ideas about the energy system – as well as policy problems and 
remedies (Hammond, 1984). 
The ability to ‘speak model’ was an important factor in the debate about the 
2030 targets. A senior Commission official said in interview: 
“…the days of lobbying by shouting louder have certainly passed. And 
the lobby groups in Brussels, the NGOs particularly understand that if 
you're going to make a case, if you can do it with a factual study with 
numbers you will be much more successful.” (Interview 10) 
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It is also clear that modelling in general: who is doing it, what their 
assumptions are, what methodology they are using, how it compares to the 
Commission’s work etc. - as well as the specifics of the Commission’s 
modelling: which assumptions are biased towards or away from my interests 
or those of other groups - was a preoccupation of many of the lobbyists 
working most closely on the brief (Interview 22, 8, 2, 9, 33). 
 
At around the same time as Eurelectric produced ‘Power Choices’, the 
Commission, in informal discussions with a well-funded environmental 
organisation, the European Climate Foundation (ECF), expressed a wish for a 
“trailblazing” piece of analysis from civil society to set the terms of a discussion 
about options for a post-2020 climate and energy policy (Interview 11, 19). 
Starting in August 2009, ECF formed a “core reflection group” of organisations 
including utilities, network companies, ENGOs and manufacturers as well as a 
wider group of stakeholders with some access to the process including 
renewable energy firms and oil major, Shell.  
The reflection group was invited to a series of workshops that informed a 
subsequent techno-economic modelling exercise (European Climate 
Foundation, 2010a). The results of the modelling were presented in spring 2010 
to newly appointed Commissioners Oettinger and Hedegaard as well as 
representatives from the other EU institutions in three reports under the title 
‘Roadmap 2050: A Practical Guide to a Prosperous, Low-Carbon Europe’ 
(European Climate Foundation, 2010a).  
The work presented in the reports focused primarily on the electricity sector, 
assumes significant electrification of the heat and transport sectors, and was a 
‘back-casting’ exercise with various fuel-mix scenarios in an almost completely 
decarbonised electricity system by the year 2050 the pre-determined end-states 
(European Climate Foundation, 2010b). In particular, the report explores the 
implications of decarbonisation for European electricity transmission systems.  
The bulk of the numerical modelling work was undertaken by global 
management consultancy firm, McKinsey with analytical input procured from the 
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Energy Research Centre (ECN), environmental think tank E3G, engineering 
consultancy KEMA, economics advisory firm, Oxford Economics, academic 
modellers at Imperial College, London and US-based non-profit organisation 
Regulatory Assistance Project (RAP). The modelling was done at the European 
level and, through the exploration of three fuel-mix46 scenarios or ‘pathways’ for 
the electricity system, proposed what it described as ‘no regrets options’ for the 
decarbonised electricity system of the future.  
No regrets policies are generally defined as policies which have net social 
benefits regardless of the outcome of uncertain factors and are most often used 
to help frame discussions about responses to challenges with a high degree of 
uncertainty such as climate change (Gray and Rivkin, 1991; Heltberg et al., 
2009). The ECF reports use the term to mean policy actions that yield benefits, 
regardless of the development of unpredictable exogenous factors such as fuel 
prices or endogenous ones like shifting political priorities. Put more politically, 
they are options that are acceptable whether actors “believe in renewables or 
CCS or in nuclear or whatever they believe” (Interview 11). 
The three ‘no regrets’ options identified by ECF’s reports include: 
1. increasing renewable energy production;  
2. improving the energy efficiency of buildings; and  
3. strengthening internal market by improving Europe’s cross-border energy 
interconnection (Interview 11; European Climate Foundation, 2010b; 
2010c).  
The policy recommendations for bringing about a decarbonised electricity 
system made in the reports include a strengthened EU-ETS cap and a new 
policy framework for climate and energy after the expiry of the 202020 
framework in 2020. 
                                            
46 80% renewables/ 10% fossil fuels with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)/ 10% nuclear; 
60%/20%/20%; and 40%/30%/30. A baseline based on the International Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) 
forecasting of 34% renewables, 49% fossil fuels without CCS and 17% nuclear was also modelled for 
comparison. 
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The ECF Roadmap 2050 project and Eurelectric’s Power Choices reports did 
two important things. Firstly, they helped to draw attention to the lack of any 
policy for keeping the EU on a trajectory towards its 2050 climate goals after 
2020. Secondly, they opened - and set the terms of - a wider conversation 
about what the post-2020 policy response ought to be and framed that 
conversation in terms of a ‘roadmap’ and ‘no-regrets’ options such as 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. 
5.3.2 Other civil-society scenarios 
While the ECF scenario modelling and, to a lesser extent, the Eurelectric work 
may have had particular resonance within the policy community and 
policymakers (Interview 10), it was not the only attempt to use models and 
scenarios to understand and comment on the implications of decarbonising 
Europe’s economy. There were several other analyses available – all focussed 
on the 2050 timeline set by the European Council in 2050. Greenpeace, for 
example, produces scenario modelling reports such as its ‘Energy [R]evolution’ 
title, updated regularly since 2007 (Greenpeace, 2010). Energy [R]evolution 
was published in conjunction with the European Renewable Energy Council 
(EREC) which in 2010 also produced a report named ‘Re-Thinking 2050: a 
100% Renewable Energy Vision for the European Union’ focused on a 100% 
renewable energy scenario for Europe (EREC, 2010). European gas industry 
trade federation, Eurogas also produced a 2050 scenarios report (Eurogas, 
2011). 
The Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) uses a number of scenarios 
to inform its influential World Energy Outlook (WEO) annual publication. Two 
WEO scenarios in particular form part of the discussion: the baseline and the 
so-called ‘450 scenario’ which explores the necessary action to limit global 
carbon dioxide concentrations at 450 parts per million (IEA, 2011b). The WEO 
scenarios inform the inputs to several other studies in 2011 and 2012. 
The ECF modelling exercise, partly due to the collective responsibility taken by 
the reflection group was familiar to many people in the policy community 
(Interview 11; 10). This familiarity, as well as the reports’ general respectability, 
inspired some interest groups to make use of the analysis to support their own 
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position. For example, the European Gas Advocacy Forum (EGF) explicitly 
drew on the ECF work to produce a report titled ‘Making the Green Journey 
Work’ that underlined a role for gas as a fourth ‘no regrets option’ in several 
future scenarios (Interview 11; European Gas Advocacy Forum, 2011). WWF 
later cited the ECF work in a report making a case for a 100% renewable 
energy future (WWF, 2012). ECF acknowledged that in providing analysis to the 
community at large on an open basis, there was some risk of “cherry picking 
numbers” by groups with divergent interests, but it appears to have been a 
calculated risk. 
“What we've seen after we did our work is that some interests within our, 
let's say, group, within the cohort, the constituency that we built around it, 
of course started off using our numbers to support their case, that's was 
inevitable.” (Interview 11) 
The decision to adopt such an open position was ultimately taken based on the 
assumption that the ECF report is primary and demonstrates broad buy-in and 
that policymakers in the Commission are wise enough to spot naked self-
interest when they see it: 
“[spin-off reports] are secondary, and are always supported by a certain 
influence groups. So the strength of the community-building report 
towards policymakers is always stronger than the secondary reports from 
a company or a group of companies that ‘surprisingly’ supports their 
product.” (Interview 11) 
In fact, there was so much scenario modelling being published that in preparing 
their own work in late 2011, the Commission produced an overview document 
as part of its impact assessment to review and compare the assumptions and 
results of various ‘stakeholder scenarios’ (European Commission, 2011c). 
Figure 36 shows an excerpt from the Commission’s review and Figure 37 
shows the covers of a selection of reports. 
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Figure 36: European Commission scenario study analysis (source: European Commission, 2011c) 
 
Figure 37: Covers of selected scenario modelling reports (source: Eurelectric, 2009; European Climate Foundation, 
2010b; Eurogas, 2011; WWF, 2012; European Gas Advocacy Forum, 2011; EREC, 2010; Greenpeace, 2011) 
There was also a level of interdependence between modelling exercises with 
studies using the outputs or underlying mathematical models of others 
(European Commission, 2011c). The bulk of the modelling work undertaken by 
the policy community drew from two sources: the PRIMES model owned and 
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operated by the Technical University of Athens on behalf of DG Ener and the 
IEA’s world energy model. Figure 38 illustrates some of the interconnections 
between reports and shows that many of the assumptions can be traced back to 
two primary sources, the IEA World Energy Model and the PRIMES model 
operated by a team at Athens University led by Professor Pantelis Capros. 
 
Figure 38: Interconnection between selected energy modelling reports, 2009-2012. Dotted lines indicate the use 
of assumptions or inputs. Full lines indicate the use of the underlying numerical model (Source: authors own 
extrapolation) 
Each of the stakeholder groups publishing modelling studies came with its own 
set of policy recommendations which broadly seek to establish outcomes that 
reflect the interests of the publishers as ‘no regrets’ options. For example, ECF 
– broadly in favour of new energy targets - urged the Commission to “consider 
the need for deployment targets beyond 2020 for key renewables generation 
technologies” (European Climate Foundation, 2010b) while Eurelectric’s report 
places greater emphasis on “the use of all low-carbon technologies and ensure 
investments” (Eurelectric, 2009) and the European Gas Advocacy Forum 
pointed to economic savings in its scenario that are “mainly a result of building 
fewer renewables” (European Gas Advocacy Forum, 2011).  
But, in general, despite a wide range of methodologies and interests, the 
technical conclusions of from the modelling had certain points in common. All 
the modelling agreed that decarbonisation will require some continued 
expansion of renewable energy; that energy demand would grow without new 
policy measures and that the most ‘cost effective’ future energy mixes 
depended heavily on the relative cost of energy technologies – itself highly 
uncertain. The similarities may have arisen from the technical constraints of 
decarbonisation, the shared underlying modelling assumptions and data 
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outlined in Figure 38, or have been influenced by a need on the part of actors to 
stay within the bounds of what are credible contributions to the community 
search for solutions.  
While all scenarios describe a future with a great deal of heating and transport 
energy provided by electricity, a major point of differentiation was the way in 
which the scenarios dealt with the issue of electricity grid security and stability. 
All the studies acknowledge the need for changes to electricity grids and their 
operation in the event of very high contribution from renewable sources such as 
wind and solar, the output from which cannot, to a large extent, be controlled.  
Proposed strategies for adapting to a high-renewables electricity grid fall into 
five basic categories, the use of so-called dispatchable generation which can be 
conventional (with or without carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology) or 
renewable such as biomass or hydro, bolstering the transmission system 
(especially cross-border) to move energy from where it is generated to where it 
is needed, large-scale energy storage and ‘smarter’, more sophisticated ways of 
using energy including demand management. Table 4 shows the approach 
taken to electricity grid security by several key modelling reports, revealing the 
priorities of key actors.  
While the gas and electricity industries agree on the need for more flexible 
conventional generation, this is seen as secondary for ECF and Greenpeace. 
Similarly, while non-variable renewable electricity generation is seen to be 
important for ECF, Greenpeace and Eurelectric, it is somewhat unsurprising 
that the gas industry does not see an important role for them. There is some 
agreement that improved transmission infrastructure is important, especially 
cross-border which, being essential ‘European’ in outlook was likely to be well 
received by officials in the Commission, as discussed in section 5.4.6 on page 
190. Finally, all but the gas industry put forward suggests reliant on emerging 
technology options such as energy storage and more intelligent ‘smart’ use of 
existing energy assets. 
 ECF Greenpeace Eurelectric EGaF 
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More flexible conventional 
generation 
o o x x 
Non-variable renewables 
(biomass, hydro etc.) 
o x o  
Transmission 
expansion/interconnection 
between member states 
x x o o 
Storage o o o  
Smart grids and demand-
side management 
o o o  
Table 4: Electricity grid stability strategies for high levels of renewable energy, selected studies. x=primary 
strategy o=considered by the report 
Overall, the scenario modelling ‘frenzy’ of 2009-2011, initiated at the request of 
the Commission, achieved several things. It engaged parts of the policy 
community in an intense discussion between ENGOs, energy producers and 
the Commission about ideas and suggestions for the post-2020 period. 
Secondly, by demonstrating the ability to engage in detailed and meaningful 
analysis, it acted as a means of ‘vetting’ membership of the policy community. 
ECF, a young organisation with almost no history of EU policy engagement can 
be singled out as having established itself as a serious player in the climate and 
energy policy community through its analytical rigour. As one senior 
Commission official said in interview: 
“I think that, certainly the work that they [ECF] have done with their 
analysis has strengthened their position enormously, because it 
[challenges] the numbers that national member states or ourselves [the 
European Commission] produce in our own analyses”…“in terms of 
getting your point across, it is the analysis and the numbers that will be 
considerably more impactful than anything else” (Interview 10) 
Thirdly, it enabled the community to coalesce around a common set of solutions 
to the climate and energy problems faced by the EU. It was established and 
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agreed that decarbonisation was technically achievable, that the costs of doing 
so were comparable to a baseline and that there were ample options to ensure 
the stability of the electricity system. Notably, absent at this time were modelling 
reports or other contributions from energy consumers such as the energy 
intensive industries47. 
5.3.3 The European Commission’s roadmaps 
The Commission produced two climate and energy related so-called 
‘roadmaps48’ in 2011. In March it published ‘A Roadmap for moving to a 
competitive low-carbon economy in 2050’, drafted by DG Climate Action setting 
out the challenge of economy-wide decarbonisation and in which two important 
things were established. First it confirms an 80% reduction in EU emissions by 
2050 as an explicit policy goal rather than a purely political ambition; secondly, 
it establishes 2030 as the ‘next’ major milestone after 2020. The DG Clima 
Roadmap also promised the publication of sector specific roadmaps including a 
‘2050 Energy Roadmap’ which was drafted by DG Ener and published in 
December 2011. The idea of a 40% GHG emissions target is introduced and 
established as a main reference point for future discussion (European 
Commission, 2011a; European Commission, 2011b). 
The significance of 40% is reiterated several times in the accompanying impact 
assessment and is felt by some environmentalists to have been an important 
factor in shaping the debate about the appropriate target that was to follow: 
“…no one really challenged the 40% figure that got put on the table a 
good few years before the European Council took its [October 2014] 
decision - even though it was the bottom end of the 40-44% that would 
be needed to meet the very bottom end of the 80-95% reductions by 
2050”….”in the effort to look credible a lot of the work that was done [by 
NGOs] after that point took it as an input and serves almost to entrench 
                                            
47 although the cement industry did commission a report in 2013 into the value of the cement industry 
and the challenges facing it (Baeza et al., 2013) 
48A Commission roadmap a report containing an initial description of planned policy initiative 
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those expectations, rather than tackling them head on at an early stage” 
(Interview 2). 
The 2050 Energy Roadmap drafted by DG Energy presents the results of a 
detailed modelling exercise. The analysis in the report is based on PRIMES, a 
proprietary mathematical model owned by the National Technical University of 
Athens and largely undertaken by a team led by Professor Pantelis Capros, an 
energy system modelling expert with a close relationship with DG Ener 
(Interview 8, 18). The document explores seven scenarios for 2050 in total 
(European Commission, 2011b): 
 Two reference scenarios (one with and one without pending policy 
actions); 
 A ‘high energy efficiency’ scenario in which strong political commitment 
to reducing energy demand results in policies which reduce energy 
demand by 41% compared to 2005/6; 
 A ‘diversified supply technologies’ scenario in which decarbonisation is 
driven by carbon pricing and there is no public resistance to particular 
technologies and CCS technology is available rapidly; 
 A ‘high renewable sources’ scenario’ in which strong policy measures 
support renewable energy to reach 75% of gross final energy 
consumption and 97% of electricity consumption in 2050; 
 A ‘delayed CCS’ scenario similar to the ‘diversified supply technologies’ 
scenario but for the assumption that CCS technology would not be 
available immediately; and 
 A ‘low nuclear’ scenario in which no new nuclear stations are built with 
CCS-fitted fossil fuel plants making up the difference. 
Using similar language to the ECF pathways 2050 reports, the Commission’s 
2050 roadmap suggest a number of ‘no regrets’ actions including a continued 
focus on the deployment of renewable energy technologies, improvement of 
energy efficiency across the energy system and society, improved 
 182 
interconnection infrastructure and completion of the internal market. The 
roadmap concludes by declaring that the next logical step is to define a ‘2030 
policy framework’.  
5.4 2013: targetology  
“Throughout this process, we've been worried about the conversation 
being based in the realm of targetology and pure numbers” (Interview 2) 
Equipped with a better understanding of the energy challenges and options 
Europe faced after 2020 and 2030 generally agreed as a reasonable interim 
date on the way to 2050, the Commission set the policy wheels in motion. In 
March 2013 it published a green paper49 on ‘a 2030 framework for climate 
and energy policies’ in which it was made clear that the Commission was 
considering to propose some targets for 2030 (European Commission, 2013e). 
Referring directly to the policy feedback from the 2020 package discussed in 
the previous chapter, the Commission sets out the major choices it intended to 
make about renewable energy, energy efficiency and an overarching climate 
target50:  
 Should there be multiple 2030 targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reductions AND renewables, energy efficiency etc. or just a 
single, GHG target? 
 What should be the level of the target(s)? 
 Should targets be legally binding? On individual member states? 
                                            
49 Commission green papers, as in many national governments, are generally ‘consultation papers’ inviting 
responses from various stakeholders rather than concrete policy proposals 
50 The questions were: 1. Which lessons from the 2020 framework and the present state of the EU energy 
system are most important when designing policies for 2030? 2. Which targets for 2030 would be most 
effective in driving the objectives of climate and energy policy? At what level should they apply (EU, 
Member States, or sectoral), and to what extent should they be legally binding? 3. Have there been 
inconsistencies in the current 2020 targets and if so how can the coherence of potential 2030 targets be 
better ensured? 4. Are targets for sub-sectors such as transport, agriculture, industry appropriate and, if 
so, which ones? For example, is a renewables target necessary for transport, given the targets for CO2 
reductions for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles? 5. How can targets reflect better the 
economic viability and the changing degree of maturity of technologies in the 2030 framework? 6. How 
should progress be assessed for other aspects of EU energy policy, such as security of supply, which may 
not be captured by the headline targets? (European Commission, 2013e) 
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2013 became a year for coalition building, position formulation and, for some, 
additional analysis – a process in which caused some integration as well as 
some fracturing of the policy community. The following sub-sections describe 
various stakeholders’ positions on each of these questions in six sub-sections: 
Section 5.4.1 looks at the target for GHG emissions reduction, 5.4.2 looks at the 
number of targets, 5.4.3 the level of a renewable energy target, 5.4.4 the level 
of an energy savings target, section 5.4.5 looks at the degree of ‘bindingness’ of 
the targets and section 5.4.6 looks at actors’ positions in relation to European 
Integration. 
5.4.1 The target for GHG emissions reduction 
One element of the framework that was never under any serious doubt was the 
inclusion of a GHG emissions reduction target for 2030, its level becoming a 
major discussion point through 2013. Although a target for GHG emission 
reduction across the economy would also impact emissions not covered from 
the EU-ETS (in the so-called ‘non-traded sectors’) it, would necessarily have 
major impacts on the EU-ETS cap in the future. The modelling by DG Ener 
suggested that a figure of 40% was appropriate (European Commission, 2011c) 
- and that number was “never seriously challenged” according to some 
Commission officials, (Interview 10, 17). Nevertheless, there were interests that 
sought to put forward a rationale for alternative levels.  
BUSINESSEUROPE, the energy intensive industries and some member states 
such as the VISEGRAD group led by Poland lobbied consistently for a lower 
target or for no target at all – at least until after the Paris climate conference in 
201551 (Interview 15, 10, 13, 17; BUSINESSEUROPE, 2013; IFIEC Europe, 
2013). The goal, if there must be a target, for many actors, including Energy 
Commissioner Oettinger, was 35% (Interview 8, 9; Euractiv, 2014i; European 
Commission, 2014h; van Renssen, 2014a).  
In the EU, the United Kingdom (UK) has long been a strong advocate for 
ambitious action on climate change and, with its 2008 Climate Change Act, 
passed the world’s first legally-binding national climate target (Lorenzoni and 
                                            
51 See section 6.4 from page 195 for more information about the motives and policy preferences of Poland 
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Benson, 2014). The UK’s position on the GHG target, which was one of the first 
major national announcements with a personal blog by the British Energy 
Minister in May and an official speech in June 2013, was in line with the 
Commission’s suggestion of 40%. There was also a proviso that it should be 
increased to at least 50% should a very ambitious international agreement be 
achieved in Paris in December 2015 (Interview 17, Davey, 2013b; Davey, 
2013a). The UK’s Secretary of State for Energy and Climate change, Ed Davey, 
later sought to engage with the proposals through the Ministerial Green Growth 
Group (GOV.UK, 2014a). 
Much of the energy industry, both renewable producer groups and others such 
as the Magritte Group, was able to accept, overtly or tacitly, the idea of a 40% 
(or greater) GHG emission reduction target. Some of the interest groups, 
however, had to be fairly creative to overcome objections by certain members. 
The secretariat and bulk of national electricity associations that make up 
Eurelectric, for example, had been convinced by the argument put forward by 
the Commission and their own policy advisor to support a goal of ‘at least 40%. 
The Polish member, the coal-dominated Polski Komitet Energii Elektrycznej 
(PKEE), however, did not feel able to agree to such a target. To overcome this 
single but powerful objection, the secretariat, in drafting a response to the 2030 
green paper included a footnote which stated that “the Polish member 
association PKEE does not adhere to the views expressed in this paper, 
especially the positions on ETS” – an approach that was repeated in 
subsequent Eurelectic publications (Interview 8, 18; Eurelectric, 2013; 
Eurelectric, 2014). 
Some, including the Energy Commissioner, made a case that a 40% 2030 
target compared to 1990 implied a rapid acceleration of effort, based on an 
assertion that, from 1990 to 202052 the expected reduction was just 20% - 
implying a tripling of the annual reduction rate between 2020 and 2030. The 
suggestion was that ‘accelerating’ decarbonisation of the European economy 
                                            
52 Although the change in the rate of reduction is far less abrupt if the reductions to 2020 assumed to have 
been achieved since 2009 when the 2020 targets were made law (still measured against the 1990 
baseline). See the appendix for more details. 
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after ‘low-hanging fruit’ such as closure or displacement of much energy 
inefficient soviet-era Eastern European industry in the early 1990s and the 
ongoing economic slump as well as other ‘one-time’ effects on carbon intensity 
have been accounted for is unrealistic (Interview 9; Euractiv, 2014i). Although 
some in the oil and gas lobby may privately have supported the suggestion by 
Commissioner Oettinger that 40% was too ambitious, this was not a position 
that was aired publically (Interview 9; Statoil ASA, 2013). The European coal 
sector had, for some time, been unique among the energy producer industries 
in its explicit resistance to ambitious climate policy, took this argument public by 
publishing a position paper late in the process which set out an argument that 
‘less climate ambition delivers more’ and proposed a 33% target (Euracoal, 
2014). 
5.4.2 Number of targets 
A major source of divergence within the policy community during 2013 was 
between advocates of technology neutrality and advocates of targeted 
technology policy (see section 1.4 on page 36). The idea of technology 
neutrality was represented by a ‘single-target’ approach with only a GHG 
emissions reduction target, making the EU-ETS the primary European policy 
instrument for promoting the decarbonisation of the energy system and targeted 
technology policy by a ‘multi-target’ approach which included targets for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency.  
As might be expected, the ‘multiple targets’ idea was most actively promoted by 
producer groups seeking greater confidence in demand for their products in the 
future, most importantly the renewable energy and energy efficiency supplier 
groups. The ‘coalition of progressive energy companies’ was set up to argue in 
favour of multiple targets (Coalition of Progressive Energy Companies, 2014) 
and its members –utilities with major renewables investments - all supported the 
idea (Interview 13; EDP, 2013). In general, a central tenet of the argument in 
favour of multiple targets was that supporting new and emerging technologies 
can promote economic activity and the creation of jobs with possible energy 
security benefits from greater use of domestic renewable energy also promoted.  
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One of the first organisations to acknowledge the importance of the 
single/multiple targets debate was the European Renewable Energy Council 
(EREC). In April 2013 the renewables group published a paper focusing on 
what it described as a ‘hat-trick’ of three targets. The argument hinged on the 
assertion that the policy package had wider aims that simply mitigating 
emissions, invoking the ‘trilemma’ of decarbonisation, security of supply and 
competitiveness as well as arguing that a renewable energy target would lead 
to more jobs being created in the renewables sectors (EREC, 2013). For a short 
time in 2013, the renewable energy industries looked as if it might split along 
technology lines. While the solar industry was clear in its support for a multiple 
target approach, the wind energy sector momentarily considered advocating a 
single target approach in coalition with natural gas companies (Interview 8; 
Euractiv, 2012) but did not pursue that line either because of the risk of ETS 
reform not delivering a high enough price or under pressure from trade 
association members (Interview 8). In the College of Commissioners, 
Commissioners Hedegaard and Oettinger expressed lukewarm support for a 
multi-target framework while there was a clear split in the Commission services 
between DG Ener which was pushing for multiple targets and DG Clima and the 
Secretariat General which tended towards favouring a single-target approach 
(Interview 32, 4). 
On the other side of the discussion were several notable groups arguing in 
favour of technology-neutrality and increasing the primacy of the EU-ETS in 
Europe’s battle against climate change. There were two main arguments used 
to support this approach. The first was that because markets rather than 
policymakers determine things like the energy mix, a firmly technology-neutral 
approach is inherently more economically efficient and therefore a less costly 
way of promoting the change needed to transform the European economy. A 
lobbyist for Shell, describing the ‘Single Target Coalition’ said:  
“…what we weren't saying in this coalition wasn't that we need more gas, 
or we need more nuclear. We were saying that ‘this policy [a single 
target] is the most cost-effective way to develop the 2030 [climate] 
target’” (Interview 25) 
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The second argument appealed to the concept of subsidiarity53 by stating that 
decisions about energy mixes should be taken at a national, rather than a 
European level – something that was written into the Lisbon treaty and gave 
member states the “right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy 
resources, its choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of its energy supply” (TFEU article 194 (2)). 
The energy intensive industries were unanimous that, if there must be climate 
ambition, it should be based on a single target (as well as aligned to an 
international climate agreement) (IFIEC Europe, 2013; LaFarge, 2013). Partly 
due to an ideological commitment to the idea of technology-neutrality and 
possibly due to its plans to build a fleet of new nuclear reactors, the UK was 
very strongly advocating a single-target approach, along with the Governments 
of Poland and the Czech republic (Davey, 2013b). The UK simultaneously 
deployed both the cost-effectiveness and subsidiarity arguments: 
“…we will have to allow the Member States to make the right choices for 
themselves – especially the choices over which technologies to use in 
the low carbon transition.”...”Countries should be free to pick the energy 
mix they prefer, and not be penalised for the choices they make – 
including on whether they choose nuclear to deliver their emissions 
reductions.”… “And we will oppose a 2030 renewable energy target at an 
EU level as inflexible and unnecessary” (Davey, 2013b) 
This position put the UK at odds with most of the Green Growth Group, 
including Denmark and Germany (Government of Poland, 2013; Government of 
the Czech Republic, 2013; Government of Denmark, 2013; Euractiv, 2014d). 
The idea of a single target was supported by the gas industry (Eurogas, 2013) 
and was central to the formation and activity of both the overlapping coalitions 
the Magritte Group and the Single Target Coalition led by Shell, a company that 
had been making a case to the Commission for a single target since 2011 
(Neslen, 2015b).  
                                            
53 Subsidiarity is the principle asserts that only tasks or decisions that cannot be taken effectively in 
national settings should be taken at the European level 
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Meanwhile, Eurelectric found itself internally conflicted about its position on one 
versus multiple targets. Some members, such as the Danish association, 
wanted to establish a multi-target position while a majority favoured a single-
target approach (Interview 21). Partly because of this internal disagreement 
between members and partly because of the personal conviction of one of the 
group’s public affairs advisors, a decision was taken to side-step the topic and 
focus instead on issues such as the overall ambition of the package (Interview 
8). Eurelectric’s response to the Commission’s green paper made no reference 
to whether a single or multi-target approach was preferred (Eurelectric, 2013) 
and: 
“…we had to write very carefully fluffy language around the one target / 
three target space in order that they could co-sign things that they 
otherwise might have wanted to disagree about. So, some of our position 
papers at Eurelectric also involve some creatively vague wording at 
times.” (Interview 8) 
The inability of Eurelectric to agree on a strong position on the single target 
issue was a frustration to members for whom it was an important focus for 
lobbying - some of whom pursued the issue in other coalitions such as the 
Magritte Group (Interview 1). 
The Prince of Wales’ Corporate Leaders Group (CLG) also equivocated on the 
issue of multiple versus single targets due to internal disagreement:  
“Most of the EU CLG members would like to continue with a 20-20-20 
style framework supporting the GHG emissions target by setting binding 
targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency ... However, this 
introduces the risk of weakening the carbon price and raising the cost of 
compliance if such policies are not correctly aligned.” (The Prince of 
Wales’s EU Corporate Leaders Group, 2013) 
The Friends of ETS also took a position that did not explicitly express a view on 
how many targets there ought to be but did strike a de-facto position in favour of 
a single target. Given that they were arguing that it was possible that interaction 
between a GHG emission reduction target and other targets could undermine 
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the EU-ETS price54 in order to accentuate the sense of crisis in the ETS, the 
campaign was unable to simultaneously argue in favour of multiple targets, 
especially since some of the members were actively lobbying for a single target. 
5.4.3 Target for renewable energy  
A group with the clearest interest in the level of ambition of any renewable 
energy target is the renewable energy producers. So it was unsurprising that 
EREC moved to make a case for a high target. As early as May 2011 it was 
arguing on behalf of the renewables industries in favour of a renewable energy 
target of at least 45% by 2030 (EREC, 2011). The Energy Roadmap 2050 
published by the Commission later the same year, however, indicates that a 
level of 30% was commensurate with achieving the 2050 decarbonisation goals 
(European Commission, 2011b). In their responses to the Commission’s 
consultation paper, the solar energy industry group, EPIA continued to support 
EREC’s 45% figure while EWEA, EPIA’s wind energy counterpart, did not - 
presaging EWEA’s departure from the group in January the following year, 
shortly before its collapse (EWEA, 2013; EPIA, 2013; GSTEC, 2014).  
5.4.4 Target for energy savings 
Although the level of energy savings was not discussed in the Commission’s 
green paper, the Coalition for Energy Savings commissioned German research 
institute, Fraunhofer, to undertake some research into the appropriate level of 
an energy efficiency target for 2030 (Interview 12: Eichhammer, 2013). Not only 
did the work aim to show that the energy savings targets need not interfere with 
emission reductions but that a strong and binding target was the appropriate 
response. Fraunhofer’s modelling suggested that the optimum level for the 
energy savings target was 41% below the baseline used by DG Ener in the 
2050 roadmap modelling exercise, leading to the energy efficiency groups to 
suggest a 40% target (Interview 12; Eichhammer, 2013; The Coalition for 
Energy Savings, 2013). Meanwhile, the Commission, acknowledging the fact 
that energy efficiency policy area was in a state of flux with the 2012 Energy 
Efficiency Directive in the early stages of implementation and a review of 
                                            
54 See chapter Chapter 4 
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progress towards the 2020 target imminent, did not suggest an appropriate level 
in the 2013 green paper.  
5.4.5 Bindingness 
Although the ability of each member state to increase production of renewable 
energy and the cost of doing so varies, the renewable energy target that was 
part of the 202020 package negotiated in 2007/8 is binding on member states. 
That is, through an ‘effort sharing’ calculation, each member state was ascribed 
a specific target, which they were legally required to fulfil – with possible legal 
sanction by the Commission in the event of non-fulfilment (European 
Commission, 2009b). Contrastingly, the 2020 20% energy efficiency target 
implemented through the 2012 energy efficiency directive was ‘indicative’ 
limiting the options available to the Commission to sanction non-compliant 
member states – a factor blamed by some within the energy efficiency sector for 
worse performance towards the energy efficiency target than the binding 
renewable energy target (Interview 12).  
The degree of ‘bindingness’ for the 2030 framework was a point of considerable 
debate55. In general, actors which favoured a multiple targets approach also 
favoured binding renewable energy and/or energy efficiency targets. The 
energy efficiency industry, for example, was very strongly in favour of a binding 
energy efficiency target with a legally binding sub-target for the buildings sector 
although who or what should be ‘bound’ was not made entirely clear (Euroace, 
2013). The discussion of bindingness on the member states is also deeply 
entwined with the contemporary debate about the proper division of 
competence between the institutions of the EU and national legislatures 
(Jacobs, 2016).  
5.4.6 More versus less Europe 
The way that various actors framed their policy positions vis-à-vis European 
integration was significant. For example, the Magritte Group of CEOs, while 
highly critical of the approach taken to climate and energy policy before 2012 – 
                                            
55 See section 6.6 from page 205 for more information about the national positions on issues such as 
‘bindingness’ 
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especially the 202020 framework, pointed to the risk of policy developments 
such as the spread of national capacity remuneration mechanisms for 
rewarding electricity generation capacity56 as ‘fragmenting’ the European 
energy market and policy landscape. These policy interventions were blamed 
on the surge in new variable renewable electricity generation following the 
202020 framework but the Magritte Group strongly advocated for a European 
rather than a national solution (Interview 1; Magritte Group, 2013). Even though 
their rhetoric about European-level capacity remuneration softened slightly, the 
Group’s pro-European approach remained strong and was well received by the 
Commission. A close advisor to Commissioner Oettinger said: 
“The Magritte Group…was saying that European energy policy was not 
working, which seemed to point the finger to Brussels as not having done 
what was necessary, but then they would say, at the same time that, in 
fact, what we needed was more Europeanisation. So, they were sort of 
critical of the state of play but saying it’s because it’s not enough, rather 
than because it’s too much [Europe]. The message sounded, initially, 
very negative towards Brussels, the EU institutional set-up, but, as time 
progressed, it became clear that, in a way, we were allies on substance.” 
(Interview 6) 
Some politicians and officials in the Commission, Secretary General Catherine 
Day in particular, were felt to be more susceptible to arguments which either 
supported further European integration (or defended it from fragmentary forces) 
than purely economic arguments. Parts of the electricity industry wanted to 
emphasise the significance of the negotiations for European integration: 
“…if you think somebody is not interested in climate, not interested in 
energy, how do you explain that it matters to them?” “What we were 
saying to [Catherine Day] is, ‘You should be interested in the energy-
climate package because depending on how it plays out and depending 
on whether you’ve got multiple measures or multiple targets or different 
strengths of targets and so on, some of these are going to suit the 
                                            
56 Ostensibly to ensure security of supply 
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internal energy market agenda better than others. You care about the 
internal energy markets agenda because it’s part of the overall market 
harmonisation agenda, which is the DNA of the European project. And if 
you get the 2030 package wrong, you have effectively let loose a virus in 
the DNA. Do you care about that?’” …“Therefore, one of the things that 
Eurelectric cared very much about was that whether there was one target 
or three targets, that they should be European level targets” (Interview 8) 
5.5 2014: the proposals 
This section describes the months ahead of the Commission’s publication of its 
proposals for the 2030 framework. 5.5.1 describes a growing consensus around 
the idea of a single target which was punctured by the intervention of pro-
multiple target member states. 5.5.2 shows that in the final weeks, the 
Commission perceived a stalemate between multi- and single-target 
proponents. 5.5.3 describes the reaction by various actors to the proposals.  
5.5.1 Consensus builds around a single target  
Throughout 2013, the main point of coordination for the renewables industry, 
EREC, had been diminishing in effectiveness and failed to follow up its initially 
strong stance in favour of high and binding renewable energy targets or provide 
policymakers with straightforward channel of communication with the 
renewables sector (Interview 11, 2, 4). At the same time, the Magritte Group’s 
strategy of delivering their message en-masse to the most senior policymakers 
culminated in a meeting late in the year with Commission President Barroso 
(Interview 4).  
In April 2013 a selection of energy utility and energy intensive industry senior 
executives joined Commissioner Oettinger, several national energy ministers 
and other notable guests such as the Secretary General of oil producers’ cartel, 
OPEC and British energy academic, Dieter Helm for a two-day meeting in the 
Austrian ski resort of Lech. The topics of the Lech Energy Forum – an event 
hosted by Commissioner Oettinger and sometimes described as ‘Günther’s little 
 193 
Davos57’ – included the 2030 targets (OPEC, 2013, p.60; vol.at, 2013; Helm, 
2014a; Euractiv, 2013g; Politico, 2016). While it cannot be confirmed what was 
discussed at the private event, it does underline the close relationship that 
Oettinger held with business interests, especially since there is no evidence that 
any leading ENGO representatives were in attendance. 
By the end of the year, it was the Commission’s view that there was 
considerable consensus around the idea of a single target, among member 
states as well as European civil society (Euractiv, 2013d; Euractiv, 2013e). 
International Oil Company, BP, wrote to Energy Commissioner Oettinger in the 
summer making the case that, among other things, overly ambitious EU climate 
policy could push industries such as refining out of Europe (Neslen, 2016; 
2015b) 
Around the middle of 2013, DG Energy’s energy efficiency unit was wrestling 
with whether it could possibly prepare its contribution in time for a January 2014 
release, given a pre-determined commitment it had to review progress on the 
2020 targets, a labour intensive task in itself. Eventually, the decision was taken 
that the energy efficiency part of the package would be announced on a 
different timescale to the GHG emission target and the renewable energy target 
(Interview 28).  
The first instalment of the Commission’s formal proposal for the 2030 package 
was set to be ‘unveiled’ on the 22nd of January, 2014 and the year began with a 
flurry of activity from the parliament and member states.   
Despite the weight of opinion that the framework was heading towards a single 
target, two events in early 2014 tempered expectations. First, over Christmas 
2013, a joint letter from eight ministers including from Germany, France and 
Italy58 was sent to the Commission requesting that ‘robust’ renewable energy 
targets be included in the package on grounds of creating “more jobs and 
growth” (Euractiv, 2014a). The Prime Minister of Denmark also intervened by 
                                            
57 An allusion to the influential World Economic Forum meeting of governments, industry leaders and 
others in Davos each winter  
58 As well as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal 
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calling Commission President Barroso on the telephone the night before the 
Commission’s decision in order to make the case for a renewable energy target 
(Euractiv, 2014b). In addition to the overall effectiveness of the policy 
framework, a central argument in favour of strong targets on renewables was 
sustaining and creating jobs in the renewables and energy efficiency industries. 
Secondly, the European Parliament also somewhat belatedly59 entered the 
discussion with an ‘own initiative’ report produced on the 9th of January by the 
industry and environment committees and approved in plenary on the 27th 
calling for a 40% GHG emissions reduction target alongside 30% binding 
renewable energy and 40% energy efficiency targets, much to the relief of 
energy efficiency advocates who had invested significant effort lobbying 
Parliamentarians (Interview 17, 10, 12 ; Euractiv, 2014j; European Parliament, 
2014c; Euroace, 2014).  
And so, despite the earlier expectations that the Commission would propose a 
single target, there were some media reports suggesting that, following the 
member state intervention lobbying for a renewables target, the Commission 
was set to introduce a non-binding renewable energy target some way below 
30% (Euractiv, 2014j). 
Throughout the first half of 2014, advocates from all sides of the debate began 
addressing the Heads of State and Government of the European Council which 
was due to meet in October to determine the final terms of the framework. 
Especially vocal were those that were unsettled by the perceived shift in favour 
of multiple targets that occurred over the winter (Interview 25). Rather than 
focussing on detailed policy issues and efforts tended to take a broader view on 
EU climate and energy policy. More than one reflected the shift from a technical 
to a political discussion by presenting contributions in the form of a ‘manifesto’ 
(Interview 25; IFIEC, 2014; Eurelectric, 2014).  
It was not just interest groups in dispute about the fundamental structure of the 
framework; the package had become controversial within the Commission. 
Despite an uneasy agreement between Commissioners Hedegaard and 
                                            
59 The report was, technically, a response to the 2013 green-paper 
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Oettinger that some form of multiple targets approach could be workable 
(although with ongoing disagreement about the level of the GHG target), some 
elements in the services, especially within DG Clima were deeply invested in 
the idea of a single GHG target. This attachment to the idea was at least 
partially due to a commitment within the department to maintain the ETS as the 
‘cornerstone’ of EU climate policy. After all, some of the people working on the 
policy had invested a decade of their professional life developing and tweaking 
the policy and therefore reluctant to see it usurped or undermined by further 
renewable energy and energy efficiency targets (Interview 11, 14, 23, 30, 17). 
Meanwhile, in DG Ener, many staff firmly believed that a multi-target approach 
which supported renewables and energy efficiency was more likely to prove 
effective than the ETS-only ‘purist’ approach (Interview 28, 17, 7). The dispute 
was ultimately resolved by Secretary General, Catherine Day when the drafting 
brief was taken from the two lead DGs, Clima and Ener and handed to a unit 
within the Secretariat General with the DGs relegated to simply reviewing ‘bits 
and pieces of text’ (Interview 7, 3, 8). 
5.5.2 Stalemate 
Lobbyists and policymakers both sensed that, during the autumn of 2013, a kind 
of stalemate had been reached (Interview 8, 10). The disagreement among 
member states, civil society and even within the Commission caused the 2030 
package to become what President Barroso described in a meeting of the 
College of Commissioners as particularly “politically sensitive” (European 
Commission, 2014h, p.23).  
Ahead of the final text for the January 2014 Communication facing a vote in the 
College, a meeting was held between Commissioners Hedegaard and 
Oettinger, Secretary General Day and President Barroso, over breakfast, to 
decide the content of the final draft (Interview 12, 8; Euractiv, 2014j). The 
outcome of the meeting was designed to placate both sides of the debate and 
made use of wiggle room afforded by the various options for the ‘bindingness’ of 
the targets. A by now uncontroversial 40%60 GHG emissions target was to be 
                                            
60 Since the impact assessment focused on scenarios for 35%, 40% and 45% GHG emissions reductions 
some felt that 40% was presented as a credible ‘middle way’: “The Commission always proposes A, B, C 
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coupled with a renewable energy target which was binding only at the European 
level. The level of the renewable energy target was determined on the basis of 
soon-to-be unpublished61 analysis which projected that, if GHG emissions were 
reduced by 40% of 1990 levels by 2030, the consequential proportion of final 
energy consumption from renewable sources would be between 24% and 27% 
depending on whether certain ‘enabling conditions’ such as infrastructure 
improvements were present (European Commission, 2014g; Euractiv, 2014j). It 
was decided that the target should be selected from within this range which 
Commissioner Oettinger explained to his colleagues in the College was “a 
percentage that would almost automatically be engendered by the target of a 
40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, according to the econometric 
models” (European Commission, 2014h, p.23). 
On the 22nd of January and following a highly charged meeting of 
Commissioners lasting more than three hours, the Commission released the 
first of its proposals (Interview 8; European Commission, 2014h). The 
Communication, ‘A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 
2020 to 2030’ was published along with a detailed impact assessment, 
focussed primarily on the structure and level of the targets. It confirmed that the 
Commission was proposing a 40% GHG emissions reductions target and a 27% 
renewable energy target binding at an EU level rather than a member state 
level. Also as expected, publication of the level and nature of the energy 
efficiency element of the proposed package was predicted later in 2014 with a 
level of 25% anticipated (European Commission, 2014b).  
5.5.3 The aftermath of the initial proposals 
The initial response from campaigning ENGOs was one of disappointment and 
an immediate call for more climate ambition and a renewable energy target that 
is binding on member states. Some Green MEPs and ENGOs also accused the 
Commission of moving too far to accommodate the demands of industry, 
                                            
on the presumption that that gives B the best chance. So … that’s why 35, 40 and 45 were run. It was to 
make 40 normative.” (Interview 8). 
61 The analysis was published as part of impact assessment alongside the Commission proposals on the 
22nd of January 
 197 
especially the utilities of the Magritte Group (Interview 4; Euractiv, 2014f; 
2014e). In defence of the proposals, Commissioner Hedegaard wanted to 
maintain focus on the GHG emissions reduction target component of the 
package which she described as “not a small thing, a big thing“ (Euractiv, 
2014f). In February, Greenpeace published a report singling out Europe’s large 
utilities as the major barrier to effective climate and energy policy (Dallos, 
2014). The ‘progressive’ utilities such as EDP, DONG and SSE cautiously 
welcomed the proposals but the demise of the mortally wounded EREC as a 
coordination and contact point for the renewable energy industries was 
completed in March 2014 when the group was liquidated, leaving the renewable 
energy sector effectively locked out of the policy process for the remainder of 
the year (Interview 13; Euractiv, 2014c). 
Within a fortnight of the publication of the Commission’s proposals in January, 
Energy Commissioner Oettinger publically aired his view that a 40% GHG 
emissions reduction target was ‘too ambitious’ and ‘unachievable’ to a receptive 
audience at a BUSINESSEUROPE event in Brussels. The statements were so 
at odds with the will of the College of Commissioners that they sparked some 
speculation that he was preparing the ground for a job in industry at the end of 
the Barroso II Commission later that year (Euractiv, 2014i; Euractiv, 2014h; 
Interview 13). 
The focus of the debate was split in the first half of 2014. While all efforts were 
made by lobbyists and other stakeholders to engage with the Commission on 
the forthcoming proposals on energy efficiency (which was on pause awaiting 
the outcome of a review, expected in the middle of the year), interaction with 
member states also increased in advance of the final decision by the heads of 
state and government at the European Council in October. Energy efficiency 
advocates felt that the period between January and July 2014 presented an 
opportunity to make their case for increasing the 25% savings hinted at in the 
January Communication, which they did largely based on re-invigorated 
arguments about energy efficiency’s positive impact on energy security, felt to 
carry more weight following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March (Interview 
32, 12). EuroACE was also able to take advantage of an opportunity to present 
its ideas to an informal meeting of energy ministers in Athens in May convened 
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specifically to discuss the topic of energy security (Joyce, 2014; Greek 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 2014). They also took it as a 
chance to critically analyse the impact assessment and the modelling that 
underpinned it – a decision that led to an ongoing controversy about the 
modelling assumptions (Interview 32; see Box 5). 
 
Box 5: #modelgate 
Soon after the initial responses to the 2030 proposals, some actors, led by 
Friends of the Earth Europe, began to question some of the assumptions of 
the Commission’s modelling reported in the associated impact assessment on 
which the targets were based in a dispute that became known as ‘modelgate’ 
(‘#modelgate’ on Twitter). The dispute centred firstly on the ‘discount rate’ 
used to assess the risk of various investments needed to achieve the Union’s 
decarbonisation goals (Interview 32). It was claimed that the rate62 used to 
assess the cost and risk of investment in energy efficiency was 
inappropriately high, making investment in energy savings less attractive than 
alternatives. Secondly, it was claimed that the Commission attempted to ‘hide’ 
modelling results showing that the European economy would grow faster 
under a higher GHG emissions target (Riley, 2014c).  
 
Figure 39: A tweet from the #modelgate (source: Twitter.com) 
                                            
62 A rate of 17.5% was used for upgrading domestic buildings compared to 9% for the electricity sector 
and 8% for the public sector (European Commission, 2014g, p.164) 
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The case was made that not only did the analysis lead the Commission to 
reduce ambition on energy efficiency; it was also used to underpin the 40% 
GHG target as the most ‘cost efficient’ target. A lot of effort was put into 
showing that, due to the alleged manipulation of the modelling, the economic 
case for framework based for a weak target for energy efficiency appeared 
artificially strong – i.e the costs of scenarios with high levels of energy 
efficiency appeared particularly expensive (Interview 32; Riley, 2014a; 2014b; 
2014c). It was also argued that the reason DG Ener was prevented from 
using more appropriate discount rates by some staff in DG Clima, wishing to 
maintain the primacy of the ETS (Interview 32; Neslen, 2014; Oliver, 2014b).  
Not everybody agreed, however. On the first point, it was pointed out the 
GDP results from complex modelling exercises – intended as tools for 
promoting understanding of an issue, not as predictions of the future - are not 
necessarily comparable63 (Knopf, 2014). In fact, DG Clima went to the 
unusual length of publishing a stern rebuttal, addressed personally to the 
Friends of the Earth campaigner who had made the allegations (European 
Commission, 2014a). The dispute about the appropriate discount rate, 
however, continued until at least the summer of 2015 when it appeared that 
the campaigner had won a concession from Commissioner Oettinger’s 
successor, Miguel Arias Cañete (Riley, 2015b; 2015a).  
It was not the first time that the energy modelling techniques used by the 
Commission were criticised. Business Europe and some heavy-industry 
lobbyists complained that the modelling work reported in the Energy 
Roadmap 2050 which preceded the 2030 proposals lacked transparency 
(Interview 20; Clark, 2011). Environmentalists also have concerns about the 
PRIMES model being a ‘black-box’, the workings of which were not visible to 
all observers (Interview 11).  
The Commission’s energy efficiency proposal that arrived in late July was for 
a 30% target for energy efficiency improvement compared to ‘business as 
                                            
63 Two models were in fact used for the 2030 impact assessment – PRIMES and the E3MG model owned 
by Cambridge Econometrics 
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usual’. In his introduction to the debate among Commissioners, President 
Barroso recommended that the Commission proceed with caution when 
setting the level of the target since the cost of improving energy efficiency 
would be uneven between member states and industrial sectors. The level at 
which the target was binding was excluded from the proposal in favour of 
“leaving the decision on the binding nature or otherwise of [the] target up to 
the Member States” (European Commission, 2014c; European Commission, 
2014i).  
 
Ahead of the publication of the Commission’s proposal for the energy efficiency 
in the 2030 framework, the same group of member states64 which had written to 
President Barroso earlier in the year in support of a renewable energy target did 
so again, this time to make the case for an energy efficiency target (Garside, 
2014). The Commission’s communication on energy efficiency in July 
suggested rather than proposed that a target in the region of 30% was 
supported by the evidence (European Commission, 2014c). 
Finally, in October 2014, the European Council broadly endorsed the 
Commission’s proposals by creating a framework of a 40 GHG emissions 
reduction target, a 27% renewable energy target, binding at a European level 
and a 27% indicative energy efficiency target with a review in 2020 that may 
lead to an increase to 30% (European Council, 2014). 
5.6 A fractured policy community 
The previous sections describe the policy options and give an overview of the 
development of arguments and counter-arguments within the policy community 
between 2009 and 2014. This section provides a description of the policy 
community, focussing on the key cleavages.  
The actors with an interest in the 2030 targets between them held a wide range 
of often incompatible views of the diagnosis of and solution to climate and 
                                            
64 With the notable exception of France  
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energy policy problems. At the level of policy, there were three main groupings 
with strongly divergent positions (Interview 18, 19, 2, 21, 23, 24, 26).: 
 Group 1: Actors which resist all action on climate and/or energy from the 
EU. These include the energy-intensive industries such as steel and 
chemical manufacturers and are often organised at a European level by 
BUSINESSEUROPE although associations such as IFIEC are also 
important; 
 Group 2: Actors which actively support action on climate change but 
perceive some types of policy (such as renewable energy targets) as 
inappropriate or threatening in some way. This group includes the 
regulated electricity sector and some environmentally-minded 
businesses such as some members of the Corporate Leaders Group; 
 Group 3: Actors which either feel that technology-specific policy should 
be pursued with utmost urgency, such as ENGOs like Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace or those that have a commercial economic 
interest in certain types of action such as the renewable energy producer 
groups and energy efficiency equipment industry. 
Groups 2 and 3 together made up what can be described as an ‘epistemic 
community’ or “network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence….and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge…[with a] 
shared set of normative and principled beliefs” (Haas, 1992b; Dunlop, 2000). 
While not homogenous in policy positions and opinions, the basic underlying 
premise of the need to tackle climate change was shared and there was 
widespread and frequent interaction between its members, not least through 
mutual critiques of modelling and other analytical interventions (Interview 26, 
30). This community included a large proportion of the Commission officials 
working on drafting the proposals (Interview 8). Group 1, on the other hand, had 
an equally strongly shared worldview but did not interact strongly with the other 
groups. The energy intensive industry, in particular, was both perceived - and 
perceived itself to be - outside of the core of agenda-shaping actors (Interview 
20, 27, 8).  
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There could also be said to exist a fourth group which, while sharing many of 
the beliefs and principles of group 2, saw a strategic opportunity to couple the 
campaigning strategies at which group 3 was especially adept with the political 
heft of some of the actors in group 2 (Interview 30, 33). The link between these 
two was EU-ETS reform – in order to secure reform of the EU-ETS, a 
calculation was made that cast aside some of the politically challenging topics 
of renewable energy and energy efficiency in order to produce a louder chorus 
in favour of stronger overall climate action (Interview 30, 8). While rooted in a 
different policy debate (that over ETS reform) the implications for the 2030 
targets debate were significant. For example, it made it coalitions between 
producer groups and ENGOs in favour of renewable energy targets harder to 
achieve. This phenomenon is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 in the 
section looking at policy windows. While accusations of ‘climate denialism’ are 
made about the group 1 actors by actors from groups 2 and 3 (Interview 4), a 
great deal of care is taken not to engage in disputes about the validity of climate 
science (see Euracoal, 2015a, for instance). Figure 40 shows the structure of 
the policy community and the relationship of the four distinct groups of actors. 
 
Figure 40: Structure of the policy community in Brussels 
Group 1: climate 
policy resistors 
e.g. energy 
intensives 
Group 3: 
Multiple target 
advocates  
Group 2: Single 
target 
advocates
Group 4: Strategic single 
target advocates 
Epistemic community of climate policy actors 
Very limited interaction 
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Even looking at only the ‘formal’ group membership (i.e. not including informal 
interaction) of various actors leads to a striking picture of a polarised community 
with two distinct groups – the energy intensive industries in one and everybody 
else in the other. Figure 41 shows the formal connections between groups and 
the cleavage between the energy intensive industries and the wider policy 
community. 
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Figure 41: Group membership. Squares are individual entities or companies, triangles are membership 
associations or federations and circles are ad-hoc or another grouping. Lines indicate group membership (source: 
author’s own elaboration) 
The general agreement within each group about the nature and importance of 
problems and about the type of solutions that might be appropriate led to a high 
degree of interaction between each of the two sides of the debate and 
policymakers with corresponding views. One lobbyist went as far as to claim 
that:  
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“…from my point of view as a lobbyist, there were people in the 
Commission who I regarded as entirely part of the team I was working 
with and for in this process”…“and, I mean, there is no question that 
those who were arguing [the other side of the debate] were having those 
conversations with their Commission allies” 
This closeness of relationships and shared beliefs among external stakeholders 
and between stakeholders and Commission staff is built on two elements: first 
the interpersonal relationships between individuals “because we’ve known each 
other for years and we’re working on the same subjects” (Interview 26) and “it’s 
all about trust” (Interview 30). 
Second are mutual resource dependencies. The resources exchanged were 
highly variable. Clearly, the attention of Commission staff who draft or are able 
to influence the content of policy document is considered valuable in its own 
right to outside stakeholders. Information is provided in return. Information may 
be a critique, political intelligence or new analysis but, as one lobbyist put it, the 
aim of interest groups is to become “…the captains of information” (Interview 
30).  
Between various lobbyists and campaigners, resources are frequently 
exchanged and often form the basis of informal or ad-hoc coalitions. In groups 
such as the Single Target Coalition, Friends of ETS and the Magritte Group as 
well as perceived legitimacy (a resource of primary importance), members may 
bring analytical skills, communications or PR skills, contacts, NGO-style 
campaigning skills - which are especially sought after by large companies which 
are “…just not set-up to operate like that” (Interview 1). In some cases, 
especially the Friends of ETS coalitions, there was a clear adaptation of policy 
preferences (in favour of a single target, for example) in order to enable 
stronger, more resilient coalitions to be built. This kind of flexible, dynamic 
coalition building built on shared interests, compromise, trust and resource 
exchange are far more prevalent in the self-appointed ‘progressive’ energy 
community than in the traditional industries which tend toward more 
hierarchical, inflexible modes of collective action. There was, however, a 
surprising lack of coordination between the renewables sector and the energy 
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efficiency sector, which had a clear common interest in building a case for 
multiple targets. This could have been due to the lack of coordination within the 
renewables sector itself, which struggled even to overcome its own technology 
divisions (Interview 13). This topic is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 in 
the section on policy entrepreneurship. 
Underlining the value of information, details of various energy system modelling 
exercises were a perennial point of discussion and debate and part of the 
language requirement of participation in the progressive community was to 
‘speak modelling’. While many actors were afforded access to the community 
by dint of connections and longevity of tenure and personal networks, the 2030 
debate saw ECF, a relatively new yet important actor in Brussels politics, gain 
admission to the community by producing well-funded, thorough modelling 
outputs. ECF also contributed to establishing the language used and terms of 
the debate by producing one of the earliest contributions, coining the term ‘no-
regrets’, later used by a range of stakeholders and the Commission, and doing 
so with a wide constituency of support across sectors. 
The fragmentation of the policy community shown in Figure 41 led to a great 
deal of suspicion between the two halves. A fragmented policy community tends 
to result in fragmented policy or ‘the right hand not knowing what the left hand is 
doing’ as Kingdon (2010, p.118) puts it. And it certainly appears to have been 
the case in climate and energy policy that two halves of the policy community 
had very different perspectives on the policy process. While heavy industry was 
doing its best to raise the profile of so-called carbon leakage problem and the 
de-industrialisation of Europe, the topic rarely featured in discussions among 
the wider community, leading to a sense of frustration and explanations from 
energy intensive industry lobbyists of policymakers motives and attitudes that 
tend towards conspiracy theories: 
“…of course, because she [Catherine Day] has supported Clima blindly 
and therefore... You know, just in general. DG Clima have the role where 
they completely ignore industry.” “…she blindly backed Clima, yeah, 
blindly. On everything. So the people who had anything trying to say... 
‘Well, yeah the impact on industry might be bad.’ Basically, you know, 
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she [gave] a little bit here, little bit there, but on the big issues we were 
completely ignored. Or I would say actively ignored. You can say that.” 
(Interview 20) 
It is also common in the traditional industries to discuss the funding 
arrangements of the ENGOs, many of whom receive grant funding from the 
Commission (described in Chapter 3): 
 “So what the Commission has done is created an echo chamber in 
Brussels by funding people who are supportive of the policy direction that 
they wish to go in. You can have different views on that.” “I don’t think it’s 
a very good system of government. It’s conflicted. If there are paid 
lobbyists in town and the lobbyists are paid by the organisation that they 
are lobbying, then, of course, the institutions will hear exactly what 
they’ve paid to hear in the same way that my message is exactly what 
my industry members want me to say because I’m paid to say that.” 
(Interview 27). 
“We have to pay for everything. And it's very expensive.” “[But] basically 
DG Clima65 is sponsoring all the NGOs. To make their cause. That's the 
real lobby.” Without the Commission, that lobby would not exist.” 
(Interview 20) 
The lack of common understanding of the problems to be solved and mistrust 
between the two camps is clearly illustrated by a report produced by coal 
producers’ association, Euracoal, titled ‘NGOs for sale’66. The report is explicitly 
designed to parody the style and content of reports from ENGOs, which are 
described by Euroacoal as “dubious” (Interview 27).  
                                            
65 The LIFE+ programs that the interviewee was referring to are actually funded by DG Environment 
66 See Box 7on page 262 
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5.7 Summary and conclusion 
MSA proposes that the policy stream represents a primaeval soup in which 
policy ideas compete for acceptance within a policy community (Kingdon, 
2010). This chapter has reviewed the ideas which had currency in the debate 
about the 2030 targets and charted their fates through time during the agenda 
setting phase of policy formulation. 
The 2030 framework proposed by the Commission and endorsed by the 
European Council contained multiple targets. The renewable energy and energy 
efficiency targets were, however, lower than advocates had hoped for and they 
were not directly binding on the member states, probably reducing their impact. 
Some saw this as a good outcome. In the words of one oil and gas lobbyist: “the 
Commission probably got it right because nobody was happy. It smells like a 
good compromise” (Interview 9). 
From 2011 to 2013 resources were expended by both the Commission and 
external actors on modelling future scenarios of the European energy system. 
Much of the modelling was derivative of previous work, but the efforts of ECF 
provided a timely, novel and competent contribution and established the idea 
that some options  - such as renewable energy and energy efficiency - could be 
described as ‘no regrets’. A focus of much of the modelling work was how the 
electricity system must change if generation is to become largely renewable. 
The ECF analysis opened a wider discussion about post-2020 climate and 
energy policy and was partially successful in framing that discussion as one in 
which renewables and energy efficiency should play a role as ‘no regrets’ 
options. Following this period of intense modelling by every actor that could 
muster the resources, several key contested ideas emerged about what the 
2030 climate and energy package should contain: 
How ambitious should Europe’s 2030 decarbonisation goal be? A figure of 
40% by 2030 was introduced at an early stage which appeared to broadly fulfil 
the goal of an 80% reduction by 2050. This figure was rarely challenged 
(despite some concerns among environmentalists about the level of ambition) 
partly due to the way in which it was ‘normalised’ by the European Commission 
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and partly because it was linked to the 2050 goal which had already been 
decided in 2009. 
Single versus multiple targets – should the EU have a single headline 
GHG emissions target or also have targets for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency in 2030? The idea or principle of a single target, in which EU 
climate and energy policy is effectively technology-neutral, was used in support 
of various interests. ‘Market efficiency’ arguments which held that ‘letting the 
market decide’ the energy mix would be cheaper for society than ‘picking 
winners’ were put forward by groups which were either threatened by increased 
EU mandate on renewable energy and energy efficiency such as the major 
utility groups, oil and gas sector and others that were generally more resistant 
to strong or effective climate policy. Within the European Commission, the 
single target tended to be supported by officials in DG Clima, seeking to 
maintain the primacy of the EU ETS as Europe’s climate policy flagship while 
DG Ener officials sought a multi-target approach. At the same time, member 
states such as the UK, with new nuclear energy aspirations or Poland with an 
important domestic coal industry (see Chapter 6 for a discussion of member 
state situations) also invoked the idea of technology neutrality, partly on the 
grounds of subsidiarity and member states’ right to determine their own energy 
mix.  
Arguments about potential economic growth and jobs in renewable energy and 
energy efficiency producer industries and security of supply from (domestic) 
renewable sources were used by some NGOs and producer groups to support 
a multi-target approach but assertions that renewable energy undermines 
energy security were not forcefully rejected by these groups. A consensus for a 
single target was perceived to be building during 2013 but intervention by 
member states and, to a lesser degree, the European Parliament, in favour of 
multiple targets appeared to reinstate renewable energy and energy efficiency 
targets on the agenda.  
What level of renewable energy should Europe target in 2030? Those who 
advocated a target, such as renewable energy producer groups, made a case 
that the target should be as high as 45% of energy demand. The eventual 
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target, however, was explicitly designed to reflect the proportion of energy that 
would come from renewable sources, whether or not there was a target. 
What level of energy savings should the EU commit to for 2030? The level 
of the energy efficiency target was determined outside the main process as a 
consequence of earlier delays in laying out the energy efficiency directive in 
2012. There was a strong divergence between the energy efficiency lobby’s 
calculations and those of the Commission on what the appropriate, most cost 
effective level should be. While the industry continued to support a 40% target, 
the Commission avoided putting forward a proposal, instead deferring to the 
member states and suggesting that a cost effective route to decarbonisation 
would lead to energy savings in the region of 25%, with the final proposal 
slightly higher at 30%. The assumptions used in the Commission’s modelling 
became the subject of a significant public dispute known as ‘modelgate’, 
underlining the fact that within the debate techo-economic modelling played a 
role that was political as well as scientific. 
MSA also posits that the characteristics of the policy community have 
implications for agenda setting. Kingdon (2010, p.119) states that the level of 
‘fragmentation’ of the community affects the coherence of policy ideas with 
close-knit communities having “common outlooks, orientations and ways of 
thinking” and therefore better able to communicate and combine problems and 
policies more rapidly. The climate and energy policy networks in Brussels 
during 2013 and 2014 were highly polarized into two distinct communities, a 
‘progressive’ community in favour of more rapid, stronger action on climate and 
energy and one, mainly comprising the energy intensive industries, which was 
not.  
However, the ‘progressive’ community was not entirely homogenous with both 
single and multiple target approaches advocated, in some cases for strategic 
reasons associated with the parallel legislative process of EU-ETS reform 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Within the ‘progressive’ policy 
community, the very close interaction of a number of key actors, particularly 
within the Friends of ETS coalition, meant that natural advocates for a multi-
target approach were somewhat muted and a single-target and the idea of 
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technology-neutrality were able to rapidly gain traction. Within the community of 
energy intensive industry lobbyists, there was a feeling of being excluded from 
the policy process - which many saw as dominated by ENGOs and 
environmental elements within the European Commission. The funding 
arrangements of the NGOs were presented as evidence of a conflict of interest 
for the Commission. 
By the end of 2013, the policy making agenda was dominated by the idea of a 
single target with the Commission and others perceiving a consensus around 
the idea, concessions only made by the Commission following the last-minute 
intervention of several member states. The single target idea proved to be 
extremely potent for a range of reasons:  
 First, great effort was expended by actors such as the Magritte Group to 
show that a single target was both more market-based and more 
‘European’ than multiple targets – in line with the values of leading 
European politicians;  
 Second, coalitions such as ‘Friends of ETS’ were formed which at least 
partially muted67 the natural scepticism of the idea held by many in the 
renewable energy and NGO community as part of a processes of forming 
a highly integrated yet diverse group of supporters of ETS reform; 
 Third, one of the natural opponents of the idea, the renewable energy 
sector, was in disarray as the main coordination and contact point, 
EREC, collapsed through 2013; 
 Fourth, the idea of a single target was the only substantive point of 
agreement across the divide between the two, otherwise entirely 
separate, halves of the policy community 
This chapter has described the policy stream – which was essentially a 
discussion about the EU 2030 targets - and the community in which the 
discussion took place. MSA proposes that the convergence of problems and 
                                            
67 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 
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policies is influenced by the overarching political context; the next chapter 
presents the politics stream. 
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Chapter 6. The politics stream  
“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the 
sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” 
Jean Monnet 
 
This chapter provides an account of the politics stream and is the final of three 
parallel chapters which describe each of the three streams of MSA, the others 
being the problem stream (0) and the policy stream (0), as illustrated in Figure 
42. It consists of an account of the important national and European political 
trends and the political landscape within which the policymaking process is 
nested. Following a recap of the MSA and its politics stream in section 6.2, this 
chapter describes the prevailing European political mood in section 6.3, surveys 
domestic politics in three important member states in section 6.4 and describes 
a state of flux in Commission personnel in section 6.5. Section 6.6 provides a 
breakdown of the member state positions in the run up to the autumn 2014 
European Council and section 6.7 concludes. 
 
 
Figure 42: The politics stream identified in MSA  
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6.1 Introduction 
In MSA, the politics stream flows quite separately from the community of 
specialists concerned with policy problems and solutions (Kingdon, 2010). 
Contrasting the broad definition of politics assumed by much political science 
and indeed much of this thesis, ‘politics’ in this sense is ascribed a fairly narrow 
definition based on electoral, partisan or other issues which one might find 
discussed in the ‘politics’ section of a national newspaper (Kingdon, 2010, 
p.145; Zahariadis, 2007). Far from being exogenous to the policy process, MSA 
sees the political context as a crucial ‘promoter or inhibiter’ of an idea’s 
progress up the policy making agenda (Kingdon, 2010, p.163). 
The chapter shows that European public attitudes to both the EU and to climate 
change were souring during the agenda-setting phase of the 2030 climate and 
energy framework. It also shows that the three member states most often 
identified by members of the policy community as important to the debate – the 
UK, Germany and Poland, were operating under very different domestic political 
constraints from each other. There was also a significant re-allocation of key 
personnel in the European Commission in 2010. Finally, the chapter provides a 
brief overview of national positions at the October 2014 European Council 
summit at which the targets were decided.  
6.2 MSA and the politics stream 
As discussed in Chapter 2, MSA proposes that the political context in which 
policy problems are discussed has implications for the coupling of problems and 
policies and the emerging policy making agenda (Kingdon, 2010). In a national 
or federal context, MSA tends to include three main elements within the politics 
stream: the national mood, pressure group campaigns and administrative or 
legislative turnover. Some modifications are needed to translate the framework 
to an EU context and Zahariadis (2008, p.518) puts forward four components 
that make up the EU politics stream. These have been used to structure this 
chapter; they are: 
 The European mood; 
 The ideological balance of parties in Parliament;  
 Member national and partisan affiliation; and 
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 The balance of the Council (or European Council) 
Reflecting the theoretical literature as well as the topics emerging from the 
interviews, the four components of the politics stream receiving attention in this 
chapter are: 
1. The European mood and the 2014 European Parliament elections 
(section 6.3) 
Direct engagement of a ‘European’ public by EU politicians is undoubtedly 
weaker than in national settings and the concept of an ‘integrated public sphere’ 
in the EU certainly has its critics who point to European politicians’ lack of direct 
accountability to voters as an indication that it may not exist (Princen, 2007). 
Nevertheless, on certain issues, a ‘European mood’ or ‘climate of the times’ can 
be detected and described which is strongest where the decision making in 
question tends to happen at the European level (Van de Steeg, 2006). This 
would include debates concerning the nature and future of the EU and Europe-
wide or global issues such as an economic crisis or climate change. The 
European mood is discussed here in terms of two topics: firstly public opinion 
about - and trust in - the EU and its institutions and secondly European citizens’ 
views about the threat that climate change poses to Europe and the world. 
2. Domestic politics in important member states (section 6.4) 
The European Union is (at the time of writing) an organisation of twenty-eight 
member states, between which consensus must be generally be found to 
approve policy goals such as the 2030 climate and energy targets. Each 
member brings its own domestic ideological and political preferences to the 
decision-making process and since any proposal must eventually be politically 
palatable, political developments in member states are watched carefully by 
members of the policy community. But some members are more important to 
the agenda-setting process than others. Although decisions in the European 
Council are almost always taken by consensus (de Schoutheete, 2012), the 
bargaining power of individual states varies considerably based on a range of 
factors. A member state may have more power due to its status in the 
international system based on size, GDP etc. or personal negotiating abilities of 
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heads of state. It may also be the case that a member state’s bargaining power 
is more potent when taking decisions on some issues rather than others 
(Tallberg, 2008).  
However, rather than attempting to establish which member states are most 
important ex-ante based on their characteristics, the interviews provide a very 
strong steer towards some member states as being particularly crucial to the 
agenda. Three states were mentioned with particular regularity in the interviews 
with almost all interviewees identifying them as important to the debate. These 
are Poland, Germany and the UK – all large and important states with, as we 
shall see in this chapter, very distinctive and contrasting domestic politics.  
3. Personnel turnover (section 6.5) 
Kingdon (2010, p.153) identifies the turnover of key personnel as critical 
moments in agenda-setting with issues pushed forward or subdued by changes. 
The turnover may be in political representatives such as Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs), other political personnel or administrative staff. 
Although Parliamentary elections were held in 2014, the new Parliament was 
unable to have much impact on the agenda setting process much of which had 
already happened before the Parliament’s opening session in July 2014. The 
European Commission, however, underwent some substantial changes at both 
the political and the administrative levels at the start of the Barroso II 
Commission in 2010.  
4. The European Council (section 6.6) 
This chapter also includes a brief account of the European Council summit in 
October 2014 which, although not strictly within the agenda-setting phase as 
defined in Chapter 2, section 6.6 illustrates the manifestation of political forces 
important to an understanding of the politics stream. 
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6.3 The European mood 
This section discusses - and presents evidence of - the state of public trust and 
approval of the EU across Europe and the salience of climate change to 
European voters in the few years up to 2014. It focusses on two key areas of 
public opinion – attitudes to the EU itself (section 6.3.1) and climate change 
(section 6.3.2). 
6.3.1 Public opinion about the EU 
For many years, European citizens were assumed by EU scholars to be largely 
disinterested in European politics and unlikely to either oppose or resist it. 
Fundamentally, EU integration was considered to be an élite business and 
treated as such. This so-called ‘permissive consensus’ among citizens implied a 
generalised but shallow-rooted acceptance of the EU politics, leaving élites free 
to continue the process of integration largely unfettered by public opinion 
(Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). The permissive consensus gave way, under 
the weight of increased public scrutiny following the Maastricht treaty in the early 
1990s, to what some scholars term a ‘constraining dissensus’ among European 
citizens, particularly following the testing period in which an EU constitution was 
rejected by French and Dutch voters in referendums in the mid-2000s (Marks and 
Hooghe, 2009, p.5; Hurrelmann, 2007). By 2013, despite that year being labelled 
the ‘Year of the European Citizens’ (European Commission, 2013g), it was clear 
that trust in the EU – which had been steadily eroding for some time, as Figure 
43 shows – was becoming a prominent political issue.  
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Figure 43: Increasing distrust of the EU (source: European Commission/Eurobarometer) 
The evolution of a global financial crisis into the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
in 2009 divided Europe into ‘creditor’ countries such as Germany which had, 
before the crisis been running current account surpluses and ‘debtor’ countries 
such as Greece which, following years of entrenched current account deficits, 
risked default and widespread financial turmoil (Lane, 2012). The latter group 
had been ‘bailed out’ with loans from other EU members and international 
organisations. Voters in both sets of countries were unhappy – those in creditor 
countries such as Germany felt that they had been forced into a situation where 
they had to prop up the public finances of debtor countries ‘ruined’ by 
irresponsible financial practices while the public opinion in debtor countries was 
inflamed by the tough and sometimes disciplinarian ‘austerity’ fiscal policies 
enforced from outside, largely by the EU (Lapavitsas et al., 2010; Lane, 2012; 
Crum, 2013). The Eurozone crisis contributed to public scepticism about the 
EU, so-called ‘Euroscepticism’, once considered a peculiarly British malaise, 
becoming a Europe-wide phenomenon with sharp declines in public trust 
measured in nearly all EU countries, as shown in Figure 44 (Torreblanca and 
Leonard, 2013).  
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Figure 44: EU-13. Net trust in the EU 2007-2012 (source: Torreblanca and Leonard, 2013) 
This growing antipathy towards the EU was manifest in the growing importance 
of populist, anti-EU parties from both the left and right of the political spectrum. 
In the 2014 European elections, strongly anti-EU parties won around 100 of the 
751 seats in the European Parliament with almost a third of MEPs from broadly 
anti-establishment parties (The Economist, 2014; Spiegel and Carnegy, 2014). 
Table 5 shows the performance of anti-immigration and anti-EU parties in the 
2014 European elections while Table 6 shows the performance of populist anti-
austerity parties. 
Party Country EP 
seats 
Domestic vote 
ranking 
UKIP UK 24 1st 
FN France 24 1st 
Golden Dawn Greece 5 3rd 
*Alternative for 
Deutschland 
Germany 7 *Anti-euro but not 
anti-EU 
Freedom Netherlands 4 3rd 
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Freedom Austria 4 3rd 
True Finns Finland 2 3rd 
Vlaams Belang Belgium 1 8th 
People’s Denmark 4 1st 
Table 5: Anti-immigration/anti-EU parties, EP elections 2014 (Source: Open Europe; Spiegel and Carnegy, 2014) 
  
Party Country EP seats Domestic vote 
ranking 
Five Star Italy 18 2nd 
Syriza Greece 8 1st 
Podemos Spain 5 4th 
United Left Spain 5 3rd 
Table 6: Anti-austerity parties, EP elections 2014 (Source: Open Europe; Spiegel and Carnegy, 2014) 
The shift in the balance of power in the Parliament itself, however, was fairly 
subtle with the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Socialist and 
Democratic Alliance (S&D) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) 
– all pro-EU groupings - maintaining a combined majority, supported by informal 
voting agreements on key legislation (Bressanelli et al., 2016; Votewatch 
Europe, 2015). Figure 45 shows the change in the makeup of the Parliament in 
the 2014 elections. The However, the results of the election can be seen to be 
symptomatic of growing scepticism across Europe of the EU’s ability and 
authority to deal with the problems facing citizens. 
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Figure 45: EP elections 201468 (source: European Parliament; The Economist, 2014) 
6.3.2 European opinion about climate change 
It wasn’t only European policymakers feeling deflated in the years following the 
2009 UN climate conference in Copenhagen; since 2008, EU citizens’ 
perception of climate change as a serious global problem had also been 
waning. In the summer of 2011, climate change was seen by respondents to EU 
surveys as second only to poverty, lack of food and drinking water ‘as the most 
serious problem facing the world as a whole’69 (European Commission, 2011d). 
By the end of 2013, climate change had been overtaken by ‘the economic 
situation’ and by 2015 had been pushed into fourth place among citizens’ 
concerns by ‘international terrorism’ (European Commission, 2014e; 2015b). 
The proportion of respondents to the EU’s Eurobarometer survey of European 
attitudes and opinion believing climate change to be the ‘single most serious 
problem facing the world’ fell from 20% in June 2011 to 16% in December 2013 
and by 2015 it had fallen further to 15%, as shown in Figure 46.  
                                            
68 The number of MEPs reduced in 2014 due to an agreement to cap the size of the Parliament during the 
negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty (European Parliament, 2013) 
69 In 2008, climate change was considered the most serious problem (European Commission, 2008) 
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Figure 46: Percentage of Eurobarometer respondents who consider climate change the most serious global 
problem (European Commission, 2015b; 2014e; 2011d; 2009d; 2008) 
This increasing indifference towards climate change was contrasted by the rise 
of economic and security concerns as well as scepticism and a sense of 
pessimism about the future of the European Union itself. Between 2011 and 
2013, most Europeans felt that the worst impacts of the financial crisis were yet 
to come and public confidence in the EU’s (rather than member state 
governments’) ability to address these concerns was declining, as measured by 
the Commission’s own polling (European Commission, 2013d).  
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Figure 47: Answers to the question "which of the following do you consider to be the single most serious problem 
facing the world as a whole? (percentage of respondents) (source: European Commission, 2015b) 
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6.4 Member states: Poland, UK, Germany 
The previous section presented information about the European mood. This 
section presents the relevant political factors in three important member states 
– UK (section 6.4.1), Germany (section 6.4.2) and Poland (section 6.4.3) - 
during the period 2011-2014. 
6.4.1 The United Kingdom  
In 2008, before the European Council’s declaration of the 80-85% 
decarbonisation aspiration, the UK’s Labour government had succeeded in 
passing a law which bound the country to an 80% reduction in emissions by 
2050 along with legally binding periodic ‘carbon budgets’, putting it significantly 
ahead of most other EU member states in climate ambition (Lorenzoni and 
Benson, 2014).  
In the 2010 UK general election, David Cameron’s Conservative party failed to 
win a parliamentary majority, leading to a coalition government - a novelty in 
modern British politics - with the Liberal Democrats led by Nick Clegg as a 
junior partner. The main energy appointment in the new government, Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change, was given to Chris Huhne, a Liberal 
Democrat, while control of the Treasury, the nation’s finance ministry, was taken 
by Conservative George Osbourne (Guardian, 2010).  
The coalition partners’ differences on the key issues of energy, climate and the 
European Union were to provide a great deal of tension between the two during 
the government’s five-year term. The Liberal Democrats have, for many years, 
been among the UK’s strongest supporters of European integration and the 
party leadership that took office in 2010 was no exception. For the Conservative 
party, on the other hand, the issue of ‘Europe’ has long been a divisive one with 
regular internal disputes between a group of typically anti-EU members of 
parliament (MPs) and more ambivalent leadership (Baker and Schnapper, 
2015).  
In the early 1970s, Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath experienced 88 
rebellions in which Conservative MPs voted against their government on the 
issue of Europe (Cowley and Stuart, 2012). The Maastricht Treaty and its 
parliamentary ratification in the early 1990s re-exposed the deep fault line within 
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the Conservative party and movement, once again resulting in ongoing 
parliamentary rebellions (Berrington and Hague, 1998). Acknowledging that the 
issue had become something of Conservative party obsession, soon after his 
election to lead the Conservative party in 2005 David Cameron pledged to stop 
the Conservatives ‘banging on about Europe’ (Parker, 2013).  
By 2011, however, the issue was firmly back on the Conservative agenda. In a 
Parliamentary debate on whether the UK should hold a referendum on Europe, 
triggered partly by a public petition, 81 Conservative MPs voted against the 
government - which was opposed to the idea - in one of the largest 
parliamentary rebellions since the Second World War (Cowley and Stuart, 
2012). In January 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron made a speech 
conceding that a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU 
would be a Conservative party manifesto pledge in the 2015 general election 
(BBC, 2013a).  
The issue of sustainable energy was also divisive in the UK government. The 
Liberal Democrats traditionally supported renewables and were sceptical about 
nuclear energy (Liberal Democrats, 2005) while the Conservatives were 
conflicted about renewables and overwhelmingly in favour of nuclear energy. 
Conservative opponents to renewable energy argued on grounds ranging from 
‘unsightliness’ to ‘infectiveness’ and cost. In early 2012 more than 100 
Conservative MPs wrote to the Prime Minister in order to demand that he act to 
reduce or remove financial support for wind energy (Telegraph, 2012; Gardner 
et al., 2012). As part of an increased focus on fiscal and budgetary restraint for 
which the government had an electoral mandate, strict limitations were 
introduced in 2010 by the treasury on the amount which could be levied on 
energy consumers’ bills in order to fund policies such as renewable energy 
support (National Audit Office, 2013).  
In 2013, hopes were high for the UK’s ‘nuclear renaissance’, an idea which had 
been gaining currency since its rekindling by Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2006 
(Wintour and Adam, 2006; Department of Trade and Industry, 2007) with the 
formerly critical Liberal Democrats also becoming ‘converted’ supporters 
(Huhne, 2011). Throughout much of the process, the European Commission 
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was scrutinising plans to subsidise a new nuclear electricity generating station 
at Hinkley Point in Somerset to ascertain whether the financial arrangements 
constituted illegal ‘state aid’ (European Commission, 2014l; European 
Commission, 2013h). Overall there was resistance by all main UK political 
parties to renewable energy targets and, to a lesser extent, energy efficiency 
targets, increasing the importance to the UK of a technology-neutral approach. 
Edward Davey, the Liberal Democrat Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change who succeeded Chris Huhne in 2012 was significantly constrained in 
his ability to make a mark on EU policy by public opinion, the UK’s pre-existing 
commitment to new nuclear energy and a visceral resistance to both the EU 
and renewable energy in elements of the Liberal Democrats’ Conservative 
partners in government. At the same time he was empowered to commit to 
ambitious targets for greenhouse gas emissions reduction by the UK’s fourth 
carbon budget under the Climate Change act which committed the UK to 50% 
greenhouse gas emissions reduction compared to 1990 by 2025, faster and 
deeper cuts than even the most ambitious suggestions for the EU-level target 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2013). The government also had support for its 
negotiating position from the Parliamentary opposition, the Labour Party which, 
in 2014, altered its stance on a renewable energy target to prefer a single target 
approach in the EU (Business Green, 2014a; Vaughan, 2014). 
The UK began building support for its ‘technology-neutral’ position as much as a 
year before many other member states (Interview 11, 17) and was the first big 
member state to announce its position on the 2030 framework which reflected 
Davey’s situation and, at least in promoting ambition on the emissions 
reductions target, was perceived to be something of a leader (Interview 2; 
Guardian, 2014). As one participant observed: 
“The UK was by far [the first to move] and I'm talking a year ahead of all 
the other member states in terms of drawing their red lines and framing 
the debates because of that, and starting coalitions with certain other 
member states.” (Interview 11) 
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6.4.2 Germany  
For many years Germany has pushed to move energy production away from 
fossil fuels and nuclear towards renewable energy, pioneering the use of feed-
in-tariffs (FITs) for renewably generated electricity in the 1990s (Mitchell, 
Bauknecht and P. M. Connor, 2006; Fitch-Roy, 2016). National targets were 
introduced in 2010 for an 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
compared to 1990 and for 80% of energy to be renewably sourced (BMWi, 
2010). In 2011 the process of energy transition or ‘Energiewende’, as it is 
known, was accelerated.  
Chancellor Angela Merkel, having previously shown some support for nuclear 
energy, took a popular decision to rapidly phase out nuclear energy70 in 
Germany following the meltdown of three nuclear reactors at Fukushima in 
Japan due to a Tsunami (Jahn and Stephan, 2016; Baake, 2013). The decision 
elevated the Energiewende project from simply ‘challenging’ to what Angela 
Merkel described as a ‘Herculean task’ and the largest social, political and 
economic project since German reunification (The Economist, 2012; Baake, 
2013). Despite strong and ongoing support for the project, by 2013 the impact 
of Energiewende policies on electricity prices was becoming controversial, 
especially since the rapid increase in renewables’ contribution was funded 
largely by consumers with much of industry exempt71. There was also some 
concern about whether the degree of coordination required by a project on the 
scale of the Energiewende was even achievable (Smith Stegen and Seel, 2013; 
Dehmer, 2013). 
But, as the discussion in Brussels about the 2030 climate and energy 
framework increased in intensity throughout 2013, Germany was in the midst of 
choosing a new government. Despite its strong performance in the September 
election, Angela Merkel’s centre-right Christian Union (CDU/CSU) lost its 
favoured coalition partner, the classically liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), 
                                            
70 At the time of the phase-out decision, nuclear energy accounted for more than 20% of electricity 
generated in Germany (Dehmer, 2013) 
71 Renewable energy levies accounted for 16% of German household electricity bills in 2013/14, the 
highest in Europe (European Commission, 2014d) 
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which failed to retain any representation in the German Bundestag. Instead, it 
formed a ‘grand coalition’ with the more left-wing Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
(BBC, 2013b). The coalition negotiations were not straightforward, taking more 
than two months and were followed by a ballot of the SPD membership on the 
agreement - resulting in the new government not taking office until 17th 
December (Euractiv, 2013c; 2013b). In Merkel’s new cabinet, the newly created 
job of Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy – and overall responsibility for 
the Energiwende - was given to Sigmar Gabriel, leader of the SPD (Euractiv, 
2013b). 
In the 202020 EU debate in 2006/7, the German government was a strong and 
leading voice among member states in favour of renewable energy, often taking 
similar positions to the renewables industry and Sigmar Gabriel remained a 
strong advocate of an energy efficiency target and especially a renewable 
energy target (Interview 5; Boasson and Wettestad, 2013, p.160; Euractiv, 
2013b; Cox and Dekanozishvili, 2015). But this time around, the timing of the 
2013 campaign, election and the subsequent coalition negotiations impaired 
Germany’s ability to engage in the debate about the EU 2030 climate and 
energy framework at a critical moment (Interview 11, 13, 2, 22). By the end of 
2013, the idea of a single target was well advanced in both the Commission and 
national capitals. Only after the terms of the German governing coalition had 
been finalised did Germany enter the debate with much force, and then with 
less vigour than many expected (Interview 13, 15, 11; Euractiv, 2014a; 2014d). 
For some close observers in favour of multiple, binding targets, it was clear that: 
“it was just stunning how disorganised the German government was at 
this time”…“the [targets] could have been stronger [if] Merkel would have 
been earlier into the game” (Interview 4) 
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6.4.3 Poland and coal 
The 2004 expansion of the EU to include relatively poor but coal-rich countries 
such as Poland complicated issues of climate policy (Stripple et al., 2010, 
p.235). Since its extrication from Soviet influence in the late 1980s Poland has 
been extraordinarily dependent on a single source of energy – coal. In 2008, it 
accounted for 55% of primary energy supply and 92% of electricity production, 
contributing to the country’s particularly high emissions per unit of GDP (IEA, 
2011a; OECD, 2012). Poland’s coal reserves are nearly 20 billion tonnes but 
many of the mines are very deep, making extraction relatively expensive and 
the un-modernised Polish coal industry is performing poorly. Many of the state-
owned mines are losing money, a situation aggravated by low prices in the 
world coal market (Vorotnikov, 2014; Euracoal, 2016). 
But coal is more than simply an energy source in Poland and a purely economic 
discussion of coal use fails to capture its role in Polish politics. Coal in Poland is 
often invoked as a powerful symbol of nationhood and independence and coal 
miners are widely regarded as heroic figures – a characterisation enhanced by 
the role played by Silesian coal miners in demonstrations against the 
introduction of martial law in the winter of 1981 when nine were shot and killed 
by soldiers attempting to break up a strike at Wujek mine (Borejsza, 2006, 
p.405; Paczkowski, 2015).  
 
Figure 48: Scene from the protest at Wujek, 1981 (source: Radio Poland) 
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The relative size and status of the coal industry in Poland gives it a strong voice 
in national politics (Janowska, 2011). Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz’s first speech 
to Parliament in September 2014, in which she discussed her position on the 
2030 framework, was accompanied by a large protest by coal miners outside 
the Parliament building in Warsaw. Kopacz pledged to oppose any EU decision 
which might increase the prices of energy in Poland and acknowledged coal’s 
‘strategic importance’ to the country. She also made it clear that she planned to 
protect Poland’s inefficient and loss-making domestic coal industry from foreign 
competition (Foy, 2014). 
Apart from coal which is seen as domestic and therefore secure, Poland is 
heavily dependent on Russia for energy imports. In 2012 Poland imported 
nearly 70% of its gas demand with 80% of that coming from Russia. Almost all 
of its oil is imported from Russia (IEA, 2014). Successive Polish governments 
have sought political solutions to the country’s dependence on Russia for 
energy. Poland has tried several times to appeal to international partners for 
‘energy solidarity’ or assistance between states in the case of energy supply 
disruption. In 2006 the idea was put to NATO but was thwarted by Germany 
and France and also featured in the negotiation of the EU’s Lisbon treaty in 
2007 and 2008 (Buchan, 2009; Runner, 2008; Politico, 2007). In 2014, shortly 
before becoming President of the European Council, Polish Prime Minister 
Donald Tusk revived the idea, coining the term ‘Energy Union’ and proposing a 
new European body to act as a central buyer of Europe’s gas (Tusk, 2014)72. 
The Energy Union has since come to be seen as an attempt to place energy 
cooperation at the heart of the European project (Szulecki et al., 2016). 
Poland has for many years resisted greater EU ambition on emissions 
reduction, unsuccessfully taking a complaint to the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) in 2011, arguing that the way in which EU-ETS allowances were 
calculated by the Commission does not adequately reflect Poland’s particular 
                                            
72 Although the term itself is new, the concept of grand energy-based European integration can be 
attributed to former European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek and Commission President Jacques 
Delors (Buzek and Delors, 2010; Hancher et al., 2010; Andoura and Vinois, 2015). 
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reliance on coal (ECJ, 2013). The government was far from restrained by the 
party political situation in Poland. The Parliamentary opposition, Law and 
Justice (PiS), were even more strongly opposed to EU climate action (Foy, 
2015). Despite Poland’s desire to present itself as a champion of energy 
efficiency, negotiations with the VISEGRAD group and the UK meant that it 
remained a single target advocate (Euractiv, 2013f; Visegrad Group plus 
Romania and Bulgaria, 2014; GOV.UK, 2014b). 
6.5 Personnel turnover in the European Commission 
This section reviews the changes in the structure of the European Commission 
during the time of the debate about the 2030 targets. 
As the agenda-setting process began, the European Commission underwent 
some significant changes as its leadership sought to integrate climate policy 
more closely to other areas of economic policymaking (Interview 29). José 
Manuel Barroso was elected for a second term as Commission President in 
February 2010 and two new Directorates-General (DG) were created in the 
European Commission. Climate issues, until then largely handled within DG 
Environment became the responsibility of a new DG for Climate Action or DG 
Clima with strong links to the Secretariat General (Interview 29; Oberthür, 
2011). A new role of Commissioner for Climate Action was also created and the 
post filled with former Danish Climate and Energy minister, Connie Hedegaard 
with Jos Delbeke, ‘founding father’ of the EU-ETS appointed Director General of 
DG Clima (Convery, 2009; Skjærseth, 2014). At the same time, energy issues 
were separated from transport through the division of DG for Transport and 
Energy (DG TREN) into DG Energy and DG for Mobility and Transport (DG 
MOVE). While the DG may have been new, there has been a European 
Commissioner for energy since the creation of the Commission in 1967. In 
2010, Barroso replaced the incumbent, Latvian Andris Piebalgs with German, 
Günther Oettinger.  
These changes were controversial in several ways. Firstly the appointment of a 
dedicated Climate Commissioner, first discussed in 2008 (ENDS Europe, 2008), 
alarmed some environmentalists. There was a fear that a side-lined 
Environment Commissioner would be unable to pursue a broad range of 
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climate-related actions and that the new DG and Commissioner role, promoted 
by a “pro-ETS gang” including influential economic think-tank Bruegel, far from 
being empowered to pursue all options could become a ‘Trojan horse’ for a 
climate policy which focused entirely on the EU-ETS at the expense of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency policy (Turmes, 2009). By 2015 DG 
Clima had been nicknamed “DG ETS” by some people in the policy community 
(Interview 11). 
Secondly, the incoming Energy Commissioner, Oettinger was seen as closer to 
German industry and more business orientated that his predecessor (Bürgin, 
2015; Buchan and Keay, 2014). In fact, some in the environmentalist 
community nicknamed him “Commissioner for the energy intensive industries” 
to reflect the “direct line” perceived to exist between him and heavy industry 
(Interview 8, 30). In February 2010, fresh from a disappointing outcome in 
Copenhagen, with a new Climate Commissioner and DG with an EU-ETS 
heavyweight as Director General and a new, less environmentally-minded 
Energy Commissioner set up the institutional backdrop to the ‘problems’ that EU 
climate and energy policymakers were seeking to address between 2010 and 
2014. 
6.6 Summit: Consensus building at the European Council, October 
2014  
This section reviews the national positions of member states in the lead up to 
the European Council in October 2014. 
When the European Council met in October 2014, there were several 
unresolved issues for the heads of state and government to discuss. A minority 
of members were in favour of a GHG emission reduction target of ‘at least’ 40% 
including Denmark and Germany as well as the UK. These members tended to 
have in place domestic targets for emissions reduction in place at least as 
ambitious as that proposed by the European Commission. A larger group of 
members had indicated that they conditionally or unconditionally supported a 
40% GHG target. Support from Poland was conditional on exclusions from 
some of its energy sectors from the cost of ETS participation. Electrically 
isolated Portugal and, to a lesser extent Spain and some of the Baltic nations, 
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wanted to see the EU to mandate increased electrical interconnection between 
states, partially to reduce electrical reliance on Russia (in the case of the Baltic 
states) and, in the Iberian countries, to open up markets for excess renewable 
energy, especially in France which was reluctant to enable more 
interconnection. Of the ‘at least’ 40% GHG members, nearly all strongly 
supported ambitious targets for energy efficiency and renewable energy, largely 
in line with their domestic policy situation. The exception was the UK with its 
overriding ‘technology-neutrality’ principle – although it had indicated that it 
would sign up to ‘non-binding’ targets for renewables. The members which had 
indicated that they could support or accept a 40% target had a far wider range 
of positions on the issues of renewable energy and energy efficiency but tended 
to favour less ambitious targets than, for example, Denmark and Germany. 
Figure 49 gives an overview of the positions of all member states going into the 
European Council in October 2014. It can be seen that the UK was something 
of an anomaly, being strongly in favour of climate ambition while resisting 
multiple targets while, in general, member states which favoured strong climate 
action also favoured multiple targets. 
 234 
 
Figure 49: Member state positions ahead of the October 2014 European Council (data source: Euractiv, 2014g) 
In the event, Poland and the VISEGRAD nations, often portrayed as tough or 
even intransigent negotiators on the European Council, especially on climate 
issues (Interview 1; Janowska, 2011), were able to use the threat of veto of the 
package to obtain an extension to the exclusion of parts of their power systems 
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from the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) cap and trade scheme 
until 2030 and access to an energy system modernisation reserve based on 
ETS revenues valued at 300 million allowances between 2021 and 2030 
(European Council, 2014). In return, Poland was able to sign up to an ‘at least’ 
40% GHG reduction target – an outcome the Prime Minister declared as a ‘win’ 
for Poland (Euractiv, 2014k). Portugal was able to bring interconnection onto 
the agenda but did not secure a binding target with an indicative 15% 
interconnection target agreed (Reuters, 2014). The final outcome of the October 
2014 European Council was the agreement on the four targets the make up the 
2030 climate and energy framework. To recap, these are: 
 An EU target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% 
compared to 1990 by 2030. This target was to be shared between the 
non-ETS sector and the ETS sector sub-targets for which were 30% and 
43% below 2005 levels respectively; 
 A target of at least 27% of all energy to come from renewable sources, 
binding at the EU level with a new governance system announced to 
monitor and ensure progress towards the target; 
 A reduction in energy demand compared to a business as usual 
benchmark of 27%, with a review of progress at 2020 with an option to 
increase the 2030 target to 30%; 
 A non-binding objective for all member states to achieve cross-border 
interconnection of 15% of their installed electricity production capacity by 
2030 (although the guiding target remains 10% by 2020)73 
  
                                            
73 Although the Commission later warned that the 15% target may not be economically viable in all 
member states (European Commission, 2015a) 
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6.7 Summary and conclusion 
MSA posits that developments in the political context, known as the politics 
stream, effects the policymaking agenda (Kingdon, 2010, p.145). This chapter 
has described the political events salient to the policymaking agenda for the EU 
2030 targets. 
During the period 2011 to 2014, tackling climate change was waning in 
importance for many European voters with economic and security worries 
becoming more important. The cost of renewable energy support had become a 
difficult political issue in several EU member states. At the same time, the ability 
of the EU to do something about these issues was being questioned, 
contributing to a surge in support for broadly anti-establishment or anti-EU 
political parties at the 2014 Parliamentary elections.  
Among important member states, the UK had nothing to lose from a strong 
GHG emissions reduction target, having already enacted its own, tougher 
climate targets. A backlash against renewable energy in the Conservative party, 
however, combined with the UK’s commitment to a new-build civil nuclear 
energy programme led to strong resistance across the UK parliament to further 
EU targets for renewable energy or energy efficiency. The UK was, however, 
able to enter the Brussels debate earlier than other members - unlike the 
natural multi-target champion Germany, which was hamstrung by the timing of 
federal elections and the ensuing coalition talks and unable to fully engage until 
early 2014. Poland, meanwhile, continued to fret about energy security and 
support its symbolically important but ailing coal industry by resisting climate 
ambition at the EU level. 
Changes within the European Commission at the start of Barroso’s second term 
created a new, ETS- friendly Directorate-general for Climate Action with strong 
links to the SecGen and ETS old hands such as Jos Delbeke in important roles. 
Meanwhile, DG Energy was separated from DG Tren and was the natural home 
for supporters of renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Commission. 
The energy Commissioner, however, was perceived by many to be a champion 
of Europe’s traditional and energy intensive industries. 
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The last three chapters have described the three streams of the MSA, problem, 
policy and politics. MSA suggests that the convergence or ‘coupling’ of the three 
streams occurs only during time-limited ‘policy windows’, often under the 
influence of skilled actors known as policy entrepreneurs. The next chapter 
explains how and when the streams came together as well as describing the 
identity and role of policy entrepreneurs in that coupling. 
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Chapter 7. Policy windows and policy 
entrepreneurs 
 
“… in order to have some impact [on policy], if you want to 
convey your message to us, you have to show us that you 
understand the political context of the issue. You cannot start 
by saying ‘I want this thing to happen, or I want this little 
thing to be changed.’” (Commission official, Interview 17) 
The three previous chapters described the three streams - problem, policy and 
politics – of the multiple streams approach (MSA). This chapter describes two 
other important elements. The first is that an appropriate policy window is open 
– that is, the time is right for “advocates of proposals to push their pet proposal 
or conception of a policy problem” (Kingdon, 2010, p.165; Zahariadis, 2007). 
The second is the action of policy entrepreneurs who seek to bring the three 
streams together. 
Following short recaps of the concepts of policy windows and entrepreneurs in 
section 7.2, this chapter has three main sections. Section 7.3 describes the 
policy window within which the 2030 climate and energy framework was 
negotiated. Section 7.4 presents evidence of entrepreneurship and identifies 
actors who may be usefully described as having acted in an entrepreneurial 
way in the lead up to the setting of the 2030 climate and energy targets. Section 
7.5 concludes. 
 
 
Figure 50: Policy window and policy entrepreneurs identified in MSA  
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7.1 Introduction 
MSA suggests that only during special moments or ‘policy windows’ can 
advocates ‘couple the streams’ or push their ideas onto the agenda with any 
success (Kingdon, 2010). This chapter explains the coupling process, the timing 
of the policy window opening and the role played by policy entrepreneurship in 
the process. 
Compared to the policy debate that led to the 202020 package in 2007, the 
political context of the 2030 package was much more complicated. The financial 
crisis, a more challenging energy security situation, a new Directorate-General 
with a remit to strengthen the EU-ETS and growing popular mistrust of 
European Union decisions all added to the complexity. In 2007 there was a 
strong push from the French EU presidency to make progress while this time 
around the various council presidencies (Ireland, Lithuania, Greece) did not 
make an ambitious climate and energy package a priority in the same way. The 
debate tested the skills of the most talented climate and energy lobbyists, some 
finding the situation “hard to read” (Interview 13). 
This chapter shows that: 
1. Not all actors experienced the same policy window, with opportunities 
opening at different times for different actors. The policy window also 
changed over time in response to events in the politics and problem 
streams; 
2. Several groups or individuals can be said to have exhibited at least some 
of the qualities of a policy entrepreneur; 
3. Ideas and networks ‘spilt over’ in the 2030 debate from the 
contemporaneous debate about ETS reform with significant implications 
for the 2030 policy. 
7.2 MSA, policy windows and policy entrepreneurs 
This section recaps the main point relating to MSA, policy windows (section 
7.2.1) and entrepreneurs (section 7.2.2) discussed earlier in Chapter 2. 
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7.2.1 Policy windows in multiple streams 
In MSA, a policy window is a moment in time when there is ‘opportunity for 
action’ (Kingdon, 2010, p.166) by advocates of a particular policy outcome. An 
open policy window is a prerequisite for policy change and it provides any group 
with an interest in policymaking with an opportunity to influence that change. In 
his original formulation of MSA, Kingdon suggested that policy windows occur 
infrequently and stay open for only a short period of time although policy 
windows have since been shown, in some settings, to remain open for years at 
a time (Carter and Jacobs, 2014). However long the duration, actors must be 
ready to take advantage of the window while it is open or face having to wait for 
the opportunity to present itself again. Windows may open in either the politics 
stream or the problem stream due to focussing event or disasters, personnel 
changes due to elections or due to cross-pollination of ideas from related policy 
areas known as spillover (Ackrill and Kay, 2011; Kingdon, 2010). 
Windows can open predictably, such as when time-limited legislation expires or 
budgets are approved or they may be “as unpredictable as earthquakes” 
(Zahariadis, 2007). The metaphor of surfers waiting for waves has been used to 
describe the concept. Policy advocates must be prepared, must have their 
ideas, messages and networks ready to catch the big wave when it comes. 
Attempts are sometimes made to catch the wrong wave but eventually the wave 
breaks that will bring them to shore (Kingdon, 2010, p.165; Boscarino, 2009). 
7.2.2 Policy entrepreneurs in multiple streams 
In MSA74, policy entrepreneurs are the skilled, resourceful actors which attempt 
to bring the three streams together: to couple their preferred policy idea to 
salient policy problems in a way that is acceptable in the prevailing political 
context. Entrepreneurs are an important factor in explaining policy change, but 
at least one study has shown that they are not essential in all contexts (Herweg, 
2016). The second half of this chapter, section 7.4, seeks to confirm whether 
policy entrepreneurship was taking place during the negotiation of the 2030 
                                            
74 The concept of the policy entrepreneur is not unique to MSA and certainly predates it. See Mintrom 
and Norman (2009) for a good overview of the concept’s wider applications and history  
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targets and, if so, the identity of any entrepreneurs and the influence they are 
able to exert on the agenda, a central theme of this thesis. 
In a world where problems are not solved in a linear, rational manner, far from 
simply being advocates of particular policy solutions, policy entrepreneurs must 
be power brokers and manipulators of ambiguity in order to “craft contestable 
meaning which they, in turn, disseminate to policymakers in order to activate 
attention and mobilize support or opposition” (Ackrill et al., 2013, p.873). 
Entrepreneurs can be from the corporate, non-governmental or policymaking 
spheres, their location “almost irrelevant” but they are always “central figures in 
the drama” (Kingdon, 2010, p.180). 
There are many actors involved in contributing to and reviewing any policy 
decision. As we have seen in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, these actors come from 
inside and outside the formal policymaking institutions and many have a 
material interest in causing, directing or preventing policy change.  
Successful policy entrepreneurs, as seen by MSA (Kingdon, 2010) tend to have 
three identifying qualities. First, they must be credible or at least have some 
claim that they should be listened to. This may be particular expertise or 
specialist knowledge, it could be the ability to speak on behalf of others as trade 
associations do - or it could be some power over the decision-making process, 
as held by officials and policymakers. Second, entrepreneurs have uncommonly 
good negotiation and networking skills and they are known for them. Third, 
Entrepreneurs are tenacious. They ‘put in the time’ and are there at the 
meetings, on speaking panels, writing positions papers and, as one interviewee 
put it, “generally keeping up the noise levels” and expending “blood, sweat and 
tears” (Interview 8; Kingdon, 2010). More generally, the activity of policy 
entrepreneurship has been argued by Mintrom and Norman (2009) to involve 
four characteristics and who also argue that policy entrepreneurs tend to display 
these characteristics. These are: 
 Social acuity or perceptiveness and understanding others when 
engaging in policy conversations – general demonstrated by making 
good use of policy networks and by “understanding the ideas, motives, 
and concerns of others and responding effectively”; 
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 Defining problems in ways that influence who pays attention to them; 
 Building teams or the ability to work effectively with others by, for 
example, building coalitions of people with complementary skills; and  
 Leading by example by, for example, turning an idea into action to 
introduce or demonstrate the concept and overcome the reservations of 
generally risk-averse policymakers and “signal a genuine commitment to 
improved outcomes” (Mintrom and Norman, 2009, p.653). 
The overriding objective of a policy entrepreneur is to create a package of 
problem, policy and politics which can then be sold to policymakers (Ackrill et 
al., 2013). Entrepreneurs, however, in the same way as any other political actor, 
have limited financial, reputational and cognitive resources available to them. 
They may have more than one drain on their abilities to form networks and 
coalitions and to connect problems and solutions.  
While preparedness is a powerful asset for any policy entrepreneur who must 
“keep the gun loaded” in case an opportunity arises, the importance of 
serendipity in an essentially chaotic system should not be overlooked. An 
advocate may experience multiple failures of a strategy, attempting to push the 
wrong solution for the wrong problem under the wrong political conditions. But 
on another day, in another policy window, the same idea may have a radical 
impact on policy. 
Kingdon (2010, p.182) points out that the concept of policy entrepreneurs and 
policy windows helps some sense to be made of the age-old structure-versus-
agency debate. A window opens for structural reasons beyond the agency of 
any individual while making advantage of that opportunity requires an individual 
to act with agency. Entrepreneurs are able to read the political and policy 
landscapes, spot opportunities and forge important connections between actors. 
The role of policy entrepreneur described by MSA is, fundamentally, a creative 
one. Entrepreneurs have excellent political instincts and tend to make the most 
out of their resources through the ability to harness political forces beyond their 
control (Kingdon, 2010, p.181). Entrepreneurs are also adaptable and able to 
compromise when needed. While many advocates may adopt radical or 
controversial policy positions during normal times, when - and only when - a 
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policy window opens, entrepreneurs bargain, make connections and give 
concessions in order to maximise their impact (Kingdon, 2010). 
7.3 The 2030 policy window(s) 
This section discusses the timing of the opening and closing of a policy window 
in the debate about the 2030 targets. It looks at the timing of the window in 
section 7.3.1, as well as some of its important characteristics in section 7.3.2. 
7.3.1 Timing 
The tempo of much European political life is set by the metronome of the 
quarterly European Council meetings of heads of state and government. Policy 
windows are opened and often closed by the timing of these summits (de 
Schoutheete, 2012).  
In the case of the 2030 climate and energy framework, identifying the closure of 
the policy window is relatively straightforward since there was a clear 
policymaking deadline. The October 2014 summit was widely anticipated to 
produce a decision on the level and structure of the EU’s climate and energy 
goals after 2020 and therefore mark the closure of the policy window. The 
timing of this particular summit was important as it was seen to be the last 
opportunity for the EU to agree on a climate target in time to conform to the 
timeline set out by the United Nations in preparation for the COP 21 climate 
talks in Paris at the end of the following year (European Council, 2014). The 
Commission’s policymaking timetable was largely worked backwards from this 
point. 
The timing of the opening of the policy window, however, is slightly less clear 
with three policymaking cycles interacting: the 202020 package expiry, reform 
of the EU-ETS and the UN climate change negotiations timetable. As early as 
2008, when the 202020 package was agreed, it was clear that the package had 
a built-in expiry date and that, at some point in the future, some form of policy 
action would be needed which addressed the period after 2020. Ahead of COP 
15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the European Council had committed the Union to 
80-95% reductions in GHG emissions, compared to 1990, by 2050. 
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Around the same time, significant changes to the structure of the Commission 
and its College were made by President Barroso as he began his second term. 
Most importantly and as described in Chapter 6, a new Directorate-general, DG 
Clima, was created, the remit of which was essentially to ensure the functioning 
of the EU-ETS. 
In late 2011, one of the follow-up UN climate conferences to the Copenhagen 
conference, this time in Durban, South Africa, set a date for a ‘universal legal 
agreement on climate change no later than 2015’. The conference also decided 
the timetable for future COP meetings with a conference planned for December 
2015, although the host city, Paris, was not announced until later (UNFCCC, 
2012a; 2012b; 2014).  
So, by the end of 2011, actors which were familiar with both the timetable of the 
UN climate talks and the deadlines implicit in the EU’s own climate and energy 
policy programme, may have predicted that decisions about a new EU climate 
and energy policy were likely to be forthcoming at some point – probably well in 
advance of the 2020 expiry. They may also have noted that the policy - 
whatever it was likely to be – may have to be accelerated to enable the EU to 
contribute to the important international climate talks in 2015 (Interview 4, 28). 
A policy window opened a crack at around the time of COP 15 in late 2009 but 
at this early stage, very few actors were able to take advantage of it. It was 
difficult for most civil society actors to gauge the range of likely payoffs of 
pushing their ideas or attempting to manipulate political events. Two actors 
which were able to exploit the inevitability of some kind of EU-level policy to 
replace the time-limited 202020 package were the European Climate 
Foundation and Eurelectric. These two very different actors were able to work 
with the European Commission to begin thinking about the technical and 
economic implications of a climate and energy policy which would reach the 
European Council’s stated aim of an 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2050. ECF, as an environmental foundation, was able to 
participate for two reasons. Firstly, because of its commitment to ‘the cause, not 
the brand’, it was actively searching for opportunities to engage behind the 
scenes and fill knowledge gaps rather than the more partisan advocacy seen 
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later on in the process (Interview 11). Secondly, among the environmental 
community, it was most able to put significant financial resources at risk with no 
guarantee that it would translate into policy. Eurelectric, on the other hand, was 
timider in its activity with a single, less expansive or influential report 
(Eurelectric, 2009). 
 As it became clearer, partly due to the analysis undertaken by ECF, that 
longer-term issues of decarbonisation were both complex and, from a policy 
perspective, not well understood at the EU level, more actors saw an 
opportunity to contribute modelling analysis and DG Energy producing the 
Energy Roadmap 2015 at the end of 2011. 
The highly technical outputs of the modelling work, especially by ECF, opened 
the policy window much wider, emboldening several advocacy groups to 
produce a flurry of modelling reports about how to decarbonise by 2050. By 
2013, the Commission had connected the 2050 target with the expiry of the 
202020 package, leading to a year of ‘targetology’ with various formulations of 
targets proposed and countered within the policy community as discussed in 
section 5.4 from page 182. Eventually, the window began to close as the 2015 
deadline of the Paris COP approached. The Commission made its proposal in 
early 2014 which shifted attention to the European Council which was 
scheduled to take a decision in October that year. Energy Efficiency and the 
nature of a target was somewhat muted during the targetology phase and 
absent from the January 2014 proposals due to an ongoing policy review within 
the European Commission. By the time proposals for an energy efficiency target 
were made in July 2014, the policy window expanded slightly due to the 
escalating energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine 
Other than a hard-core of especially engaged experts, most civil society actors 
were effectively powerless to act until the Commission, more or less on its own 
initiative and in keeping with the timeline, rather than in response to a direct 
request by the European Council, formally opened up the discussion with a 
green paper on the 2030 targets in spring 2013. Indeed, Commission officials 
responsible for the package only acknowledge that a discussion about the 2030 
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targets began in 2013: even well-connected lobbyists only beginning their 
engagement in earnest during the drafting of the green paper (Interview 25). 
The timing of the green paper itself was ultimately an artefact of the 
international climate negotiations timeline and the impending expiry of the 
202020 framework (European Commission, 2013e). For many actors, the green 
paper marked the opening of the window of opportunity to engage with and 
influence the Commission’s proposals. 
7.3.2 Nature of the policy window 
This section shows that the width of the window or the scope for change from 
the 202020 model was determined by events in the political and problem 
streams, as well as spillover from an adjacent policy window. 
That the EU policy for after 2020 was seen as an opportunity by civil society 
actors and the Commission to shift the course of climate and energy policy was 
down to recent developments in the problem and politics streams. In the 
problem stream, the economic crisis and worries about the cost of energy to 
firms and households had made cost effectiveness a primary concern for all 
policymakers, regardless of the policy area. At the same time, stemming from 
declining trust in the EU as well as the poor outcome from Copenhagen climate 
conference, there was seen to be an opportunity to make arguments against 
ambitious EU action, especially action which risked the EU moving too far 
ahead of the international community on climate. Towards the end of the 
window’s opening, events in Ukraine widened it significantly. The topic of 
energy security which had been an important but largely background issue 
suddenly leapt into the foreground in June 2014 when Russia cut off the gas to 
Ukraine, threatening European energy security (Interview 2, 21, 22, 25, 9).  
Even once the green paper had been published, for some topics making 
progress on the agenda was hindered by the timetable; the energy efficiency 
portion of the discussion, in particular, remained somewhat sidelined due to an 
ongoing commitment contained in the 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) 
for the Commission to review energy efficiency progress on a strict annual 
timetable which precluded decision-making or even much intensive discussion 
on proposed targets for 2030 until the review was completed in spring or 
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summer 2014 (Interview 28; European Commission, 2012).  Figure 51 provides 
an overview of how the window ‘openness’ or scope for actors to influence the 
2030 targets changed with time. 
 
Figure 51: Policy window openness vs time. Political and administrative events in green. Problem events in red 
7.3.2.1 Overlapping windows  
Most actors saw EU-ETS reform - for which a window of opportunity had 
opened due to the extremely low price of allowances in the system - and the 
negotiation of the EU 2030 targets either as part of continuous process or as 
very closely linked (Interview 1, 8, 9, 16, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, 33)75. This 
overlap between the legislative phase of the ETS reform debate and the 
agenda-setting phase of the EU 2030 debate was important for the 2030 policy 
window in several ways. 
Firstly, most civil society actors with an interest in climate and energy policy 
were spending at least some time and resources between 2010 and 2013 
                                            
75 See Figure 29 on page 136 for a more detailed timeline of the overlap 
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lobbying for or against ETS reform, limiting their ability to engage 
wholeheartedly in the 2030 debate, at least in the early stages. Secondly, 
significant coalitions such as ‘the Friends of ETS’ were formed to exploit the 
ETS reform window which persisted into the 2030 policy window. Finally, the 
coalition of pro-ETS reform actors, Friends of ETS, framed much of EU climate 
and energy policy in terms of ‘fixing the ETS‘, at all costs, a factor which 
influenced the discussion about the 2030 targets that will be explored in more 
depth in the following sections.  
7.4 Policy entrepreneurs 
The previous section sets out the opening, closing and nature of the policy 
window. This section explores whether or not any civil society actors meet the 
definition of policy entrepreneurs (set out in Chapter 2, page 66) in the 2030 
debate. First, it reviews some of the difficulties of using interview data obtained 
from participants who self-identify as entrepreneurs in section 7.4.1. The section 
then takes each of the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs proposed by 
Mintrom and Norman (2009) discussed on page 66 and presents evidence 
relevant to each of them. Subsection 7.4.2 looks at social acuity, 7.4.3 looks at 
how actors define problems, 7.4.4 at team building and 7.4.5 at leading by 
example. 
7.4.1 Problems with self-identified entrepreneurs 
Identifying policy entrepreneurs can be problematic. Many civil society and 
business actors are under pressure to demonstrate to supporters, funders or 
employers that they are able to exert influence on policy. In interview, a strong 
bias is observed towards self-reported successes. Lobbyists and campaigners 
almost universally make a case that their strategy was not only successful but 
that it – and their political skill - was superior to that of others (for example, 
Interview 1; Acke, 2014). For this reason, the assessment of policy 
entrepreneurship is based on the categories suggested by Mintrom and Norman 
(2009) discussed in Chapter 2 on page 66. These are: social acuity, problem 
definition, team building and leading by example, is used to identify 
entrepreneurship.  
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7.4.2 Social acuity 
There are two dimensions to social acuity. The first is getting the timing right  or 
the ability to read the policymaking context in order to appreciate when a policy 
window is open or is about to open. The second is making friends and 
influencing people or the ability to make critical interpersonal connections since 
‘being well connected’ and ‘getting along well with others’ – even those with 
whom you disagree (or perhaps especially) - are important if one wants to 
achieve anything in the policy community (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). The 
following subsections look at each of these dimensions in turn. 
7.4.2.1 Getting the timing right 
Lobbyists tend to have a keen sense of the agenda setting process and the 
changing nature of opportunities to engage through time. The environmental 
group, E3G for example, uses a conceptual tool it describes as the ‘decision-
funnel’ to describe how a debate moves from generalities, through a policy 
debate and on to a specific choice between a small selection of options 
(Interview 2; E3G, 2014a). Brussels lobbyists generally try to respond to an 
opportunity as soon as an accessible policy window opens. While there may be 
some “space to influence” later on, “for us, the time to engage is early in the 
process” (Interview 25). It is also important for all actors to recognise that 
attention to what they are saying is a limited resource and that they need to try 
and time their interventions well. As one lobbyist put it: 
“I guess you have to choose your moment when you’re going to fight 
because if you’re just noisy all the time, you’re just a noise and people 
ignore you.” (Interview 27) 
As discussed in the previous section, the policy window can be thought of as 
having opened slightly in late 2009 around the time of the Copenhagen COP 15 
climate conference. At this time, however, very few actors from civil society 
were able to become involved in the process. Those that were, primarily 
Eurelectric and ECF, seem to have spotted what others had not: that some form 
of follow-up package to the 202020 deal (which had only been legislated that 
year) was inevitable if the EU was to take its own climate ambition, as decided 
by the European Council ahead of Copenhagen, seriously.  
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That ECF and Eurelectric were able to engage at this early stage was as much 
due to their characteristics as their reading of the policy landscape. ECF was 
well regarded and connected – and had the funds – to produce a detailed (and 
presumably expensive) piece of analysis with no firm sign of a payoff yet on the 
horizon. This kind of high-risk speculative activity might be hard to justify for 
most trade associations or ad-hoc groups to justify funding, even if they were 
able to anticipate the policy direction.  
From 2011 onwards, advocates of energy efficiency policy, led by Euroace, had 
been working to associate the ‘solution’ of greater energy efficiency with energy 
security (Warren, 2011). These efforts were escalated in 2014 as the Ukraine-
Russia energy dispute intensified with the Secretary General of Euroace able to 
present the ideas to an informal meeting of Europe’s energy ministers at the 
moment the crisis reached its height (Greek Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, 2014). 
7.4.2.2 Making friends and influencing people 
Entrepreneurs tend to “understand the ideas, motives, and concerns of others” 
(Mintrom and Norman, 2009). BUSINESSEUROPE and the energy intensive 
industries were one group that the 2030 debate revealed to be especially 
reluctant or unable to deploy these kinds of soft-skills. As discussed in Chapter 
3, its style of political engagement was seen by others, both inside and outside 
the formal policy process, to be aggressive and often confrontational. Some 
point out that BUSINESSEUROPE’s strategy on climate and energy lobbying is 
to consistently point out problems such as the costs of certain policy choices for 
business rather than signal a commitment to problem-solving in partnership with 
policymakers and are often seen as arrogant or at least overly direct (Interview 
1, 29, 30). At least some of the weakness of these industries to engage on a 
social level with peers and policymakers could be down the fact that a large 
proportion of employees in the energy intensive industries are middle-aged 
men, less comfortable in more diverse settings: 
“I have to say I think a lot of that was also to do with age group and 
gender. So inside the BUSINESSEUROPE working group on climate 
change, there were, not infrequently, incidents where a man in his 50s 
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representing one of the heavy industry type interests would say, ‘Oh, 
another of you bloody women,’ because actually, as it happened there 
were about five younger women who attended that working group and 
we all worked on the [opposing] side of the issue”. (Interview 8) 
Contrastingly, the coordinator of the Friends of ETS was well regarded by other 
lobbyists. People from the electricity sector, utility companies and even 
BUSINESSEUROPE, who fiercely opposed the policy positions taken by the 
coalition, described him in favourable terms. For example, political adversaries 
were able to describe him as “great” or as having “… a very, very good 
overview, and very great insights.” (Interview 15, 18, 26, 8). The coordinator 
himself puts it down to trust, the ability to “gee up the troops” and “keeping 
people together”: 
“Big corporations and their guys, their lobbyists in Brussels trust me. It’s 
all about trust. There’s no other reason why they would talk to me. I don’t 
have a big empire, nobody’s heard of me. You know, I have no traction 
whatsoever, other than the fact that I’m good at spotting opportunities, 
I’m good at organising things, and I’m good at getting people to work 
together” (Interview 30). 
The Magritte Group’s high-profile members were especially well placed to make 
connections with senior national and European policymakers. The group was 
able to secure meetings with the head of state or government of France, 
Germany and the Czech Republic as well as Commissioners including Gunter 
Oettinger and Parliamentary leaders (CEZ Group, 2014; ENGIE, 2014). The 
conception of the group was to engage at a “senior level” and senior 
policymakers apparently welcomed the engagement with their peers from the 
world of business (Interview 1, 3).  
7.4.3 Defining problems 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, different actors framed the problems facing EU 
climate and energy policy in various ways.  
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The energy intensive industries continued their strategy of making ‘carbon 
leakage’ a primary problem not only of the EU-ETS, but of climate and energy 
policy more generally - as they had for many years. While this strategy had 
proven successful in the past, gaining a ‘carbon leakage list’ and other 
concessions, the energy intensives and BUSINESSEUROPE had recently 
strongly but unsuccessfully resisted ETS reform, leading to some reputational 
damage (Interview 4, 20). Despite the ETS reform setback, the economic crisis 
in Europe was felt to strengthen their arguments for taking Europe’s industrial 
competitiveness seriously (Interview 4). Many of the arguments put forward in 
favour of protecting heavy industry had, over the years, been well absorbed and 
understood by policymakers in the Commission who see little new constructive 
thinking coming from that quarter (Interview 17).  
The energy intensive industries also worked to show that unilateral climate 
action - setting a GHG emissions reduction target ahead of the talks in Paris – 
would be damaging to Europe’s international competitiveness. An approach that 
one lobbyist described as;  
“… a sort of St Augustine position, you know, “We can’t say no to climate 
policy but we don’t really want it. Lord, make me chaste but not yet.” It 
was always the tomorrow maybe in the future, non-definite clause thrown 
into anything positive they said.” (Interview 8) 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in its efforts to secure ETS reform, the Friends of 
ETS worked hard to frame Europe’s climate policy problem as a failure of the 
emissions trading system. The group made sure that: “every single bit of 
coverage leading up to any communication from the Commission [on energy 
and climate] we said, ‘We have a crisis in the ETS’” (Interview 30). For 
members of the Friends of ETS coalition, this posed a problem: 
 “We couldn’t talk about multiple targets, which meant we couldn’t get the 
wind people on board”… “the wind people wanted to keep on putting in 
language saying ‘multiple targets’. We kept on saying ‘it’s only the ETS 
that counts’”…”[so]this was the sacrifice we had to make. It was either to 
get wind [energy advocates] on, or we can go and get more people who 
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are ultra-the-heart-of-darkness, but quite frankly they’ve got more power, 
and I’d rather talk to the guys who’ve got more [power]” (Interview 30). 
The energy efficiency trade association, Euroace along with NGOs such as 
Friends of the Earth worked hard for several years to emphasise the problem of 
European energy import dependence with their ‘energy dependence day’ 
campaign which was accelerated during the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute of 
2014. 
The Magritte Group worked hard to frame the problem as a security one of 
electricity generation adequacy, caused by rapid expansion of renewables, 
largely as a consequence of the 202020 framework legislated in 2009. At the 
same time they, with some success, helped to push the problem of increasing 
consumer energy bills into the conversation, also framed as a problem caused 
by adding renewables to the mix – a line that was supported strongly by 
organisations such as Shell (Interview 25). The Magritte group was also very 
aware that European politicians, especially those in the Commission, were 
nervous about declining trust in the EU and its institutions. In response, the 
group was very clear in defining all the problems as ‘European problems’ that 
would require ‘European solutions’, a framing that was well appreciated by 
Commissioners, particularly when the Magritte group delivered it in person to 
heads of state and governments of member states, in whose hands the future of 
European integration ultimately lay (Interview 1). 
The European Climate Foundation (ECF) had perhaps the most sophisticated 
or, at least, best funded, approach to problem definition. Rather than relying on 
existing rhetoric, ECF sought to introduce entirely new knowledge to the debate 
with their Roadmap 2050 project, as discussed in Chapter 5. The project, which 
looked at the problems associated with decarbonisation, was an important 
milestone in setting the terms of reference for what would become the 2030 
debate. At a very early stage it successfully established that renewable energy, 
energy efficiency and improving energy infrastructure were ‘no regrets’ options 
for decarbonising the electricity sector. 
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7.4.4 Team building 
 
“…whenever there’s an official discussion, we have sessions 
beforehand; ‘this is the message that we want to say, who is going to 
be speaking, who should be speaking’, then different people start to 
influence the people who are setting the calendar for who’s speaking 
and we make sure our guys are there. We know what 
messages…[what] they’re going to say - we’re drilling. I’m sitting there 
trying to second guess… well, the energy intensives are the 
opposition, what their message is going to be, so we’re shaping it 
up…” (Friends of ETS, Interview 30) 
 
“In national politics, if you want to be influential, you probably need to 
talk to about five people on an issue. Add a factor of 10 for Brussels, 
easily, because you’ve got many DGs and the turf areas between them 
are not entirely clear. Because the parliament’s much more 
complicated. Because you’ve got 28 member states. Because you’ve 
got 24 languages...” (Interview 8) 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, several alternative groupings were active in the 
debate about the 2030 targets. Coalition building and teamwork are a primary 
activity of civil society actors in Brussels and there are three main reasons for 
doing it. These are: 
1. Demonstrating that not only is there wide support for an idea among a 
large number of companies or organisations, but that the support is 
broad-based and actors with diverse interests are in favour of it. 
Coalitions including ‘strange bedfellows’,  ‘unholy alliances’ or ‘coalitions 
of the unlikely’ of interests that would not normally take the same position 
are seen as especially potent since they signal that the idea or position 
has wider support (Interview 8, 30, 17; Fairbrass, 2013; Monciardini, 
2016);  
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2. Intelligence gathering and sharing. A coalition of actors is a valuable 
means of sharing information and intelligence;  
3. Division of labour. A coalition is a good way of gaining access to the wide 
range of the resources needed to mount effective lobbying campaigns 
(Interview 1).  
The following three subsections look at each of these rationales for 
teambuilding in turn. 
7.4.4.1 Demonstrating broad support 
“…we teamed up with [non-energy companies], to make clear to 
policymakers that it’s going broader, the coalition goes broader than 
just the energy sector” (Interview 18) 
 
“Yes, we had to have something from outside to change the fact that 
we were cancelling each other out. I remember producing lots of 
diagrams which showed who was on which side and thinking, ‘Who the 
hell can we recruit?’”(Interview 8) 
 
The Magritte group of energy utilities consisted of 10 or so very similar 
organisations but those organisations spanned a large geographical area with 
its members all prominent energy suppliers and employers across much of the 
European continent76. Altogether, the group was able to claim that it provided a 
half of Europe’s electricity, serviced hundreds of millions of customers and 
employed two-thirds of a million people (Magritte Group, 2013). Finding 
common ground between companies with very similar business models was not 
a great challenge for instigator Gérard Mestrallet of GDF Suez (now Engie) – 
especially when that business model faced, by some reckoning, a common 
existential challenge, as described in Chapter 4. There was, however, some 
                                            
76 The group included major gas and electricity suppliers from France, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Netherlands and Italy. The member from Sweden, Vattenfall, left the group in early 2014 (Crouch, 
2014) 
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friction within the group over the topic of additional remuneration support for 
what the group described as under-used electricity generation capacity leading 
to the departure of Swedish Utility Vattenfall from the group in 2014 (Interview 
1: Crouch, 2014). The sheer political mass of the Magritte group enabled it to 
access decision makers at the highest levels with meetings scheduled with 
powerful figures in all the EU’s institutions including Commissioners and leaders 
of member state governments.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, on the topic of the GHG emissions target, by early 
2014 it seemed to some that those favouring low climate ambition (35%) and 
those arguing for more ambition (40% or more) had reached a stalemate and 
were effectively “cancelling each other out” (Interview 8). In response, some 
sought to introduce actors to the community which were not usually directly 
involved in debating EU climate and energy policy. The Institutional Investors 
Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), representing investors holding trillions of 
Euros in assets, rarely engages with the EU policymaking process beyond 
responding to consultations by the Commission. But, largely coordinated by a 
lobbyist working for electricity association, Eurelectric, the IIGCC members 
visited Brussels in January 2014 and met with several European 
Commissioners to make a case for a 40% target on behalf of the finance 
community. As a result of this experience, the IIGCC significantly increased its 
efforts on EU climate policy (Interview 8; Blanqué et al., 2015). 
Within the renewable energy sector, the demise of the European Renewable 
Energy Council (EREC)77 made team building within the renewable energy 
sector much harder. As one frustrated renewables advocate put it: 
“In terms of the Brussels debate, the absence of EREC has penalised us 
and is still penalising us, to an extent, because you cannot consult fifteen 
small associations every time you need to make a decision when you 
have Eurelectric, Eurogas and then a plethora of, “I might have 10 
megawatts”, “Oh I have 1000 megawatts but they’re only in one country”. 
                                            
77 See Box 2, page 65 
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No one cares. Get together, sort it out and then come with one 
composition. And that’s what EREC could do.” (Interview 13). 
Other groups relied on building teams with representation from across different 
sectors and interest groups. For example, the Prince of Wales Corporate 
Leaders Group’s inclusion of prominent members from a wide range of 
industries was an attempt to speak on behalf of as wide a business 
constituency as possible (Interview 29). The weight of the brands under the 
umbrella, as well as the endorsement of the Heir to the British Crown, opened 
doors for the coalition with a twice-annual meeting organised with Commission 
President Barroso (Interview 29). 
As discussed in Chapter 5, some of the sharpest lines of division within the 
policy community were among businesses and ENGOs and between renewable 
energy companies and incumbent energy firms. Relatively few teams or 
coalitions managed to bridge these divides.  
The Coalition for Energy Savings, for instance, includes members from NGOs 
and companies with a strong common interest in promoting energy efficiency. 
Trade associations such as the International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA) include diverse actors – all of whom stand to benefit from expanded use 
of emission trading.  
The ‘Friends of ETS’ coalition, however, was able to include conventional 
energy companies, renewable energy associations, gas and electricity trade 
associations, oil companies and chemical firms in the same coalition with a less 
clear common interest in ETS reform. The coalition, coordinated by a small 
environmental NGO, Change Partnership, clearly saw that having a range of 
voices speaking in favour of an idea, especially from the business world, was 
important for getting a point across: 
“[If] I go in and say, ‘Hey, Commission, we need to change the ETS 
target…’ [they will say] ‘F*ck off’. But, if the likes of Shell and [Italian 
utility] Enel go in and say, ‘We represent X million jobs and this much 
investment, and we think it’s an important thing...’ we know that the 
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business orientated institutions will listen to them more than they’ll listen 
to us.” (Interview 30) 
In order to create a coalition like ‘Friends of ETS’, its leaders needed to 
overcome a degree of scepticism on both sides of the divide but especially 
among the ENGOs:  
“Some of the NGOs were quite wary of having businesses move into the 
‘green space’ because a lot of ethos for the historical origin of those 
NGOs is that this should be about social outcomes, not about business 
outcomes”…” “…there were definitely people in the NGO world who felt 
[Change Partnership] was spending too much time with the businesses” 
(Interview 8) 
It is useful to note that not all organisations joined the Friends of ETS coalition 
for the same reasons. For example, in some cases, electricity utilities 
associated the idea of pushing for ETS reform with the ability to raise electricity 
prices in the face of falling demand and poorly performing generation 
investments. As the coalition’s coordinator put it: 'it kind of completely 
undermines our entire argument”... “but, as long as the [desired] outcome is the 
same, then it doesn’t really matter what everybody’s intentions are.” (Interview 
30). 
The breadth of the coalition led to some tension and constraints on what it could 
do. Although the coalition coordinators were ambivalent about the issue of a 
single target, some of the most powerful members were strongly in favour, 
shaping the membership and the policy preferences of the group: 
“Okay, so this is where I was boxed into a corner myself. So with the 
Friends of ETS, because we had a couple of companies who were the 
single target coalition...Statoil, E.ON; we couldn’t talk about multiple 
targets, which meant we couldn’t get the wind people on board.” 
(Interview 30) 
Importantly, the approach to assembling the coalition was more organic than by 
design, with political judgment, staying power and trust seen to be more 
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important qualities in members than comprehensive representation of a range 
of interests: 
“Lots of people like grand designs, you want to get vanguards from every 
single sector, [but] I always pick people who I trust. I pick people who 
understand politics, who understand it’s not a straight line. And that if 
things go a bit wobbly they’re able to keep people together because 
things will always go wobbly.” (Interview 30) 
In some cases, conventional trade associations were able to team up with other 
groupings. For example, Euroace the energy efficiency industry association 
played a full role in the Coalition for Energy Savings, alongside other groups. 
The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) was a member of the Prince 
of Wales Corporate Leaders Group.  
Box 6: Overlapping windows with ETS 
The nature of the debate and the behaviour of some actors were strongly influenced 
by an earlier policy window which had opened due to the perceived failure of the EU-
ETS to provide a strong enough price signal to steer investment away from fossil 
fuels. While advocating reform of the EU-ETS, a wide range of actors, including 
some within the new DG Clima, built a case that the trading system was in crisis – at 
least partly due to interaction with other policies such as the 2020 renewable energy 
and energy efficiency targets. Coalitions that emerged during the ETS reform debate 
included some who would probably support a renewable energy target but found 
doing so harder due to their earlier stated commitment to the primacy of the ETS.  
 
As a consequence, some actors found themselves in a situation in which they were 
constrained by their position in the ETS debate and had “boxed themselves into a 
corner” when it came to issues of renewable energy and energy efficiency targets 
(Interview 21, 30). By making the case that the ETS should be the primary driver of 
climate and energy policy to argue in favour of reform, for some actors, it then 
becomes logically inconsistent to argue in favour of renewable energy and energy 
efficiency targets. As one member of the Magritte Group and the Friends of ETS put 
it: 
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“…if you say we rely on the ETS to drive the low-carbon transition, that is the 
reason you don't want binding targets on renewables, on energy efficiency.” 
(Interview 1). 
 
Although established to lobby in favour of EU-ETS reform, the very large Friends of 
ETS coalition was active during the debate about the 2030 targets. One of Friends of 
ETS’ most impressive achievements as an environmental campaign was the 
recruitment of some of the most powerful trade association and utility actors in 
Brussels. Eurelectric was an important member, as was Eurogas and several 
members of the Magritte Group. The coalition was able to bridge gulfs within the 
policy community by appealing to the worries about economic crisis and energy 
costs (ETS was framed by oil companies and utilities as a ‘cost efficient’ policy) as 
well as concerns about climate ambition (reform of the ETS was principally in order 
make a more effective emissions mitigation tool). The coalition coordinator, Change 
Partnership, was well regarded, as was the quality of the political intelligence that 
was offered to member organisations. The coalition’s principal policy impact was to 
frame the problem of climate and energy policy of one of an ETS ‘crisis’, a position 
largely in line with many senior officials and politicians, as well as member states 
such as the UK. While this was seen by members to be effective, the idea of 
technology-neutrality implied by the framing of the problem, especially the 
suggestion that the crisis in the ETS price had been exacerbated by renewables and 
energy efficiency policy, affected the ability of advocates of multiple targets to make 
their case – especially those who were also members of Friends of ETS. 
 
It should be noted that membership of a group does not automatically translate 
into influence over its position. In the same way that some businesses felt that 
BUSINESSEUROPE’s policy positons did not reflect their interests (Interview 
8), Shell, a big oil refiner and therefore energy intensive consumer, for example, 
was unable to persuade the Prince of Wales Corporate Leaders Group to 
support a position in favour of greater carbon leakage provisions (Interview 18). 
The most common way of aggregating the policy views of a broad group of 
actors with common interests is the trade association. This model and its 
federated variant have been familiar features of the Brussels political landscape 
since the 1950s (Greenwood, 2011). The largest, oldest and, on paper, the 
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weightiest of these is BUSINESSEUROPE which claims to speak on behalf of 
20 million businesses (BUSINESSEUROPE, 2016). But, despite the impressive 
representation, BUSINESSEUROPE and the energy intensives’ credibility with 
policymakers was often poor.  
This appears to be for three reasons. Firstly, BUSINESSEUROPE and the 
energy intensive industries had, during the ETS reform debate been seen to 
inflexibly resist the policy around which a consensus of other actors had 
developed, putting them, in intellectual terms, on the periphery of the 
discussion. Secondly, BUSINESSEUROPE, along with the energy intensive 
industries, failed to reach out to a larger constituency during the ETS reform 
and 2030 debates and was perceived by many people, inside and outside the 
Commission, to speak on largely behalf of the energy-intensive industries, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 (Harvey, 2013). Finally, it was an active 
strategy of some self-described ‘progressive’ business actors to counter the 
sheer mass of BUSINESSEUROPE’s representation by highlighting, wherever 
possible, that BUSINESSEUROPE’s “does not speak for business in Europe”  
“[For] those of us who didn’t feel represented, the solution was to go out 
and do things like send letters with 59 logos of companies and 
associations, to just embarrass BUSINESSEUROPE, basically, so they 
couldn’t claim they spoke for us”…” They, in principle, should have had 
all the muscle in this game and my view and I think [the view of] a lot of 
us is that fortunately, they’re big and stupid as opposed to big and 
nimble” (Interview 8) 
But simply because BUSINESSEUROPE’s ideas were treated with some 
scepticism didn’t mean that they were not an important presence in the debate. 
The opinion of BUSINESSEUROPE was still important to policymakers, 
especially those in political positions in the Commission such as Commissioner 
Oettinger who took the concerns of heavy industry very seriously and served as 
a ‘steer’ to other lobbyists and campaigners the limits of a debate (Interview 25, 
6, 17, 22, 3, 4,8). This is primarily due to the sheer size of its constituency. To 
put the relative size of BUSINESSEUROPE into context, while it was able to 
claim that it spoke on behalf of companies that employ 120 million people, 
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another trade association, Euroace, the energy efficiency group was able to 
field an equivalent number of 350,000 employees78 (Interview 12).  
ECF’s deployment of its substantial financial resources relies on building 
networks and coalitions. Firstly, ECF’s commitment to ‘the cause, not the brand’ 
means that they tend not to engage in active lobbying, instead contributing to 
the creation of resources which other actors can use. It starts with the 
identification of a: 
“…knowledge gap, as we call it, in terms of data and a technical 
understanding of the problem, we [engage in] some technical analysis. 
[Which becomes] a bit of a reference point for the NGOs. So we can 
professionalise or improve their contribution that they can do. And we 
frame the debate around what we think are the key levers and the key 
choices for the debates.” (Interview 11) 
It was significant that ECF’s modelling contributions from 2010 onwards were 
drafted and reviewed by actors of its ‘core reflection group’ with a wide range of 
interests. Since the assumptions and methodologies used in the analysis were 
vetted and approved by the entire group – which was carefully selected by ECF 
to represent as many interests as possible – the results were more acceptable 
to policymakers (Interview 10). At the same time, the involvement set up:  
“…a bit of an undercurrent, and of a group of generally supportive and 
understanding businesses, around the transition that we are looking for” 
(Interview 11) 
Although this approach to team building was not without its risks. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, members of the group which did not necessarily share ECF’s 
policy goals, such as the gas industry, began to use the assumptions and 
analysis as the basis of secondary analysis in support of their own policy 
positions (Interview 11). 
 
                                            
78 see Figure 20 on page 71 for more information 
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7.4.4.2 Intelligence gathering 
 
“I would get phoned up by and asked ‘What’s BUSINESSEUROPE 
doing? What are they going to say? Do you know if they’ve met 
Commissioner Oettinger? Should we go in and meet him as well to 
counter balance?’”…” So one of the first things you do when you look 
for allies is you look for teamwork, just to understand what’s going on.” 
(Interview 8) 
 
Information about what other actors are doing, how they are doing it and 
changes in the receptiveness of policymakers to certain ideas is seen as an 
important strategic asset. As mentioned in Chapter 5, one goal of lobbyists is to 
become the ‘captains of information’. In the 2030 debate, teamwork and ad-hoc 
coalition building played a distinct role in the sharing and dissemination of 
intelligence. On joining a group, actors gained access to the pooled 
informational resources of other members (Interview 1, 2, 4, 5, 23, 29, 30, 31). 
The quality of intelligence held by different types of actor was valued differently 
by other actors. For example, for many in the business community, the 
intelligence gathered by NGOs was particularly important:  
“Their [ENGOs] political intelligence and network are not to be 
underestimated, certainly, which is why we try to coordinate with them as 
much as possible.” (Interview 23) 
“We all talk to each other and we all need each other, and you know, 
sometimes we will share intelligence behind the scenes because we're 
all trying to do the same thing to a certain degree even if it's nuanced.” 
(Interview 29) 
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“Of course, we also talk with the more classical, environment NGOs like 
Greenpeace, WWF and also the Coalition for Energy Savings to discuss, 
to exchange, information and exchange intelligence on how things are 
evolving…” (Interview 5) 
For members of the Friends of ETS coalition, access to information was an 
important reason for participating.  
“It [the coalition] is an exchange of intelligence, information. Shared 
meetings, contact details”…”it was really gathering information that we 
had from meetings to have a broad lobbying effort.”(Interview 1) 
And the coordinator fully recognised that managing access to the group was, in 
effect, managing access to information: 
“’One of the things I did was I created an email address, and you’ve got 
to be on this email address because all of the information, all of the 
leaks, all of the intelligence is coming on that email list. I was getting 
leaks; I was sharing it with them before I shared it with anybody else. 
And people would come up to me from all sorts of companies, like ‘Oh 
yeah, can I join your list?’ And I was like, ‘Well, I’ll get back to you on that 
one.’” (Interview 30) 
Within the Brussels policy community, people often move between 
organisations with an interest in the same policy area. Less often, they cross 
the fault-lines that exist within the community that are described in Chapter 5. 
On those rare occasions, people find themselves playing the role of interlocutor 
between two camps. In one example, a former ENGO lobbyist moved into the 
electricity sector and while some former colleagues felt that:  
“’…now we can talk to them. We can talk to you and, therefore, to people 
we find it hard to talk to.’” (Interview 8).  
7.4.4.3 Division of labour 
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“I said, ‘Hey, can we borrow your office? Can we get someone in? Can 
we use your facilities?’ Knowing that if Shell sent an email off to people 
saying, ‘Look, we’re serious about doing something for the ETS’; 
people are going to turn up to it.” (Interview 30) 
 
Despite the relatively small number of bonafide policy experts in Brussels, EU 
decision-making processes involve a comparatively large number of people. 
The complexity of effectively engaging with the process means that, in many 
cases, actors seek to share the burden of work required in mounting a 
campaign:  
“But I think the main driver [of coalition building] in the end is that it’s a 
very big process and there really aren’t enough bodies on the ground to 
cover it. We don’t all speak technical languages, et cetera, etcetera, 
etcetera.”… “Nobody can do it alone.” (Interview 8) 
A lobbyist for a large utility company which was a member of the ‘Friends of 
ETS’ coalition, when discussing the coalition’s ability to engage in dynamic, 
fast-moving campaigning described how different members brought different 
strengths to the group: 
“Companies [like us] are not set up for campaigning in that way. We had 
experts in communications, in campaigns, in the coalition. Some 
members have more competencies in that area - campaigning by NGOs 
for example. We pool together our resources...”…”it’s about sharing the 
load” (Interview 1). 
7.4.5 Leading by example 
The nature of climate and energy policy means that there was little scope for 
civil society actors to show the ideas in action or ‘create working models of the 
proposed policy’ themselves (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). Activity like proving 
the viability of new energy technology is often beyond the means of even the 
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biggest players79 (Interview 25). Some, however, were able to point to examples 
of policy implementations outside Europe. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
argument made by actors in favour of limiting climate ambition often hinged on 
painting Europe as a ‘first-mover’ which, should it adopt ambitious unilateral 
climate targets, would be detrimental to Europe’s international competitiveness.  
“The way to answer that as a lobbyist was to keep showing a map 
produced by the World Bank of what’s going on with carbon market 
developments globally, keep saying, ‘China. Brazil. California. Mexico. 
Korea. We’re not alone.’” (Interview 8) 
 
Figure 52: World Bank map of international emissions pricing systems (source: World Bank) 
Member states, however, were in a stronger position to demonstrate the 
workability of policy implementations. Several members had in place policies 
which were clearly more ambitious that others on climate change. The UK’s 
Climate Change Act and Germany’s ongoing Energiewende provided clear 
examples of similar policy at work. In the case of the Energiewende, though, it 
also provided an example of just how complex and challenging an economy-
wide low-carbon transition could be. 
                                            
79 although it could be argued that for carbon pricing mechanisms such as the ETS, good examples of 
corporate ‘internal pricing’ of emission are available, although whether they are leading or following 
policy is less clear (Carbon Disclosure Project, 2013). 
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Box 7: Imitation - the sincerest form of flattery 
 
There were several instances of an apparently effective strategy being 
adopted or copied by other actors. One lobbyist pointed out that for each 
action there appeared to be an equal and opposite reaction. For example, if a 
letter with “oodles of logos from different companies and business 
associations” was sent to Commissioners or national governments by 
businesses in favour of a high target, a letter would soon be sent from 
business favouring a lower target “taking a similar tack because every time 
you launch a tack, the other side copy it within days” (Interview 8). Alongside 
this ‘tit-for-tat’ approach to influence, there were some examples of novel 
strategies or approaches to lobbying being replicated. 
 
Soon after the launch of the Magritte group in a large press conference 
designed to impress, the renewable energy sector, led by EWEA, held a 
press conference with a similar format under the title ‘Europe Business Day’, 
a “sort of pun on BUSINESSEUROPE” (Interview 13; EWEA, 2014b). But the 
initiative “just could not have the clout that Magritte had” (Interview 13). 
Around the same time, as discussed in Chapter 5, the European Climate 
Foundation’s expansive and well regarded modelling work, reported in its 
‘Roadmap 2050’ reports led to several reports using the outputs and 
assumptions to make an alternative case, such as framing natural gas as a 
fourth ‘no-regrets’ policy option, an idea which came directly from the ECF 
work (Interview 11). 
 
One group went beyond imitation into parody. Euracoal, the representatives 
of the European coal industry was often frustrated by what it saw as poorly 
evidenced, ‘pseudo-scientific’ reports produced by NGOs in favour of more 
action on emissions reduction – something that the coal industry is technically 
unable to achieve without breakthroughs in carbon capture and sequestration 
(CCS) – a technology that has yet to be proven viable at scale (IEA, 2013). A 
Euracoal lobbyist felt that: 
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“…their [NGOs] scientific reports are just a trawl of the internet, picking 
out the things that they want to put into a scientific report. So they’re 
not actually scientific reports; they’re just a piece of lobbying but they 
look well referenced, they look well researched”… (Interview 27) 
 
In response, Euracoal explicitly adopted the techniques that they viewed as 
dubious in a report criticising the relationship between the European Climate 
Foundation (ECF), its American funders and recipients of its grants. The 
report was published with very little expectation of influencing the debate 
about climate and energy policy: 
 
“They [reports by NGOs] do look scientific but they’re not because 
they’ve just selected stuff at random off the internet, which is pretty 
much what we did for that ECF report”…”It wasn’t going to be 
successful for us. Nobody in Euracoal thought that this would have any 
impact but we felt that nobody else is going to publish it.” (Ibid). 
 
 
Figure 53: Cover of Euracoal report on ECF (source: Euracoal, 2015b) 
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7.5 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter has described the policy window, its closing and opening and 
presented evidence of policy entrepreneurship.  
A policy window was opened by a confluence of the predictable rhythm of the 
European Council summits, the timetable of international climate diplomacy and 
the upcoming expiry in 2020 of the existing package of climate and energy 
policies. The accessible window of opportunity was different for different actors. 
Some, such as ECF, were able participate as early as 2009, partially due to 
their reading of the policy landscape and partially due to their ability to take a 
risk with their resources and the knowledge that they did not plan to engage in 
the later stages of the debate – which meant that their ability to follow through 
and push their ideas onto the agenda was limited. Others with access to good 
analytical resources contributed to a slightly later modelling phase in 2011 but 
many actors such as the Magritte Group did not really begin to feature in the 
debate until 2013.  
Following the publication of the Commission’s proposals for the package of 
targets, the ability to influence the agenda narrowed considerably and also 
shifted attention to directly appealing to the member states of the European 
Council. For energy efficiency advocates, access to the debate was limited by 
on on-going review of the policy area, which was not completed until mid-2014 
but the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute opened the policy window somewhat wider 
around the same time. An overlapping policy window in which reform of the EU-
ETS was being legislated was not only a distraction from the 2030 debate but it 
influenced the coalitions that were active in the climate and energy policy 
community and there was clear spill-over of ideas into the 2030 debate, as will 
be discussed in the next chapter. That different actors experience different 
policy windows invites us to build on the oft-cited metaphor of surfers waiting to 
catch waves. It is possible that while actors are indeed like surfers, not all 
surfboards are created equal and some actor characteristics or ‘surfboards’ 
allow their riders to catch waves earlier – or further from shore - than others. 
A number of actors displayed policy entrepreneurial traits during the debate. 
Some of the large, traditional industries and energy consumers replayed their 
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stock responses to all discussions of climate and energy policy (essentially that 
it should be minimised) without much engagement with the wider policy 
community or seeking to understand and respond to criticism of their ‘St. 
Augustine’ position. This may be because groups like BUSINESSEUROPE 
command such a large constituency of support that they do not need to engage 
in entrepreneurial activity to access decision makers and to act as an anchor on 
the ambition of EU climate and energy policy. Other parts of the policy 
community saw a range of more dynamic approaches to lobbying. The Magritte 
Group was a novel attempt by the utility sector to speak with one voice directly 
to senior national and European politicians, by-passing the desk officers in the 
Commission services with whom most Brussels lobbyists hold relationships. 
The European Climate Foundation put their resources to effective use at a very 
early stage by creating new knowledge about the nature and scale of the 
decarbonisation challenge and in the process not only established renewable 
energy and energy efficiency as ‘no regrets’ options but also created buy-in 
among businesses and NGOs to the methodology used in their analysis.  
Several attempts were made to increase the breadth and depth of support that 
could be shown for an idea. Some, such as Eurelectric, sought to bring in 
unfamiliar but authoritative voices from outside the immediate policy community 
while others such as the Prince of Wales Corporate Leaders Group sought to 
build a broad coalition of like-minded actors. The renewable energy sector’s 
ability to build political capital from events in the problem and politics stream 
was badly impaired by the fragmentation that followed the collapse of the 
umbrella group, EREC in 2014. There was also a surprising lack of common 
cause made between renewable energy and energy efficiency advocates. 
Energy efficiency groups were able, however, to push the idea that energy 
efficiency is an effective mitigation for energy security concerns into the space 
opened up by the Ukraine-Russia gas dispute in 2014.  
Within the rather chaotic policy community, coalitions were an important means 
of sharing resources such as skills and information as well as demonstrating 
support for ideas and are an important element of policy entrepreneurship. In 
addition to trade associations, there were three main approaches to building 
coalitions in the 2030 debate. The first was to form a coalition of peers as was 
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the case with the Magritte Group. The second was to hand-pick the 
representation that is needed in order to demonstrate that an idea has suitably 
broad support, as demonstrated by both ECF which tried to include the widest 
representation of the policy community possible and the single target coalition 
which drew from a narrower pool of organisations with the same policy 
preferences.  
Finally, the Friends of ETS coalition took an approach that, while it achieved 
representation from most quarters in its more than forty members, the decision 
to include or exclude an organisation was based on an assessment of personal 
characteristics such as the political judgement and attitude to setbacks of 
individuals. This approach proved highly effective making Friends of ETS one of 
the most robust coalitions in the policy community, despite its disparate 
membership. 
This chapter presented evidence of the timing and nature of the policy window 
that opened, fluctuated and eventually closed in response to events in the 
politics and problem streams. It also showed that a wide range of 
entrepreneurial activity was attempted by an equally wide range of actors 
although even the successes that were observed were partial. In the next 
chapter, these attempts to influence the agenda are critically assessed and the 
impact of various actors’ actions on the agenda and policy decision are 
discussed.  
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Chapter 8. Findings and discussion  
“Life itself, she thought, as she went upstairs to 
dress for dinner, was stranger than dreams and far, 
far more disordered.” - Nancy Mitford, Christmas 
Pudding 
This thesis provides an account of the policy agenda setting process to explore 
how European interest groups influenced the EU’s 2030 climate and energy 
framework. In this chapter the threads marked out in the main results chapters 
are drawn together and the findings made in the preceding chapters 
summarised and discussed. In order to ensure the coherence of the discussion, 
the findings are restated in this chapter. 
Following an introduction in section 8.1, this chapter provides a recap of the 
narrative gleaned from the research in section 8.2, sets out and discusses the 
key findings in section 8.3, and concludes in section 8.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 54: The findings related to the policy agenda identified in MSA 
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8.1 Introduction 
The decisions to set EU targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency at 
27%, to make them non-binding on member states and to set a target of an at 
least 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 were taken by the 
European Council, the 28 heads of state and government of the Member States 
of the European Union. But this decision, on the 23rd of October 2014, followed 
several years of discussion and debate within a community of specialists from 
the private and non-governmental sector as well as the staff of the EU’s 
executive, the European Commission. The range of options - the agenda - 
faced by the European Council was shaped during this period, with lobbyists 
and campaign groups representing a wide range of interests seeking to 
influence the agenda and the proposals put forward to the Council by the 
European Commission.  
These actors deployed a variety of strategies for influencing the agenda. Some 
strategies were novel such as the creation of coalitions around detailed 
technical analyses, some were tried and tested lobbying strategies, but all of 
them were attempts to harness political forces outside of their control in order to 
influence policy outcomes. In the language of the multiple streams approach, all 
civil society actors (as well as officials and politicians) seeking to influence the 
outcome were attempting to ‘couple the streams’ or create a package of 
problem, policy and politics that was in line with their interests but also 
acceptable to policymakers in light of the prevailing political situation. 
8.2 Narrative review of events 
Around the time of COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, it started to become 
apparent that the EU needed to update the core of its climate and energy policy 
which was due to expire in 2020. While the shape of the package was unclear, 
earlier chapters have shown that despite some early discussions about the 
merits of renewable energy and energy efficiency as part of a ‘no regrets’ long-
term policy package, the idea of a shift towards a more technology-neutral 
policy began to move up the agenda from 2011 onwards.  
By the end of 2013, the idea of a single target for greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction had gathered serious momentum. Energy utilities and oil companies 
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were joined by a nascent ‘progressive’ business lobby - which favoured action 
on climate change - in making the case for a single greenhouse gas emissions 
target for 2030 rather than a trio of targets including renewable energy and 
energy efficiency targets. Arguments which framed renewable energy and 
energy efficiency as ‘undermining’ the price of the EU-ETS allowances were 
used, alongside age-old arguments about cost efficiency and the right for 
member states to independently determine their own energy mix enshrined in 
article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty. Arguments that the EU-ETS should not only be 
the primary EU-level policy instrument but that it had been actively damaged by 
renewable energy and energy efficiency targets were widely used in support of 
a more technology-neutral position by businesses and some officials from a 
strongly pro-ETS DG Clima. 
Many business interests favouring a single target also favoured a 40% GHG 
reduction target. Companies with up-stream gas interests such as Shell and 
Statoil wanted to ensure a growing market for gas, especially in electricity 
generation which they felt would be best delivered through an increase in the 
price of carbon allowances which would make carbon-intensive coal-fired 
generation relatively more expensive. The UK, at that time a powerful member 
state also worked hard to make the case that a single target was appropriate, 
primarily on subsidiarity grounds but also pointing out apparent cost efficiency 
of technology-neutrality. 
There were complicating factors. Activity in an overlapping policy window in 
which EU-ETS reform was being debated put the trading system in the spotlight 
and meant that many actors that might otherwise have preferred to see a multi-
target approach accepted, tacitly or overtly, the idea of the EU-ETS as the 
‘cornerstone’ of a technology-neutral climate and energy policy – an idea 
supported by senior figures in the newly created DG Clima. The problem of the 
low allowances prices had, to varying degrees, been framed as the result of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency policy in the EU-ETS reform debate. 
The fact that a large number of actors in search of good political intelligence 
had joined the influential and trusted Friends of the ETS, a coalition that was 
purposefully ambivalent on the topic of multiple targets, gave the idea an extra 
boost. 
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Several actors attempted to couple the political and problem streams in order to 
promote the idea of a single-target. Utilities, oil companies and other 
businesses were all strongly supportive of a single target approach, often citing 
the effects of earlier renewable energy and energy efficiency policies as 
damaging to energy security. By connecting Europe’s economic and political 
crisis as well as the poor performance of the EU in the 2009 Copenhagen 
climate talks to the idea, they were able to ensure that senior politicians and 
officials within the Commission were able to show support for it – a task made 
easier by the ‘pro-Europe’ stance of the utilities and other companies. They 
were also aided by the idea’s promotion by parts of the environmental lobby in 
the adjacent ETS reform policy window. Those in favour of multi-target 
approach were more fragmented, less able or willing to find common ground 
between sectors such as the renewables and energy efficiency industries and 
also lacked a channel of communication with the College of Commissioners – 
something that the single target bloc enjoyed. 
But the ‘pure’ single target, ETS-only approach did not materialise. Energy 
efficiency advocates successfully connected energy security concerns arising 
from events in Ukraine in early 2014 with policies to save energy. Intervention 
by several member states in late 2013 and early 2014, in favour of targets for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency, put pressure on the Commission 
President to create a compromise proposal which satisfied supporters of a 40% 
single target on GHG emissions as well as member states in favour of 
supplementary targets with weak, non-binding targets for renewable energy and 
energy efficiency.  
Having reviewed in précis the events that set the agenda for the 2030 
framework policy, the following sections set out the factors that, together, 
answer the research question. 
8.3 Summary of the findings 
The research question posed in Chapter 1 is: 
 “How did Brussels-based interest groups influence the decision 
not to include binding national renewable energy and energy 
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efficiency targets in the EU climate and energy framework for 
2030?”  
A number of factors were found to be relevant to this question. These are listed 
below and discussed in the following subsections. 
Economic recession, the Eurozone crisis and growing anti-EU sentiment 
overshadowed the debate about the 2030 framework (8.3.1) and the Magritte 
Group of utility CEOs were able to make a timely contribution to the debate in 
favour of a single target by singling out renewables a both insecure and partially 
responsible for the ETS price crash while also presenting their preferred policies 
as ‘European’ (8.3.2). Opponents of the single target idea such as the 
renewable energy industry were poorly organised and unable to build a broad 
coalition in favour of strong, multiple targets (8.3.3) while the European Climate 
Foundation was able to move early and create new knowledge but unable to 
forcefully push that knowledge into the later stages of the debate (8.3.4).  
A long-running difference of opinion between the two Directorates-general 
responsible for the policy about the respective roles of the ETS and targets was 
settled in a last-minute deal brokered by the Secretary-General and the 
Commission President with Energy Commissioner Oettinger conceding a 
proposed 40% GHG target in return for non-binding renewable energy targets 
(8.3.5). BUSINESSEUROPE and the energy intensive industries did not need to 
exploit entrepreneurial tactics or create new ideas to influence policy and acted 
as an effective anchor on the ambition of the policy by dint of their political heft 
(8.3.6).  
The softening up of the policy community to new ideas was important in several 
areas including framing energy efficiency as a solution to energy security 
concerns (8.3.7). Entrepreneurial activity designed to exploit a window of 
opportunity for reform of the EU-ETS enhanced the position of the idea of a 
single target and made it harder to create coalitions in favour of multiple targets 
in the EU 2030 debate (8.3.8). Energy models were a primary medium of 
discourse during the very early stages of the debate about the 2030 targets, 
models played a role as both knowledge contributions and symbols or 
qualifications to participate in the policy community (8.3.9).  
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The UK, a leading proponent of the idea of a single target for greenhouse gas 
emissions, moved into the policy debate early and was effective in making its 
case to the Commission while the voice of Germany, a natural supporter of 
multiple targets was muted for much of the agenda-setting phase as it elected 
and formed a new government (8.3.10). And, finally, the EU climate and energy 
policy community is better considered to function as two distinct communities 
with one-half accepting the imperative of ambitious climate action and seeking 
influence by contributing solutions within that constraint while the other half 
seek to limit or slow emissions reduction strategies (8.3.11). 
8.3.1 A change in the political and economic context 
Economic recession, the Eurozone crisis and growing anti-EU sentiment 
overshadowed the debate about the 2030 framework  
The political and economic environment in which the 2030 targets were debated 
was radically different from that which shaped the 2020 package. The 2020 
policy was implemented at almost the same moment that the global financial 
crisis triggered the Eurozone crisis and the economic backdrop to the debate of 
the 2030 policy was several years of recession and uncertainty. This timing had 
two important impacts. Firstly it had material effects on key EU energy and 
climate policies as well as changing the perception of these policies. The 
recession and slump in industrial production were major contributors to the 
collapse of the price of emissions allowances in the EU-ETS, the impacts of 
which are discussed in section 8.3.8, below. It also highlighted the budgetary 
implications of the 2020 policy, especially the cost of support for renewable 
energy. The cost of renewable support became a key reference point for actors 
who sensed that policymakers would be receptive to cost effectiveness as an 
argument in favour of a 2030 package which did not include a strong renewable 
energy target. 
Secondly, the recession and attendant crisis in the Eurozone was perceived to 
have contributed to a measurable decline in trust in the EU’s capacity to deal 
with Europe’s problems. This growing scepticism was evident in a surge in 
support for populist, anti-EU political parties across Europe and was reflected in 
the election to the European Parliament of record numbers of anti-EU or anti-
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establishment candidates in the elections in spring 2014. At the same time, 
climate change had been slipping down the list of European citizens’ chief 
concerns since COP 15 in Copenhagen at which the EU’s attempts to broker a 
global deal on climate change had failed. The issue of whether a policy solution 
could in some way resist the fragmentary forces being experienced by the 
Union was perceived by some civil society actors to be an important factor in 
persuading European policymakers, especially senior Commission figures, of 
their legitimacy.  
Under these conditions, that the EU was less ambitious in its climate and 
energy policy in 2014 than it had been in 2007 appears unsurprising. It is 
interesting to observe, however, how civil society actors chose to make use of 
these macro-scale political developments in their attempts to influence the 
shape of the 2030 framework. The follow sections discuss the major findings of 
this study. 
8.3.2 Magritte group: utility CEOs team up 
The Magritte Group of utility CEOs were able to make a timely contribution to 
the debate in favour of a single target by singling out renewables as both 
energy insecure and partially responsible for the ETS price crash while also 
presenting their preferred policies as ‘European’. 
The Magritte Group’s approach to lobbying was not developed until the debate 
about 2030 became one about targets in 2013. Building a team of companies 
with very similar interests was not especially difficult for Gerard Mestrallet, chief 
executive of GDF Suez (now Engie). The group was able, however, by dint of 
their combined size and status of the CEOs, able to conduct a high-profile 
media campaign as well as secure meetings with influential figures in the 
Commission, Parliament and Member States. While the members participated 
in various coalitions, they were not instrumental in setting them up. The utility 
companies of the Magritte Group were able to explicitly connect events in the 
problem and political streams to their preferred policy of a single target. The 
group carefully defined the problem of unprofitable gas-fired electricity 
generation plants as an energy security problem – which they strongly implied 
was caused by the earlier 202020 framework and its renewable energy target. 
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They also conspicuously made the case that they would like to see ‘more 
Europe’ in solving some of these problems, a welcome sentiment in the 
European Commission facing low levels of trust in the EU by European citizens. 
8.3.3 A disorderly renewable energy lobby 
Opponents of the single target idea were poorly organised and unable to build a 
broad coalition in favour of strong, multiple targets. 
The renewable energy industry has been shown to have been a potent force in 
the 202020 debate in 2005 to 2007 (Boasson and Wettestad, 2013) but in 2013 
and 2014 they were perceived by many other actors as weak and disorganised 
(Interview 8, 30, 10, 13). Many of the problems stemmed from the collapse of 
the umbrella group, EREC, at an especially inopportune time, as discussed in 
Box 2 on page 120. The demise of EREC meant that not only were the 
individual industries unable to coordinate among themselves but forming wider 
coalitions was much harder. Most notably, the renewable energy industry did 
not form any meaningful coalition with the energy efficiency sector, a natural ally 
in many ways, especially in the face of rapidly increasing acceptance of a single 
target approach towards the end of 2013. The renewables industries were also 
unable to effectively counter the assertion from groups such as the Single 
Target Coalition and the Magritte Group that not only had renewables 
contributed to the problems faced by the EU-ETS by undermining the price, but 
that they had also exacerbated the issue of energy security by undercutting 
existing gas-fired generation stations, making them unprofitable and forcing 
their owners to withdraw them from service. The renewable energy industries 
individually pointed out the energy security benefits of domestically sourced 
renewables but, alone, none of the voices had the authority or credibility of 
BUSINESSEUROPE, the oil companies and the Magritte Group, all of whom at 
least partially framed renewables as a problem for energy security. This lack of 
coordination with the energy efficiency industry may have been partially 
because of the delay caused by the energy efficiency review required by the 
energy efficiency directive. Ultimately, the renewable energy lobby - which for 
many years had pushed the idea that renewable energy was domestic - and 
therefore secure - struggled to make a case in favour of strong targets for 
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renewable energy, even at a time energy security fears peaked in mid-2014 
with the Ukraine-Russia crisis. 
8.3.4 Early mover: European Climate Foundation 
The European Climate Foundation was able to move early and create new 
knowledge but unable to forcefully push that knowledge into the later stages of 
the debate 
The European Climate Foundation’s (ECF) ability to move very early and take 
the risk that the policy process would not evolve as it hoped was matched by its 
team building skills. By selecting a group of actors for its ‘core reflection group’ 
that was balanced by design, including actors from all segments of the policy 
community added to the credibility of the modelling work and its findings – 
among which was a distinctive diagnosis of the problem as one of increasing 
the interconnectedness of the European electricity system, improving energy 
efficiency and increasing the proportion of energy from renewables. But having 
taken advantage of a slim opening of the policy window around the few months 
following COP 15 in Copenhagen, ECF were far less prominent in the 
remainder of the debate, effectively ‘passing the baton’ to the disorganised 
renewable energy sectors which were unable to cement the ideas into a rapidly 
shifting agenda. Their strategy of opening up the process of problem definition 
to the wider group was also risky and saw their data used in several 
unsanctioned reports from both campaigning NGOs and the gas industry, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
8.3.5 Inside the European Commission 
A long-running tesnsion between the two Directorates-general responsible for 
the 2030 policy over the respective roles of the ETS and targets was settled in a 
last-minute deal brokered by the Secretary-General and the Commission 
President with Energy Commissioner Oettinger conceding a proposed 40% 
GHG target in return for non-binding renewable energy targets 
There were differences of opinion about the policy package in both the 
administrative and political levels of the European Commission. DG Clima had 
been separated from the DG Environment at the start of the Barroso II 
Commission in 2010 a move that had been controversial at the time with critics 
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concerned that the new DG would focus on the ETS as the main or only 
instrument for tackling climate change, leaving little scope for other policy 
options. The instuitional corollary to this concern was that on many issues, such 
as the EU 2030 framework, DG Clima would hold joint drafting responsibility 
with another newly formed department, DG Energy, which had previously been 
merged with Transport. Within the two Directorates-general responsible for 
drafting and consulting on the 2030 framework, DG Clima, custodians of the EU 
emissions trading system, were concerned about the future of the landmark 
policy. Given the recent collapse in the price of allowances within the system 
and the general lack of measurable emissions impact since the policy’s 
implementation in 2005, this concern was understandable and the DG was 
somewhat cautious about the possible interaction between policies such as 
renewables targets and the ETS. DG Energy, meanwhile, had units specifically 
created to manage technology-specific policy areas such as renewable energy 
(unit C1) and energy efficiency (unit C3)80 and its staff were perceived to be 
more in favour of a multiple-target approach.  
Meanwhile, as well as this ‘horizontal’ tension between DGs, there was a 
‘vertical’ dimension. As discussed in Chapter 3, there was an increasing 
tendency for the Secretariat-General (SG), under Catherine Day, to take an 
interest in the day-to-day activity within the DGs. This centralisation of control 
over policy within the Commission was manifest when both DG Clima and DG 
Ener found themselves relieved of drafting responsibility for the 2030 framework 
and relegated to a role as advisors to a new unit within the Secretariat General, 
which was to draft the policy. The reasons for the SG taking over the drafting 
brief are not absolutely clear. Whether it was simply a means to overcome 
intractable dispute of the nature of the framework between DG Clima and DG 
Ener or whether it was part of an explicit strategy of senior Commission figures 
seeking to take control of what President Barroso called ‘politically challenging’ 
policies in order to avoid conflict with the European Council cannot be 
discerned. What is evident is that the framework that emerged was a political 
compromise firstly between Oettinger and a small number of Commissioners 
                                            
80 See page 49 for more detail on the structure of the DGs 
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who supported a 35% target and the majority who supported a stronger target 
and secondly between what the Commission perceived were the disparate 
preferences of the member states. 
It is also the case that the framework was more compromised than either DG 
would likely have been happy with. On climate ambition, the proposal was 
towards the lower end of the range supported by the analysis undertaken by DG 
Clima and the weak, non-binding targets on energy efficiency and renewables 
clashed with the belief within DG Ener that without specific policies in these 
areas, the emissions goals would be very hard to achieve. 
8.3.6 Big doesn’t need to be smart 
BUSINESSEUROPE and the energy intensive industries did not need to exploit 
entrepreneurial tactics or create new ideas to influence policy and acted as an 
effective anchor on the ambition of the policy  
Both BUSINESSEUROPE and the direct representatives of the energy intensive 
industries took a very conventional approach to their lobbying efforts. Their 
message was largely the same as it had been on all topics of climate and 
energy policy for years. Their inability or unwillingness to find common ground 
with other organisations and the rigidity with which they stuck to their demands 
led other lobbyists and service level Commission officials to view them with 
scepticism. More senior Commission figures such as President Barroso and 
Commissioner Oettinger, however, were more likely to take notice of the 
group’s colossal membership and both have been shown to have been very 
receptive to a single target approach (Bürgin, 2015). In many ways, it could be 
said that BUSINESSEUROPE did not employ innovative techniques and build 
coalitions simply because it was large enough and influential enough not to 
need any help in order to be heard. It could also be speculated that by making 
the threat that ‘business’ – and by inference prosperity - may suffer due to 
climate policy, policymakers face little choice but to listen. BUSINESSEUROPE 
and the energy intensive industries were able to point out that consumers and 
industries were under financial pressure and that relaxing climate ambition –
perhaps by refraining from a deal until after the Paris climate conference - could 
ease that pressure. They were unable, however, to make convincing arguments 
 286 
about how to square their demands with the desire to maintain Europe’s 
position as a climate leader. The core message that climate and energy policy 
contributes to higher energy costs was particularly salient for policymakers at a 
time of economic crisis and worries about the cost of energy. That business 
interests were able to apparently make a case that was received by 
policymakers without recourse to entrepreneurial activity echoes the concerns 
raised by Charles Lindblom about a policy process in which business interests 
wielded more power simply due to the existence of an all-encompassing market 
system, as mentioned on page 53. As he puts it  “not human need and 
aspiration but of the market system [is] the fixed element in the light of which we 
think about policy” and the ‘threats’ of poor business performance an example 
of the ‘automatic recoil mechanism’ by which capital resists change (Lindblom, 
1982, p.333).  
8.3.7 Softening up – good ideas take time 
Kingdon’s suggestion that ideas need to be introduced gradually ahead of time 
to gain familiarity and acceptance within the policy community appears to have 
been particularly significant for the idea that saving energy is good for Europe’s 
energy security 
As described in Chapter 2, Kingdon (2010, p.127) refers to a process he 
describes as ‘softening up’ by which familiarity with a concept or idea within the 
policy community is increased over a period of time so that, when the time is 
right, the idea is generally accepted to be valid and does not come as a 
surprise. In 2014, trade association EuroACE was able to make use of the 
political space created by the escalating Russia-Ukraine energy dispute to 
make a strong argument in favour of an energy efficiency target directly to the 
Council’s energy ministers. But it was no accident that energy efficiency 
advocates could move quickly – they’d prepared the arguments and engaged 
several years of softening-up81. The idea that energy efficiency could reduce 
gas dependency and therefore play a role in improving energy security had 
                                            
81 See page 19 for a more detailed description of the term 
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been gently pushed by EuroACE since it coined the term ‘energy dependence 
day’ in 2011. 
The idea of technology-neutrality and an ETS-only approach to climate and 
energy policy needed little softening up because it had been the among the 
most important and ambitious policy initiatives on climate the EU had embarked 
on in the previous decade. Familiarity with the trading system was widespread 
and it is highly unlikely that a Brussels lobbyist or other political actor could 
thrive without a solid understanding of the concept as well the details of its 
functioning and history. 
8.3.8 Spill-over: entrepreneurship does not equal power 
Entrepreneurial activity designed to exploit a window of opportunity for reform of 
the EU-ETS enhanced the position of the idea of a single target and made it 
harder to create coalitions in favour of multiple targets in the EU 2030 debate 
In order describe the influence that one policy window may have on another, 
Kingdon (2010) borrows the term ‘spillover’ from Ernst Haas’ theory of 
neofunctionalism, first published in the late 1950s (Haas, 2003). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Kingdon’s MSA suggests that spillover may occur when a principle is 
established or a precedent set which alters the way in terms under which a 
policy topic is discussed in the future - perhaps changing the political dynamics 
of the situation. Kingdon also suggests that success by a policy entrepreneur in 
one area may impact what happens in other, adjacent or overlapping policy 
area. This could be because it appears that a particular type of policy idea 
(Kingdon uses the example of deregulation), once shown to be successful in 
one field then becomes attractive to entrepreneurs seeking success in another. 
It could also be the case that “…the coalition that was built and nurtured to 
establish the new policy can be transferred to other fights” (Kingdon, 2010, 
p.192). 
The fact that there were two overlapping policy windows, one in which ETS 
reform was being legislated and the other in which the agenda was being set for 
the 2030 targets meant that it was always likely that some kind of spillover 
would occur. Within the ETS reform window, one of the most striking pieces of 
entrepreneurship appears to have taken place. A small ENGO managed to play 
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an important role in securing the two reforms to the trading system - 
backloading and the market stability reserve - which it saw as crucial to 
increasing Europe’s climate change mitigation efforts. Change Partnership 
worked tenaciously to build a large and diverse coalition of actors (Friends of 
ETS), which put pressure on policymakers to enact the changes to the ETS. 
The coalition appeared to be especially impressive since it spanned cleavages 
in the policy community between ENGOs, utilities, renewable energy producers, 
oil companies and non-energy businesses.  
The coalition’s coordinators actively contributed to a perception that the ETS 
was in crisis, as evidenced by the very low price of allowances, and consistently 
stressed that resolution of the crisis was the primary problem of EU climate and 
energy policy. In order to create this sense of crisis and a perception that ETS 
was the climate policy problem in need of solution, Change Partnership went as 
far as to indicate that earlier policy decisions such as the 2020 renewable 
energy target, had contributed to the low prices in the ETS. The reasoning 
behind FoETS’ agnostic stance on ‘technology-neutrality’ was partly to enhance 
the ability build the coalition. By pragmatically adopting a position firmly in 
favour of the ETS as the central issue in climate policy, the coalition could 
appeal to actors such as Shell and RWE, long standing critics of renewable 
energy targets. It was also very much in line with the thinking in the key 
Directorate-general on climate policy, DG Clima. DG Clima is, or at least some 
of the key figures leading the department were, deeply wedded to the idea of 
the EU-ETS as the ‘cornerstone’ of EU climate policy. The reason for the DGs 
existence was intimately bound to the maintenance and perfection of the trading 
system and its staff was judged to be more receptive to advocacy which shared 
that view. Indeed, the decision to pursue ETS reform by environmentalists was 
simply based on a perception that institutional support for maintaining the ETS 
was so strong – in spite the policy’s manifest failure to effect change - that there 
was little point ‘blowing against the wind’ with alternative suggestions. The 
support of some strategically important members was also contingent on the 
group not taking a supportive line towards policies other than the ETS, 
especially energy targets. 
 289 
While it was perceived by its members and others to have been successful in 
the ETS reform debate (Wettestad and Jevnaker, 2016), the impact of the 
coalition and its activity on the 2030 debate was more ambiguous. As 
acknowledged by the coordinators, maintaining the cohesion of the group 
meant that on the key issue of single versus multiple targets it was silent or 
purposefully ambivalent. This suited some actors more than others. For 
example, utilities like GDF Suez, E.On and CEZ and oil major Shell were able to 
remain members of the FoETS coalition while actively pursuing other coalitions 
lobbying hard for a single target. But, once the reforms to the ETS had been 
secured, the coalition continued to act as a platform for information sharing and 
social interaction among the members. 
That the ETS was perceived to be unmovable as the central plank of climate 
and energy policy, that a sizable group of businesses that saw themselves as 
‘progressive’ (and plenty that did not) were likely to be able to participate, that a 
political situation in which energy costs and the ‘cost-efficiency’ of policy was 
especially important all meant that pressing for ETS reform could be seen, in 
2012, to be the best chance for environmental campaigners to make a tangible 
impact on the ambition of EU climate policy. And it is possible to argue – as the 
participants and many observers do – that FoETS was an extremely effective 
coalition for demonstrating support and arguing for ETS reform and therefore a 
successful environmental lobbying campaign. But it is also possible to arrive at 
an alternative conclusion. 
A coalition on the scale of Friends of ETS, in the relatively small community of 
EU climate and energy specialists, was always likely to have a wider impact 
than simply on the EU-ETS reform debate. For some members, a pro- 
(reformed) ETS stance may have impacted directly on their approach to the 
2030 debate. The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) for example, 
was a FoETS member that had traditionally been a strong supporter of 
renewable energy targets. Participation in FoETS may have made making the 
case for renewable energy targets intellectually more challenging to sustain and 
there was certainly some suspicion among other actors that EWEA had come 
close to adopting a single target position.  
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Many of the ‘progressive’ members (i.e. excluding the utilities and oil 
companies) of the coalition may, under other circumstances, have been open to 
discussions about how best to promote the idea of multiple targets. Despite 
success for the environment in the ETS reform debate, the FoETS coalition 
contributed to a significant shift of the overall policy debate’s centre of gravity 
towards technology-neutrality and the idea of a single target. 
As discussed at the start of this section, Kingdon (2010) anticipates spillovers 
from one policy window to another, and it certainly appears that spillover 
occurred between the ETS reform debate and the 2030 debate. What Kingdon 
didn’t apparently anticipate was the potential for an entrepreneur to establish a 
precedent or create networks in one window, which undermined the effects of 
their entrepreneurship in a second window. This implication for MSA will be 
discussed in more detail in the conclusion. 
8.3.9 Energy models: knowledge AND symbol 
Energy models were a primary medium of discourse during the very early 
stages of the debate about the 2030 targets; models played a role as both 
knowledge contributions and symbols or qualifications to participate in the policy 
community 
As explained in Chapter 582, during the debate about the 2030 targets, 
particularly during the early stages of the discussion between 2009 and 2011, 
much of the interaction between actors took place through the medium of 
technical and economic modelling. The modelling work undertaken by civil 
society actors served two key purposes. The first was a practical knowledge 
contribution to the policy debate and the second was as what Hammond (1984) 
describes as ‘symbolic action’ to ‘call attention to the modellers and to their 
advice’. 
The novelty or amount of new knowledge produced varied greatly between 
different modelling efforts. The European Climate Foundation’s 2010 ‘Roadmap 
2050’ project, for example, was a solid contribution to the policy community’s 
                                            
82 see Box 4 on page 107 
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shared understanding of what was required to fulfil the EU’s goal of deep 
decarbonisation by 2050. The work was lengthy, detailed and credible and, 
according to Commission officials, had an impact on the way that the topic of 
decarbonisation of the energy sector was thought about by policymakers. At the 
same time, however, ECF’s reports and the process through which they were 
produced were powerfully symbolic. At the time the work was started, ECF was 
not much more than a year old and by firstly demonstrating its competence in 
the highly technical area of climate and energy policy and secondly by doing so 
in a collegiate and open way with many key partners – many of which were 
established members of the policy community - ECF was able to reinforce its 
role within that community.  
But, as Hammond (1984, p.228) points out, in order for energy modelling to 
function as a claim to authority, the underlying knowledge does not necessarily 
need to be new or even ‘up to snuff’. While broadly competent, some of the 
modelling contributions by civil society actors brought little in the way of new 
knowledge to the debate. In particular, the more derivative reports discussed in 
section 5.3.2 from page 174 tended to serve a more as symbols than as 
knowledge contributions. For example, the report produced by the European 
Gas Advocacy Forum (EGaF) in early 2011 did not introduce any new ideas 
other than those that had been used by the gas industry for some time – namely 
that using fewer renewable installations and more natural gas would be cheaper 
and more secure. It did, however, demonstrate the EGaF and its members were 
able to ‘speak model’ and participate in discussions about the future energy 
system. 
Despite the high-level of model-literacy across the policy community, the effort 
required to engage with the Commission in order to challenge their modelling 
methods or assumptions was high. The account of what became known as 
#modelgate given in Box 5 shows that it took an environmental campaigner a 
full year of pressure to make the case that the discount rate used in the 
Commission’s model to estimate energy efficiency costs and benefits did not 
reflect real-world investment decisions and that the modelling results had made 
a multiple target approach relatively more expensive than a single emissions 
target. Whether or not the campaigner was right in his assertion that the 
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Commission had ‘fixed’ the discount rate in the name of political expediency 
(Riley, 2014b), by the time the Commissioner responsible conceded that it 
should be changed, the European Council had taken its decision and, as far as 
the structure of the targets was concerned – there was no going back. 
8.3.10 Member state interventions 
The UK, a leading proponent of the idea of a single target for greenhouse gas 
emissions, moved into the policy debate early and was effective in making its 
case to the Commission while the voice of Germany, a natural supporter of 
multiple targets was muted for much of the agenda-setting phase as it elected 
and formed a new government.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the process by which the 2030 framework would be 
decided upon was for the European Commission to propose the policy and for 
the European Council to reflect on those proposals as it acts in its capacity to 
‘define the EU’s political direction and priorities’. The fact that the 2030 
framework proposed by the Commission was due to debate and adopted, or 
not, by the heads of state or government meant that particularly close attention 
was paid by the Commission to the likely preferences of the European leaders. 
The Commission’s decision to propose a 40%83 target - the bare minimum level 
commensurate with the 80-95% decarbonisation goal set for the EU ahead of 
COP 15 in Copenhagen indicates that the Commission was not anticipating an 
appetite for ambition by leaders following the perceived failure of EU leadership 
in the Copenhagen climate talks and amid the on-going financial crisis. Some 
states, most notably the UK and Germany had written into domestic law 
emissions reductions commitments that matched or exceeded what was likely 
to be agreed at the European level. It was clear that despite statements from 
the UK that the target should be as high as 50%, that a major challenge at the 
European Council would be to put forward a package that could be agreed by 
member states unconvinced of the need for the EU to act on climate change, 
especially coal-dependent Poland and other central and eastern European 
states.  
                                            
83 at least 40% 
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While the relative lack of ambition for the overall emissions reduction goal 
seems fairly well explained by the shift in the European political and economic 
context between 2007 and 2014, the nature of the debate about the number 
and nature of the targets was more complex. The Commission, while attempting 
to anticipate the aggregate position of the European Council was also subject to 
attempts at persuasion by some member states. For example, the UK reacted 
very early to the prospect of a new package of targets by making it very clear 
that it rejected the idea of another multi-target package on grounds firstly of the 
right of members to determine their own energy mix (as granted by the Lisbon 
Treaty) and secondly on grounds that a single target was more cost efficient. 
The status of the EU in the UK’s domestic politics and its on-going attempt to 
embark on a nuclear energy renaissance made it hardly surprising that the UK 
would resist a new renewable energy or energy efficiency target. The fact that 
the UK’s 2008 Climate Change Act already committed it to faster emissions 
reductions than were being contemplated in Brussels makes the UK’s position 
in favour of climate ambition equally unsurprising. It is more surprising that 
Germany, the member state which contemporary accounts put at the centre of 
the movement to adopt the multiple-target framework for 2020 in 2007, was 
perceived as lacklustre or absent from the agenda setting phase of the 2030 
discussions.  
Despite its reputation as one of Europe’s green energy champions, Germany 
was not immune from the political pressures that were being felt by energy 
policymakers across Europe. Indeed, the fact that Germany’s Energiewende 
had delivered very rapid uptake of renewables meant that compared to other 
members states the financial pressure on consumers was perceived to be 
especially high, as explained on page 160 in Chapter 4. It could well be that the 
German government’s support for renewables-focussed EU climate and energy 
policy had dimmed since 2007 – but it seems just as likely that the federal 
electoral campaign and ensuing coalition negotiations between Angela Merkel’s 
CDU and Sigmar Gabriel’s SPD severely reduced Germany’s ability to engage 
with the agenda-setting process during 2013. 
The UK certainly contributed to the consensus that had developed during 2013 
around a single target but not long before the Commission’s proposals were 
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due to be published in early 2014, other states including Germany, France and 
Italy made it known to the College of Commissioners that they strongly favoured 
some form of multiple target approach. Facing this seemingly unbridgeable gulf 
between member states, the College was able to use the wriggle room it had in 
the form of different interpretations of ‘binding target’ to craft a compromise that 
had the credentials of climate ambition (at least 40%) as well as some kind of 
renewables and energy efficiency targets, although member states would not be 
asked to bind themselves to the targets. 
8.3.11 One fragmented community or multiple communities? 
The EU climate and energy policy community is better considered to function as 
two distinct communities with one-half accepting the imperative of ambitious 
climate action and seeking influence by contributing solutions within that 
constraint and the other half attempting to limit or slow emissions reduction 
strategies 
Kingdon (2010, p.118) suggests that the rate at which a new idea may take hold 
within a policy community is a function of how integrated that community is. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the expectation is that the closer the integration of the 
policy community, the faster an idea can take hold and more fractured or 
fragmented policy communities resulting in the slower propagation of ideas.  
During 2013 and 2014, the climate and energy policy community in Brussels 
was deeply fractured. The most energy-intensive and polluting industries as well 
as lobby-group, BUSINESSEUROPE had little or no constructive interaction 
with the rest of the community of businesses, thinktanks and ENGOs. This 
remainder was so closely integrated, however, that it may be more useful to 
think of the policy community as two separate communities, as explained in 
section 5.6. 
While the community of energy intensive industries had a strong and shared 
worldview, it did not interact a great deal with the other groups. The energy 
intensive industries were both perceived - and perceived themselves to be - 
outside of the core of decision-making actors and tended to pursue other 
avenues to influence policy than persuasion and contributing to problem-solving 
within the policy community. Within the other community, however, while policy 
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positions and opinions were varied, the basic underlying premise of the need to 
tackle climate change was shared and there was widespread and frequent 
interaction between its members. This community included many of the 
Commission officials working on drafting the proposals.  
Despite the fragmentation into two, almost independent, communities, the fact 
that one of the communities was very closely integrated meant that during 2013, 
the idea of an ETS-only climate and energy policy, which had been on the 
fringes of the debate for some time, moved very fast into the mainstream of the 
community’s thinking quite rapidly once the debate about the appropriate policy 
response began.  
8.4 Summary and conclusion 
A number of findings (summarised on page 278) can be drawn from the account 
provided in the preceding chapters. These findings have implications for the 
distribution and wielding of power; although these are qualified by the slippery 
nature of the concept of power (see section 1.3). It is shown that since 
European civil society can influence policy outcomes, the policymaking process 
(or at least the agenda-setting process) is effectively supra-national. The 
findings do not, however, allow for an assessment of the balance of power 
between interest groups – they simply describe how the power that interest 
groups are able to muster is wielded. The important fact is that there are many 
ways in which groups are able to deploy resources to exert influence. 
BUSINESSEUROPE has membership and connections and does not need to 
act entrepreneurially, while smaller organisations such as EuroACE are nimble 
and can react fast to political events such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis in 2014. 
While it is difficult to produce highly generalizable findings from a single case 
study, this does not reduce the validity of the findings since there is already a 
well-developed, general understanding of the mechanics of interest 
representation in the literature (see 1.3 on page 33) and because the aims of 
the study are intrinsically linked to the specific instance of EU policy making with 
wide ranging implications for the sustainable transformation of the European 
energy system.  
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The findings show that the scope of the combined climate and energy policy 
portfolio which spanned two commission departments was too broad for most 
actors to fully internalise, forcing them to specialise in one area or another. 
Since two major briefs were under discussion simultaneously, blind spots about 
renewable energy and energy efficiency policy were highlighted among ETS-
specialists.   
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
“There were poisons so subtle that to know their 
properties one had to sicken of them. There were 
maladies so strange that one had to pass through 
them if one sought to understand their nature.” 
Oscar Wilde – The Picture of Dorian Gray 
 
This chapter concludes the research. Following an introductory section, section 
9.2 revisits the aims, objectives and research questions set in the opening 
chapters. Section 9.3 assesses the research’s contribution to several fields of 
literature, and section 9.4 suggests some areas for further research, 
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9.1 Introduction 
The EU 2030 targets that were decided on by the European Council in 2014 
have become an integral part of the EU’s ‘Energy Union’ – an attempt to place 
energy cooperation at the heart of the European Project (Szulecki et al., 2016). 
The decision will determine key characteristics – as well as the likelihood of 
success – of Europe’s low-carbon energy system transformation. The targets 
represent a reduction in ambition compared to the 2020 policy that was in place 
and a strong shift in favour of technology-neutral policy – a shift that the 
literature on energy transitions and transformations (see section 1.4 on page 
36) suggests will have far-reaching implications for the route - and prospects for 
success - of Europe’s low-carbon energy transformation. 
It has long been observed that the EU policymaking process is remarkably open 
to interest group activity. Far from an exception, climate and energy policy is 
one of the most heavily lobbied portfolios Brussels. Commercial, industrial and 
environmental interests are all impacted by decisions such that taken on the 
2030 targets and are represented in the policy making process.  
This research investigated the role played by the interaction of these interests 
and the policy process from which the European Commission’s proposals for 
the 2030 framework emerged. This chapter concludes the thesis by assessing 
the study against the aims, objectives and questions set for it in the opening 
chapter in section 9.2, situating the work in the existing literature in section 9.3 
and highlighting some promising avenues for further research in section 9.4. 
9.2 Revisiting the aims, objectives and research question  
The research question guiding this research is:  
“How did Brussels-based interest groups influence the decision not to 
include binding national renewable energy and energy efficiency targets 
in the EU climate and energy framework for 2030?”  
As well as the explicit research question concerning the role of interest groups 
in determining the non-binding nature of the energy targets in the 2030 
framework, this study set out to meet two additional aims. These are the 
creation of a detailed impression of the climate and energy policy community in 
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2013 and 2014 and a ‘thick’ description of the context of the debate about 
targets. 
The findings of the study are laid out in the previous chapter and there is little 
value restating them here. However, there are some important concluding 
points worth making.  
This thesis has described and analysed a wide range of factors. Personal 
beliefs, interpersonal relationships and trust have been shown to be significant, 
as have grand historical and political trends. But at the heart of the thesis is the 
story of an idea. More accurately, it is a small part of a much larger story of an 
idea. The idea is ‘technology-neutrality’ and its story stretches all the way back 
to Pigou’s suggestion in the 1920s that putting a price on economic 
‘externalities’ is a justifiable means of modifying the behaviour of businesses 
and individuals in a way that reduces or eliminates the externality.  
As set out in Chapter 5 and in the introduction, this idea has long been 
contested within the fields of climate and energy policymaking. The debate 
about climate and energy policy is not simply a uni-dimensional pull and push 
between low and high climate ambition - between achieving climate goals and 
maintaining European industry. The additional, cross-cutting tension between 
technology neutral and more technology specific approaches give rise to an 
inherently multi-dimensional and altogether more complex debate in which the 
idea of technology neutrality is invoked and manipulated in support of a wide 
range of interests including those of utility companies worried about the rate of 
renewable energy growth, oil and gas actors concerned about a future for gas in 
the energy mix, energy intensive consumers concerned about the cost of 
climate policy and member states attempting to retain sovereignty over energy 
policy decisions. 
The idea of technology neutrality defined the battleground on which the 2030 
targets were debated in a way that significantly influenced the result – ultimately 
setting an agenda for a more technology neutral and - as we learn from 
transitions studies (see section 1.4) – probably less effective decarbonisation 
policy. As set out in the introduction, compared to the 202020 policy package, in 
which specific renewable technology targets were derived for each member 
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state, the 2030 package with its weak European-level renewable energy and 
energy efficiency targets was a distinct shift of EU policy in favour of 
technology-neutrality. 
9.3 Contribution to literature 
This thesis contributes to three main areas of literature: that on the role of 
interest groups in EU governance, the recently growing literature on framing 
and also the ongoing debate about the application and refinement of the 
multiple streams approach. These are discussed in turn. 
This thesis is primarily an empirical contribution to the growing stock of 
descriptive case-studies of interest representation and the role of interest 
groups in the multi-level European governance structure (Coen, 2007b; Kohler-
Koch, 1994; Greenwood, 2011; Richardson and Coen, 2009). It adds a case 
study which validates many of the observations in the literature about collective 
action by interest groups towards European policy – especially the rationales for 
creating ad-hoc coalitions of interests or maintaining hierarchical governance 
structures. At the same time, this thesis suggests a greater role for ideas in the 
mediation of power between interest groups than has previously been 
acknowledged, as well as the potential for interest groups to act apparently 
against their own stated interests as they seek to create more stable, influential 
coalitions.  
In particular, it becomes clear from the research that the observed trend 
towards closer cooperation between business and environmental interests 
(Fairbrass, 2013) in the field of climate policy lobbying is apparent and that it is 
an important factor in agenda-setting. However, this kind of partnership is not 
necessarily neutral and that the costs (such as, in this case, taking a more 
technology neutral approach in order to satisfy partners from business) and 
benefits (such as enhanced credibility for business) of creating business/ENGO 
coalitions can be unevenly distributed in favour of businesses. The obvious 
mitigation for any interests engaged in negotiating policy positions with other 
interest groups is to exercise caution. 
The research also contributes to a more recent growth within the literature on 
framing by European interest groups (Voltolini and Eising, 2016; Boräng et al., 
 301 
2014; Eising et al., 2015; Klüver and Mahoney, 2015). The 2030 policy debate 
was a fierce competition to frame the policy challenges and options in various 
ways - with differing levels of success. Both framing and counter-framing were 
significant although no one particular frame was preeminent (as per Eising et 
al., 2015, p.531)  While ECF deployed detailed numerical analysis to frame 
certain options as ‘no regrets’, the utilities sought to frame the package as a 
response to a crisis in electricity generation adequacy while energy intensive 
industries attempted to frame it as a de-industrialisation problem. Unanticipated 
in the literature on framing in the EU policy process, however, the most powerful 
framing effect observed was that a range of actors with differing interpretations 
of the problem could frame a particular idea or solution – that of technology 
neutrality - in a way that served their interests.  
This thesis is an application of the Multiple Streams Approach, contributing to 
an improved understanding of the validity of the approach’s assumptions and 
the applicability of the approach to the analysis of EU interest representation 
(Kingdon, 2010; Ackrill et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2016; Zahariadis, 2007).  
Chapter 2 identifies two clear potential shortcomings of the MSA when applied 
to the research question guiding this thesis. As observed in section 2.3.4, 
Kingdon’s and other subsequent formulations of MSA neglect do not allow for 
interests groups a fully-formed political role. For a study seeking to understand 
the nature and implications of the behaviour of these actors, this is problematic. 
At the same time, existing elaborations of MSA fail to provide a specification 
against which policy entrepreneurs may be usefully identified. 
By modifying the framework i) to expand the role of interest groups into all three 
streams rather than simply the politics stream as suggested by Rozbicka and 
Spohr (2015) and ii) by tightening the definition of policy entrepreneurship 
(Mintrom and Norman, 2009), the thesis has shown that MSA can be 
successfully applied to a case study of EU climate and energy policy interest 
representation. It also confims that the original scheme in which interest groups 
were excluded from the problem and politics stream provides an inadequate 
conceptualisation of the status of interest groups in the policy process.  
 302 
Kingdon (2010) and later Zahariadis (2014) and others have developed the 
multiple streams approach (MSA) to explain the agenda setting process under 
conditions of ambiguity, manifest as unclear goals, fluid participation and 
unclear or opaque organisational technology, as explained in section 2.2. 
During the debate about the 2030 targets, these conditions generally appear to 
have been present.  
The goals of some actors do seem to have been unclear. Differences of opinion 
within the Commission made it difficult to ascertain the overarching policy goals; 
industrial development, climate mitigation, minimising energy costs to 
consumers, diversifying supply away from Russia were all argued to be ‘most’ 
important at some point. In fact, the ‘Trilemma’ frame introduced in section 4.3 
(page 138) and often cited by the Commission is itself an acknowledgement 
that the goals of energy policy can be somewhat ambiguous. The goals and 
preferences of civil society actors were also fuzzy. It was not entirely clear, for 
example, whether some environmental groups wanted to increase the 
effectiveness of the EU’s main climate policy instrument (the EU-ETS) or 
encourage the transformation of the energy system. While on the surface they 
are apparently complementary goals, manipulation of the idea of technology-
neutrality by interests in favour of a single, technology neutral GHG target made 
it very hard to argue strongly for ETS reform while also making the case for the 
renewable energy and energy efficiency targets that the literature on transitions 
and transformations suggest will be effective.  
Participation was fluid within parts of the decisions making process. For 
example, by moving the drafting responsibility away from of DG Ener and DG 
Clima into a specialist unit within the Secretariat General, a new set of 
personnel was required to become familiar with the policy brief. Civil society 
actors concentrated their efforts on different parts of the process. ECF was 
more involved early on while the utility companies focussed on attempting to 
influence the agenda much later. The renewable energy lobby more or less 
departed from view as EREC collapsed during the process. 
It is less easy to be certain that the ‘organisational technology’, to use 
Zahariadis’ term, was unclear. All actors seemed to understand the process by 
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which the Commission was to propose a framework and the European Council 
was to endorse it as policy. Actors do, however, hold opposing views on the 
most important elements of the process. For example, some lobbyists 
emphasise intergovernmental bargaining as critical and therefore target the 
Council while others focus on the persuasion of Commission desk officers by 
civil society. The role of parliamentarians in the agenda setting process also 
seemed to be a source of some confusion. Whether this diversity of preferred 
access points is evidence of actors ‘venue-shopping’ to make the most of their 
resources (Mazey and Richardson, 2001) or a less-than-perfect understanding 
of the processes is not clear. 
Another of the core assumptions of MSA was difficult to validate. That the three 
streams function independently of one another is central to the model’s 
conception, although Kingdon himself had some reservations about how 
separate they really are and was concerned in particular about the separation of 
the problem and policy streams  - acknowledging that there was a certain 
degree of relatedness (Kingdon, 2010, p.227). When using the MSA as an 
heuristic for organising and analysing research findings, the researcher must 
repeatedly answer the question ‘to which stream does this observation 
belong?’. In most cases the answer is straightforward: the energy security crisis 
is clearly a ‘problem’ and a renewable energy target (for example) is clearly a 
‘policy’. Some confusion arose around the topic of the EU-ETS, however.  
The ETS is, very obviously, a policy of the EU. But, as explored in section 4.4.3 
(page 147), the ETS and its performance was considered a major problem for 
EU climate and energy policy. Deciding in which stream this ‘problematic policy’ 
should be handled posed something of a dilemma. Ultimately, the crisis in the 
ETS was handled in Chapter 4 as a ‘problem’, largely based on how the issue 
was presented by members of the policy community. This decision was based 
on assessment that since the 2030 targets were not (directly) about the ETS, it 
provided something of a background to the debates about targets, rather than a 
particular solution or element of the policy.  
The ambiguity about whether the EU ETS deserves to considered within the 
policy or the problem streams is problematic for MSA which is built on the 
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premise that the streams are separate at all times outside stream coupling. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the separation of the streams is a 
conceptual conceit rather than a description of the real world and the device 
appears to have enabled a useful and illuminating analysis. 
In general, Kingdon’s (2010, p.141) observation that problem and policies 
evolve independently and that when it comes to policy ideas, “there is no new 
thing under the sun” is well supported by the prominent role in the debate for 
Pigou’s idea about pricing externalities from the 1920s (Pigou, 2013). Indeed, 
the idea of technology neutrality bears all the hall-marks of “a solution searching 
for a problem” that characterises the ‘garbage can’ model on which MSA is built 
(Zahariadis, 2008, p.519; Kingdon, 2010; Cohen et al., 1972, p.2). 
As argued by Spohr and Rozbicka (2015), the activity of interest groups and 
other civil society actors can be captured by the use of the multiple streams 
approach to analysis. Not only does this study support the assertion that civil 
society actors can and should be treated as full participants in all of the streams 
rather than merely an adjunct to the politics stream, it also shows that the 
framework can be used as an effective lens for a focused view on that particular 
part of each of the streams. 
While together, all elements of MSA provided a valuable heuristic to ensure that 
information relevant to the research question was collected and analysed, some 
elements of MSA have proved themselves to be particularly useful. The idea of 
a policy window, for instance, enabled the study to conceptualise two 
interdependent processes (ETS reform and EU 2030), with actions taken in one 
having impacts in the other and the role of social processes within the policy 
community (attempts at policy entrepreneurship) in enabling such spill-over. 
The concept of the policy entrepreneur put forward by Kingdon was found to be 
loosely specified and a tighter specification of this crucial role was taken from 
the literature on policy entrepreneurship, allowing a closer examination of policy 
entrepreneurship in Chapter 7 (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). 
In addition to a more tightly specified role of the policy entrepreneur, there are 
also several assumptions of the framework for which modifications or 
refinements may be suggested in light of the findings. In order to illustrate the 
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importance of structural factors in determining how an when an entrepreneur 
should best deploy their resources, the metaphor of a surfer is often invoked 
(Kingdon, 2010, p.165; Boscarino, 2009). It is held that an actor (or surfer) must 
be prepared for the fortuitous confluence of problems and/or politics that opens 
a policy window (or wave). Once the wave (opportunity) comes, the surfer must 
be ready to catch it. In the MSA metaphor the surfer, while they have agency 
over which waves they attempt to catch and what they do once one arrives, 
they are destined to wait for serendipity to send it their way. The metaphor 
largely rings true. Individual actors cannot control large-scale political or 
problematic events like the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis or the rise of populist 
sentiment any more than a surfer can control the waves in the ocean.  
But the findings suggest two qualifications for the metaphor. The first is about 
the assumed inability of actors to exert even modest control over the opening of 
policy windows - the breaking of waves. As described in Chapter 3, there was a 
certain inevitability that a policy window would open due to the impending expiry 
of the existing climate and energy framework in 2020 and the upcoming Paris 
climate conference in December 2015. But, while these events made up the 
limits of the policy window, actors that moved early were able to impose some 
shape on the window. ECF, for example, in discussion with the Commission 
made an attempt to kick-start the debate as one about renewable energy and 
energy efficiency (and potential targets) with their modelling project at a point in 
2009 the shape of the debate to come was very much unclear. ECF was unable 
to act to follow up their work in the light of later developments but they did 
contribute to the fact that targets were being discussed at all. It could be said 
that the ECF Roadmap 2050 project marked the opening of the usable policy 
window and the start of the debate about the 2030 targets. 
The second qualification is the absence in the literature of much discussions of 
what may happen when catching waves or so-called ‘problem surfing’ goes 
wrong. It is expected that pushing an idea into the wrong window or at the 
wrong moment simply leads to the proposal or campaign ‘fizzling out’ or being 
‘destroyed on the reef’ (Kingdon, 2010, p.171). But the findings of this study 
show that something more damaging may occur. As discussed above, the 
Friends of the ETS coalition sought to make use of the peaking crisis in the ETS 
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in order to make the case for ETS reform and did so with some success, 
primarily through the recruitment of business interests to the coalition. It is also 
described how, through the mechanism of spillover into the adjacent 2030 
targets policy window, its activity contributed to the rise up the agenda of the 
single target idea, reducing the scope for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency targets. From an energy system transformation perspective, this 
outcome could well be described as a ‘wipeout’84. 
9.4 Potential areas for further research 
As well as providing answers to the research question, the findings also suggest 
some avenues for further research. Three possible areas are outlined below. 
9.4.1 Interest group governance for sustainability 
In many instances, European interest groups appear inefficient aggregators of 
their members’ interests. BUSINESSEUROPE, for instance, is often criticised 
by members and policymakers for taking a stance on issues of climate change 
and sustainable energy at odds to much of its membership and Eurelectric 
found it impossible to come to clear positions on key issues during the 2030 
debate. It has been pointed out that this ‘lack of governability’ (Greenwood and 
Webster, 2000) has impacts on the EU decision-making system which relies on 
the participation of a wide range of interests for its legitimacy (Long and 
Loerinczi, 2009). Understanding if and why organisations take a position less in 
line with the goals of a sustainable energy transition than the mean position of 
its membership is a fruitful line of enquiry. A parallel investigation may be 
conducted into the behaviour of company lobbyists, some of whom appear to 
take a more combative approach to sustainable energy policy engagement than 
the views of their board would suggest (Interview 8). A hypothesis could be 
made here that, in order to justify their continued presence in Brussels, 
companies’ objections to sustainable energy policy are exaggerated by 
lobbyists. Passivity by public affairs staff in this context may be associated with 
redundancy. 
                                            
84 a wipeout is a fall from a surfboard. For an especially vivid description of the experience of surfing, see 
Finnegan (2015) 
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9.4.2 The impact of European Commission funding of ENGOs on energy 
policy and legitimacy 
As discussed in section 5.6 on page 200, the funding by the European 
Commission of ENGOs engaged in lobbying is widespread. While the existing 
literature does question the impact that this type of funding may have on 
groups’ attitudes to ‘project Europe’ (Greenwood, 2011, p.137), there is little to 
challenge or confirm the finding of this thesis that many industrial groups 
perceive the playing field as unfairly tilted towards the environment – a view that 
echoes some views in the public discourse about a so-called ‘green blob’ of 
powerful environmental interests (Booker, 2014). This position is clearly at odds 
with the claims made by neopluralists that the policymaking system, embedded 
as it is within the structures of the market economy, cannot but help to favour 
commercial interests (Lindblom, 1982) – a position given tentative support by 
the observation in this thesis that actors such as BUSINESSEUROPE do not 
feel the need to make entrepreneurial efforts to be influential actors in Brussels.  
An assessment of whether or not ENGOs are privileged over other interests in 
participation in the policymaking process requires more than accounting for the 
financial resources available to them. As discussed above, the deployment of 
resources by ENGOs and companies tends to be very different, despite some 
cross-over and adoption of each other’s’ tactics. Research which seeks to 
discover whether or not the European Commission’s NGO funding programmes 
such as LIFE+ is indeed crowding out commercial interests would serve to 
improve the legitimacy of sustainable energy policies. 
9.4.3 The politics of energy modelling 
The study found that the role of energy modelling, both technical and economic, 
extends beyond the provision of new knowledge on which to base decisions. 
Work in the 1980s also shows a strongly political dimension to the use of 
energy modelling by governments, think tanks and lobbyists (Hammond, 1984; 
Midttun and Baumgartner, 1986). More recent studies show that technical and 
scientific evidence ‘cannot be a direct and unproblematic link between scientific 
evidence and policy decisions and outcomes’  and that such evidence is nearly 
always contested among a wide range of influential actors (Cairney, 2016, 
p.129).  
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Further research into the political particularities of energy system modelling 
would build on this observation - with benefits for academics seeking an 
improved understanding of energy policy making processes as well as 
practitioners such as modellers, lobbyists and decision makers. Such research 
into the application of contemporary modelling techniques to the policy process 
and politics more widely would align strongly to a social science research 
agenda that is emerging in energy research and add to the growing literature on 
the politics role of technical and scientific evidence in policy making (Sovacool, 
2014; Cairney, 2016). 
  
 309 
 
Epilogue: Reflection on methods and 
comparison with other studies 
In light of the preceding chapters, this epilogue reflects on and reviews some of 
the methodological choices described in section 2.4 (page 71), in order to 
assess the reliability and validity of the findings. There are two main elements to 
the assessment that may impact the validity of the study’s findings: the choice 
to pursue a single, detailed case study and the choice of empirical methods. 
This section discusses each in turn before comparing the findings - first to those 
from other studies of the same phenomenon (EU 2030 targets) and secondly to 
the body of empirical research on another instance of European civil society 
engagement in EU environmental policymaking. There are six sections: The first 
section reflects on the choice of qualitative methods, the second of the use of a 
single case research design, the third reflects on the use of the multiple streams 
approach as a conceptual tool, the fourth returns to the empirical choices, the 
fifth compares and discusses the findings to those from other studies and 
finally, the sixth compares the findings to those made by studies in other policy 
domains. 
Choice of qualitative methods 
This thesis used an exclusively qualitative research design. The primary 
method, process tracing, draws on qualitative data gained from élite interviews 
and documentary analysis to build as complete a picture as possible of the 
activity in question. Section 2.4.1 details the steps taken to ensure the quality 
and reliability of the research. Nevertheless, the approach was not without its 
challenges – both in collecting and analysing data. Firstly, when using élite 
interviewing, even the best efforts will deliver an imperfect sample which may 
have important gaps or oversights. This problem is confounded by the 
sometimes arbitrary nature of personal connections between researcher and 
subjects. When analysing the data, the sequence of events is critical, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. Without complete certainty that the data is exhaustive 
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(an impossibility), the possibility for missing or out out-of-sequence steps 
remains.  
It is the case, however, that other, quantitative methods exist which may 
augment or negate the results of the qualitative techniques.  
For example, since the unit of analysis is effectively the ‘network’ of actors with 
an interests in the EU2030 policy, quantitative network-mapping techniques 
could have been applied to the research question with preference data drawn 
from the large number of responses to the European Commission’s green paper 
on the 2030 targets which contain basic information about the policy 
preferences of the more than 550 companies that responded. This technique 
has been – and continues to be – used to analyse EU interest representation in 
a range of policy contexts using a range of statistical tools (e.g. Zeng and 
Battiston, 2016). These quantitative approaches offer a number of apparent 
advantages when compared to qualitative research. Firstly, they can claim to be 
exhaustive – that is, while the qualitative research conducted here cannot claim 
to have considered every connection or every actor relevant to the research 
question, a quantitative approach can, within the bounds of its research design, 
make such as claim. Secondly, research based on quantitative methods can 
more easily be shown to flow from the underlying data with less ‘subjective’ 
interpretation required. Thirdly, statistical models of behaviour are more likely to 
lead to generalizable findings than the ‘thick’ context-rich descriptions that 
emerge from qualitative research. Finally, the number of data points measured 
and analysed can be very much greater than the sample of 35 élites interviewed 
for this study. 
That is not to say, however, that quantitative research designs are inherently 
more useful – nor does it follow that the two approaches are mutually exclusive.  
Quantitative research depends on precise measurement of variables that may, 
as this research has revealed, be inherently ambiguous. For example, 
‘measuring’ the policy positions of actors for whom a policy preference is an 
outcome, rather than an input their social interaction is likely to lead to 
misleading findings about the nature of that actor’s role in the phenomena and 
processes under investigation. At the same time, models of actors’ decision 
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making that assume rationality are likely to miss many of the cognitive, social 
and other context-dependent factors which may appear important in a 
qualitative study. A combination of the two approaches may yield useful results, 
however. A broad quantitative mapping exercise which highlights actors and 
connections of interest followed by a qualitative analysis of a smaller group or 
network may yield especially compelling results. 
Choice of a single case 
The preceding chapters outlined, in some detail, the context and events that 
defined European civil society’s role in setting the agenda for the EU 2030 
climate and energy policy and a number of findings have been made. As 
described in section 2.5.5 on page 87, a research strategy based on a single 
case study has been argued to suffer from the ‘small-n’ problem which renders 
the generalizability of the findings lower than if the research strategy is based 
on several instances of a phenomenon. And, in some ways, this is the case. It is 
not possible to glean from the findings, for example, whether spillover between 
policy windows is common or comment on the factors that make it more or less 
likely. It is also not possible to comment on the trends affecting interest group 
behaviour and strategy across policy areas or across policymaking venues. The 
findings do not allow the categorisation and comparison of the impact of 
scenario modelling in different policymaking settings or even the role that actors 
such as BUSINESSEUROPE play in other policy debates.  
Despite these issues, there are three reasons why a study based on a single 
case remains appropriate. First is that interest group behaviour and strategy is 
fairly well covered in the political science literature and general trends, such as 
the increasing prevalence of time-limited, ad hoc coalitions in EU advocacy, are 
well understood, as set out in Chapter 3. Secondly, as explained on page 87, 
abstract, context-independent knowledge is not necessarily more valuable than 
the context-specific knowledge created by an in-depth case study such as this 
one (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Thirdly and most importantly, the research question, 
inspired by the discipline of policy analysis, is itself highly context-specific. This 
thesis explicitly seeks to understand the role that interest groups played in a 
very particular change in EU policy - which is likely to have far-reaching 
implications for the low-carbon transition of Europe’s energy systems - and 
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makes its primary contribution to knowledge in this area. As a detailed empirical 
account, however, the thesis is also able to put forward findings with 
implications for general theories of the policy process, as set out above. 
The study employed the technique of process tracing to develop a detailed 
sequence of events in order to pick apart, to the greatest extent possible, the 
causal links between events. The technique proved extremely useful in 
following events from action to outcome in a range of factors that together 
influenced the policymaking agenda. From the available data, however, it was 
not possible to discern the relative influence of the various factors on the 
agenda. This is at least partly due to the large number of parallel and 
simultaneous processes, which characterise the EU policymaking process. 
Reflections on the use of the multiple streams approach 
The multiple streams approach (MSA) guided many of the decisions that 
shaped this thesis, as discussed in Chapter 2. Considering the conceptual 
application of MSA, two main shortcomings were anticipated: first the 
containment of interest group activity to the politics stream and second the 
inadequate specification of ‘policy entrepreneurs’. The steps taken to mitigate 
these problems are set out in Chapter 2 while the implications for the analysis 
and for MSA research and suggested modifications are discussed in Chapter 9. 
On balance, the decision to proceed with the MSA as the primary conceptual 
framework was based on that framework’s specific focus on changes that occur 
within the agenda-setting phase of the policy process. 
This earlier discussion, however, does not reflect on the more fundamental 
implications for the research of the decision to use the framework which 
undoubtedly influenced not only the data collected but also subsequent 
decisions about which data to emphasise, which to disregard and how to 
interpret them. To use an oft-cited metaphor, the conceptual framework or ‘lens’ 
through which the object is viewed may be seen as a ‘pair of spectacles’ and 
alternative lenses or changing the colour of the spectacles though which 
phenomena are viewed may allow for very different interpretations of events or 
seem, in fact, to show ‘alternative worlds’ (Smith, 2007, p.11). 
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As stated in Chapter 2, there are a number of candidate theories or approaches 
which could have been justifiably used to approach the research question, 
which may, if applied in place of MSA, have given rise to alternative findings or 
conclusions. The advocacy coalition framework (ACF), for example, places a 
greater emphasis than MSA on coalitions of likeminded actors (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993) which would not have necessitated the additional 
application of a network theory and may have produced findings that do not 
precisely mirror those reported here.  
Indeed, there is some evidence in the findings to support the assumptions of 
ACF – namely the challenge of maintaining the separation of the streams which 
MSA sees as entirely separate and ACF sees as fused. For example, when 
considering the ambiguous status of the EU-ETS which may be seen as a 
‘problem’ or a ‘policy’ and is discussed by actors in the policy community as 
both – the decision to place it in the problem stream in this analysis ultimately a 
pragmatic one. One could also argue that over a long enough time-horizon, the 
political stream responds to activity in the policy stream as the failure to address 
climate change through policy becomes more apparent. But, while critiquing the 
separation of the streams, we should not lose sight of the fact that, even if it 
represents an imperfect model of reality, the analytical benefits gained from the 
conceptual device of stream separation, particularly in a context in which a long-
established idea such as technology neutrality is so important, remains 
valuable. 
Similarly, other approaches that may have provided a successful, if alternative, 
piece of research is the punctuated equilibrium framework (PEF) which places 
importance on long periods of stability infrequently ‘punctuated’ by change 
(True et al., 1999) or more general theories of politics focussing on the role that 
ideas, discourse and institutions play in change such as ‘discursive 
institutionalism’ (DI) (Schmidt, 2008; 2010). 
While it has been argued that in many senses these frameworks or ‘lenses’ are 
often complementary (e.g. Meijerink, 2005), they a) feature some fundamental 
differences in opinion about how the world works and b) would almost certainly 
yield an account of the research topic which emphasises different 
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characteristics of the subject. While this is a non-trivial issue, and care should 
be taken when attempting to represent the findings of the research, there is no 
straightforward answer to which framework is the most appropriate in a given 
setting. Instead, one goal of political research could be said to be developing 
theoretical plurality through critical application of existing frameworks. This 
thesis, by testing and questioning some of the fundamental assumptions of the 
MSA and proposing revisions for the future contributes to that aim. 
Empirical choices 
As explained in section 2.4 on page 73, the study used a range of data sources 
including official documents, journalistic accounts and the transcripts of 32 élite 
interviews with policymakers, lobbyists, campaigners and observers. The 
challenge of obtaining and interpreting useful data is discussed below.  
As anticipated in Chapter 2 and discussed in section 7.4.1 on page 249, nearly 
all interview participants put forward an account in which not only were they 
largely successful, but that the strategies they employed were intrinsically 
superior to others’, a phenomenon sometimes knows as ‘expansiveness bias’ 
(Beyers et al., 2014). For individuals whose value to their employer is largely 
derived from intangible changes to the debate about energy policy, this kind of 
self-validation is understandable. Cases of direct impact on policy are rare and 
where they do occur they are essentially indemonstrable. It is also the case that 
lobbyists and other actors may seek to influence accounts of other actors’ 
participation in the policymaking process, such as the one reported here. For 
these reasons, the account provided in this researcher treats self-reports of 
success (such as successful policy entrepreneurship) with scepticism. In all 
cases, self-reports are triangulated against other evidence, especially 
independent accounts or evidence from other actors with little or no common 
interest. 
As discussed above, the relative influence on the agenda of the factors 
described in the findings is difficult to discern. By the same logic, there may 
exist factors which influenced the policymaking agenda that were, for some 
reason, invisible to the research. However, given the range of data sources 
used and the number of in-depth interviews conducted, it is felt that the 
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existence of significant factors which were not encountered during the research 
is unlikely. 
Comparison with alternative explanations of events 
As discussed in Chapter 1 (see page 31), at the time of writing relatively little 
literature has emerged which considers politics of the specific case of the EU 
2030 targets although an article reporting similar research was published by 
Bürgin (2015). The paper focusses on the impact of the internal dynamics of the 
European Commission rather than the activity of external actors on the GHG 
emissions target and the renewable energy target, but the conclusions make for 
an interesting comparison with this study. The first finding of the article is that 
the poor overall economic situation and the EU’s tarnished status as a leader on 
climate contributed to a climate target that was less ambitious than had been 
achieved in 2007 - roughly coherent with the findings of this study, especially 
those that stem from the analysis of the politics stream in Chapter 6.  
Bürgin’s article also concludes that energy Commissioner Günter Oettinger 
acted as a policy entrepreneur by forging a deal in the College of 
Commissioners. A key factor determining the results is said to be that Oettinger 
only agreed to an at least 40% GHG emissions target (he had previously 
argued in favour of a 35% target, as explained in section 5.4.1 on page 183) if 
other Commissioners could accept that the proposed renewable energy target 
was ‘non-binding’ on the member states (i.e. weaker). Overall, the article’s 
explanation of the outcome grants Oettinger exceptional agency over the level 
and nature of the targets and places his entrepreneurial skill at the centre of its 
explanation. While it is clear that the College meeting in the Berlaymont Building 
on the 22nd of January, 2014 was a heated debate about the proposals, the 
findings presented in this thesis offer a slightly different explanation. It is likely 
that both civil society and member state input also had a significant impact, 
reducing but not entirely discounting the agency that Oettinger was able to 
enjoy – his were certainly not the only entrepreneurial actions relevant to the 
targets package. 
Firstly, the debate leading up to the publication of the proposals in early 2014 
had seen a very strong movement in favour of a single target throughout 2013. 
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Although there were some appeals from member states to include a renewable 
energy target in the last days before the College met, overall the view was that 
a single emissions target was strongly supported by industry, business and 
even parts of the environmental community. Under these conditions, that the 
renewable energy target was weak is unsurprising. Secondly, the positions of 
the member states, most notably the UK, Germany and Poland were likely 
prominent in Oettinger, Barroso and Catherine Day’s discussion ahead of the 
College at which they put together the detail of the framework. The result was a 
compromised package that somewhat satisfied all of these interests.  
Comparison with other examples of civil society engagement with EU 
environmental policy 
An interesting comparison can also be made between accounts of one of the 
most heavily lobbied pieces of EU action on the environment, Regulation, 
Evaluation and Authorisation of Chemicals (REACH) which was debated among 
a community of policy specialists between 2003 and 2005. As set out in section 
3.7 on page 127, REACH is considered to be an important case study into how 
civil society actors engage with the EU environmental policy making process. 
Studies into the REACH debate conclude that ENGOs were a potent force in 
the discussions, especially in the agenda setting phase (Long and Loerinczi, 
2009; Greenwood, 2011). Reasons for this perceived success of NGOs in 
emboldening the Commission to take a strong position on chemicals regulation 
were given as the creation of novel coalitions, building alliances with other 
environmental groups and even businesses and commissioning the creation of 
new knowledge – strategies that are all visible in the agenda-setting process for 
the 2030 climate and energy framework. Business, on the other hand, was 
unable to act with the same dynamism, constricted as it was by competition 
between companies and rigid organisational structures. But, while the parallels 
between the agenda-setting process for REACH and that for the 2030 climate 
and energy framework is clear, the findings of this study points out some 
important differences. 
Firstly, the interest group environment in which the REACH proposals were 
debated was very different from those described in earlier chapters of this 
thesis. The financial crisis was still several years away and the political 
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populism that came to dominate the 2014 European elections was still on the 
fringes, as described in section 6.3. Secondly, the community was essentially 
polarised between industrial interests which wanted lower regulation of 
chemicals in the EU and environmentalists, consumers and some businesses 
that wanted greater oversight. The 2030 targets were more complex and volatile 
with differences of opinion about the ambition of the targets as well as their 
form. While it was fairly clear which side for an actor to take on REACH, some 
actors in the 2030 debate found themselves in ambiguous positions, especially 
around the single/multiple target question. Also, the discussion of the ETS 
reform process which muddied the waters also has no parallel in the REACH 
discussion. The creation of the FoETS coalition fits with the ENGO strategies 
identified by studies of REACH (although it was particularly ambitious) but in 
that context, the potential to undermine progress in an alternative policy window 
was not a risk.  
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Appendix 1: Research Interviews 
 
Interview Name Organisation Date of interview 
1 Clothilde Poplineau GDF Suez (now Engie) 16/04/15 
2 
Jonathan Gaventa and 
Louisa Casson 
E3G 09/04/15 
3 Senior official European Commission (SecGen) 20/11/15 
4 Parliamentarian European Parliament 07/05/15 
5 Alexandre Roesch Solar Power Europe 03/08/15 
6 Senior official 
European Commission 
(Commissioner Oettinger's 
Cabinet) 
10/07/15 
7 Official European Commission (SecGen) 21/10/15 
8 Jesse Scott Eurelectric 04/09/15 
9 Anders Marvik Statoil 25/02/15 
10 Senior official 
European Commission (DG 
Energy) 
21/09/15 
11 Dries Acke European Climate Foundation 02/07/15 
12 Adrian Joyce Euroace 26/08/15 
13 Jacopo Mocchia Ocean Energy Europe 15/04/15 
14 Belen Balanya Corporate Observatory Europe 08/09/15 
15 Margarida Bolzer BUSINESSEUROPE 14/04/15 
16 Noel Regan Eurogas 05/11/15 
17 Senior official 
European Commission (DG 
Energy) 
16/04/15 
18 Koen Noyens Eurelectric 17/04/15 
19 Mark Johnston European Policy Centre 06/11/15 
20 Robert Jan Jeekel ArcelorMittal 28/07/15 
21 Ulrich Bang Velux 10/04/15 
22 Tara Connelly Greenpeace 26/02/15 
23 Pierre Tardieu EWEA 24/04/15 
24 Alistair McGirr SSE 23/02/15 
25 Susan Shannon Royal Dutch Shell 24/02/15 
26 
Matthias Lauber and 
Corrina Grajezky 
RWE 12/01/16 
27 
Brian Ricketts and Mike 
Bostan 
Euracoal 12/01/16 
28 Senior official 
European Commission (DG 
Energy) 
12/01/16 
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29 Sandrine Dixon-Decleve 
Prince of Wales Corporate 
Leaders Group 
08/01/16 
30 Sanjeev Kumar Change Partnership 13/01/16 
31 Sarah DeBlock IETA 20/2/2015 
32 Brook Riley Friends of the Earth Europe 29/04/16 
 
  
 323 
Appendix 2: Comparing the ambition of the 2020 and 2030 targets 
Compared to the 202020 targets negotiated in 2007, which can be seen as an 
important step in the transition to a sustainable energy system (Kern et al., 
2014; Knopf et al., 2013), the 2030 targets were less ambitious. This appendix 
sets out the comparison of the three main elements of each package and shows 
that all three targets are easier for the EU to achieve, requiring less change and 
therefore represent a slowing the transition to a sustainable energy system. 
What is more, the structure of the 2030 targets relies less on encouraging 
specific sectoral change and more on a price delivered by the EU’s emissions 
trading mechanism, the EU-ETS, to encourage sustainable investment: an 
approach that is not only less compatible with the complex challenges of energy 
system transition, but also relies on an appropriately high price signal from the 
EU-ETS – something that has eluded EU climate policy since its inception in 
2005. 
GHG emissions target 
The greenhouse gas emissions target was designed to meet very specific aims. 
The EU had committed to reducing emissions by 80-95% by 2050 in 2009 
(European Council, 2009). DG Climate Action, one of the departments of the 
European civil service responsible for the 2030 targets, calculated in 2011 that, 
in order to reach the 80-95% goal, overall emissions would have to fall by 
between 40% and 44% compared to 1990 by ‘milestone’ year, 2030 (European 
Commission, 2011a).  Against this reckoning, the (at least) 40% target is the 
lowest of the reductions targets considered compatible with the overarching 
policy goal. 
It is also interesting to compare the rate of reductions implied by the 2030 target 
with the rate required to meet the 2020 target and the rate achieved. By 2007, 
when the 202020 GHG target was agreed, emissions were already down by 
nearly 8% and by 2014, the 2020 target had been exceeded and emissions 
reductions were down 22.95% compared to 1990, partly due to economic 
recession and partly due to lack of ambition. 
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Figure 55: GHG emissions have been falling since the reference year 1990 and the 2020 target was reached six 
years early (data source: Eurostat, 2014b; author’s own elaboration) 
When the policies designed to achieve the 2020 target were implemented 
between 2009 (renewable energy directive) and 2012 (energy efficiency 
directive and EU-ETS phase 385), the average rate of change needed to meet 
the target by 2020 was 0.94 percentage points per year (12.2 percentage points 
over 13 years). The rate achieved up to 2014 was more than twice as fast – an 
average of 2.16 percentage points per year (15.15 percentage points over 7 
years). 
In 2014, the European Commission expected that the EU would reduce 
emissions by 24.5% by 2020 (European Commission, 2014j). The implied 
average rate of reduction between 2020 and 2030, therefore, is 1.55 
percentage points per year (15.5 percentage points over 10 years). 
                                            
85 see page 133 in Chapter 4 for more detail on the phases of the EU-ETS 
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Interestingly, the 2030 target rate of reduction is precisely the average of the 
anticipated and actual rates of reduction since 2007. 
 
Figure 56: GHG emission reductions rate (source: author’s own elaboration) 
Energy efficiency 
Calculating and setting targets for energy savings is complex in the EU. Rather 
than measuring a net reduction in consumption, a projection of EU energy 
consumption is made, using the PRIMES86 energy model, which is used a 
baseline for the target. The 2020 target of a 20% savings was based on a 2007 
projection of 2020 consumption of 1,842 Mtoe/yr. For comparability, the 2030 
target of 27% energy savings is based on the same 2007 baseline which 
predicted that energy consumption would reach 1,874 Mtoe/yr by 2030. While a 
27% saving initially appears to be a broad continuation of the trajectory 
established by the 2020 targets, there are two reasons why this conclusion may 
not bear scrutiny. The first is that the modelling projections made in 2007 were 
produced before the recession affected Europe’s GDP, with a knock-on impact 
on energy demand. The second is that it also fails to account for policies 
designed to achieve the 2020 target such as 2012’s Energy Efficiency Directive. 
In 2013, the European Commission produced an updated projection which 
estimated 21% less primary energy consumption in 2030 than the 2007 
                                            
86 See box Box 4 on page 151 
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baseline projection. If the 2030 target is measured against a baseline derived 
from the 2013 projections, the 27% target appears greatly reduced at around 
16% of primary energy demand. 
 
 
Figure 57: Comparison of the 2030 energy efficiency target against alternative baselines (Source: author’s own 
elaboration. Data: European Commission, 2014c; European Commission, 2014g; European Commission, 2013b; 
European Commission, 2014f). 
 Renewable energy  
When the 2020 target was negotiated in 2007, the EU sourced approximately 
10% of its energy consumption from renewables. By 2014 this proportion had 
increased to 16%, a rate of change that would indicate that the 2020 and 2030 
targets of 20% and 27% respectively represented roughly equivalent ambition, 
as shown in Figure 58. 
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Figure 58: EU share of energy consumption from renewable sources (Source: authors own elaboration. Data: 
Eurostat code: nrg_ind_335a) 
By 2014, however, things had changed since the 2020 targets were decided in 
2007. For one thing, actual energy consumption had dropped by around 11%, 
as mentioned above, increasing the share of total consumption that a fixed 
proportion of renewables represented. Secondly, the projection of where energy 
consumption was heading had changed even more radically. EU energy 
consumption in 2030 was projected in 2013 to be 21% lower than was thought 
likely in 2007 meaning that, to match the ambition of the 202020 targets, the 
2030 framework would need to take this reduction in demand into consideration. 
The resulting 27% of EU energy consumption sourced from renewables was 
admitted by the Commission president to be low on ambition when he cited 
analysis which projected the likely outcome to be between 24 and 27% even in 
the absence of a target for renewables (European Commission, 2014h; de Vos 
et al., 2014).  
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